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START Treaty Does Not 'Fundamentally Change' U.S.-Soviet Rivalry

*HK0609022491 Beijing LIAOWANG in Chinese
No 32, 12 Aug 91 pp 44-45*

[“International Commentary” by Shu Lujia (2457 7627 0163): “New Development in Soviet-U.S. Relations”]

[Excerpts] U.S. President Bush held talks with Soviet President Gorbachev from 30 to 31 July in Moscow. Both sides discussed the question of arms control and some regional issues; signed the treaty on reducing offensive strategic weapons, which was reached as a result of nine-year-long marathon talks; and issued three joint statements—on the Middle East question, the situation in Yugoslavia, and the Central American issue—indicating the intention of the two countries to enhance cooperation and coordinate action on these issues. [passage omitted]

Both sides highly praised the summit. Bush said that the summit “marks the end of the long hostile period between the United States and the Soviet Union and the beginning of the establishment of a new partnership.” Gorbachev said that the summit “has further promoted Soviet-U.S. relations.” However, public opinion within and outside the Soviet Union pointed out that the new U.S.-Soviet partnership reflects the subtle relations which are not based on equality. The summit also indicates that there are a number of differences and problems between the United States and the Soviet Union and that they have not totally dispelled their suspicions and lack of confidence. The treaty on reducing strategic weapons is another achievement attained in arms control following the U.S.-Soviet intermediate missile treaty signed in 1987. The treaty stipulates that both sides will reduce their strategic weapons by 30 percent in the next seven years. Of course, this will be conducive to keeping the level of nuclear arms under control. However, even if the treaty is put into implementation, each side still has 6,000 nuclear warheads, more than enough to wipe out the other party. Moreover, the treaty does not have any restrictions on improving the quality of weapons. Therefore, the treaty has not fundamentally changed the situation of the United States and the Soviet Union, which are main military opponents. [passage omitted]

Diplomats Attend Biological Weapons Conference

*OW1109014491 Beijing Central People's Radio
Network in Mandarin 1600 GMT 10 Sep 91*

[From the “International News and Current Events” program]

[Text] A third conference of signatories to the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons opened in Geneva on 9 September. Government officials and disarmament experts from nearly 100 countries will

examine the implementation of the convention over the past five years and discuss how to improve or strengthen its validity.

(Garcia), conference chairman and Argentina's permanent representative to the UN Disarmament Conference, said at a press conference: Compared to when the convention was concluded 19 years ago, tremendous changes have taken place in the international situation. Questions concerning verification and trust-building measures have thus become increasingly important. Such questions will be the main topics to be discussed by those attending the third conference.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons was concluded in 1972 and became effective in 1975. It now has 115 signatories. China formally acceded to the convention in 1984.

According to Chinese diplomats attending the meeting, the Chinese Government favors in principle the establishment of an effective verification mechanism but is opposed to the indiscriminate use of verification measures.

Diplomat Views Biological Weapons, Technology

*OW1309093691 Beijing XINHUA in English
1354 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] Geneva, September 12 (XINHUA)—A Chinese diplomat said here Thursday that China strongly supported the ban on biological weapons and opposed their proliferation.

Hou Zhitong, China's ambassador for disarmament affairs, declared that China would stick to the policy of no development, no production and no stockpiling of biological weapons.

Hou was speaking at an international conference called to review the implementation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

Under the convention, signatories undertook to destroy existing stocks of biological weapons but there was no verification mechanism, leaving it open to violation.

China had seriously and comprehensively fulfilled its obligations to the convention, submitting annual reports to the United Nations containing information and materials related to the convention, he said.

Hou stressed that biotechnology had its positive uses which should be encouraged.

“It is China's consistent position to oppose the proliferation of biological weapons, but at the same time, we do not agree to any action aimed at restricting or hindering international cooperation and exchange in the peaceful uses of biotechnology,” he said.

To this end, he called on developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote trade and technological transfer to developing countries.

Hou also proposed measures to further strengthen the authority and effectiveness of the biological weapons convention including a drive to attract more signatories.

Moreover, existing confidence-building measures should be reinforced and in-depth studies should be conducted with a view to gradually resolving the issue of verification, he said.

Efforts to establish a verification mechanism should be guided by U.N guidelines on the issue, he added.

Pugwash Conference Views Danger of Nuclear War

*OW1909175491 Beijing XINHUA in English
1536 GMT 19 Sep 91*

[Text] Beijing, September 19 (XINHUA)—Scientists from both the East and the West today warned of the danger of nuclear war, and called for worldwide nuclear disarmament and further efforts to prevent nuclear war.

Joseph Rotblat, president of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which is being held here, said, "nuclear weapons are still there and no single nuclear warhead has yet been eliminated as a result of an international agreement."

"The danger of nuclear war is going down, but nuclear weapons and nuclear arsenals are increasing," he added.

Mr. Rotblat, aged 83, started work on the atom bomb in the first and second world wars and was a signatory of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955.

Ironically, he suggests he was perhaps the first person to help develop the concept of nuclear deterrence.

He said there are 50,000 nuclear warheads throughout the world, but "the main dangers come not from China but from the United States and the Soviet Union, because they have the largest nuclear arsenals."

He said he was happy about China's decision to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty since many people had worried China might intend to support nuclear proliferation in other countries.

Chinese physicist Chen Xueying noted that although the United States and the Soviet Union have originated the START treaty, the original goal of eliminating the first-strike capacity of the two sides has not yet been realized.

To promote nuclear disarmament scientists from the East and the West call on more people to discuss both the threat nuclear weapons pose to the world and possible means of preventing nuclear war.

Mikhail Milstein from the Soviet Union urged further efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban, noting that such tests damage the environment and do not contribute to nations' security.

Mr. Rotblat said that the efforts made by the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs in the past 30 years and more have helped prevent nuclear war by using scientific data to inform world leaders of the huge human and environmental costs of nuclear war.

Delegate at Pugwash Conference on Disarmament

*OW2209175891 Beijing XINHUA in English
1508 GMT 22 Sep 91*

[Text] Beijing, September 22 (XINHUA)—China cut one million military forces several years ago and now runs a quite low military expenditure, only five U.S. dollars per capita, far lower than that of Western developed countries, a Chinese official said here today.

Zhu Shanqing, vice-president of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, said at the 41st Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs that China has made concrete action in preserving world peace and disarmament.

Addressing more than 200 scientists from 20 countries and international organizations, he said, China's military expenditure is the lowest compared with that of big countries in the world. Not long ago, China announced that it decided in principle to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"The Chinese people are willing to join the efforts of all countries to seek world peace, security and development," he added.

He said that the theme of the conference—striving for world peace, security and development—reflects the common desire and great demand of all people in the world, including the Chinese people. The Chinese people attach great importance to peace and security in the process of development.

However turbulent the global situation is, he said, the Chinese people will be firm in socialist modernization drive.

Thus, he said, China needs a peaceful international environment. It will further develop relations with various countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence, enhance friendly cooperation with the Third World countries, and establish good-neighborly relations with its peripheral countries.

During the six-day conference, scientists and scholars from 20 countries, including Britain, China, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States, exchanged views on eight major topics such as world peace, regional security, disarmament and a nuclear free world.

Joseph Rotblat, chairman of the 41st Pugwash conference, called on scientists in the world to make an

important contribution to the elimination of a major cause of war and to world peace.

He said that the United Nations must play an increasingly important and marked role in the field. It must possess peace-keeping and peace-enforcing machines, and be able to exercise authority in a demonstrably independent manner, Rotblat added.

NORTH KOREA

Conference in Vienna Urges Korean NFZ

Conference Attendees, Resolutions Listed

SK0709052691 *Pyongyang KCNA in English*
0443 GMT 7 Sep 91

[Text] Pyongyang, September 7 (KCNA)—A Conference of European Political Parties and Organisations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone [NFZ] on the Korean Peninsula was held in Vienna on September 1.

The conference was attended by Peter Schieder, chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission of the parliament of the Republic of Austria, parliamentarian Willy Burgeon, member of the bureau of the Belgian Socialist Party and chairman of the Vallon District Committee, Heinz Stehr, co-chairman of the German Communist Party, Ingve Iversen, chairman of the Central Committee of the Norwegian Communist Party, and other figures of all walks of life from Europe.

Head of a delegation of the Workers' Party of Korea [WPK] Kim Hyong-u, vice-director of a department of the CC [Central Committee], WPK, and the DPRK ambassador to Austria were also present.

Former Greek general Georges Pattas, chairman of the West European Committee for the Reunification and Peace of Korea, made a keynote report and Kim Hyong-u, head of the WPK delegation, delivered a supplementary report.

Then speeches were made.

Letters to the great leader President Kim Il-song and the dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il were adopted at the conference.

Also adopted there were an appeal to the governments, parliaments, political parties and public organizations of all countries the world over and international organisations and a letter to the chairman of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

At the request of the honorary president of the World Peace Council, the conference decided to inform foreign government delegations to the U.N. General Assembly session and delegations to the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers' Conference this year of the proceeding of the current conference through relevant channels and appeal to them to express governmental support for the establishment of a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula.

"On the problem of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula," an information of the secretariat of the West European Committee for the Reunification and Peace of Korea, was adopted as an official document of the conference and it was decided to widely distribute it on various occasions in the future.

DPRK Delegate Reports

SK0709075091 *Pyongyang Korean Central*
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0000 GMT 7 Sep 91

[Supplementary report by Kim Hyong-u, head of the Workers' Party of Korea delegation to the Conference of European Political Parties and Public Organizations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula held on 1 September in Vienna, Austria—read by announcer]

[Text] The removal of the danger of nuclear war has now become a major concern for the world's peace-loving people as well as a pressing international political matter.

Realizing nuclear arms reduction and removing the nuclear threat is an urgent, irresistible matter of the present era that faces the world's progressive people, including the anti-nuclear peace force.

The danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula has not abated at all and it has taken on a more dangerous nature. As is widely known, the United States, assuming South Korea as its major military, strategic point in Asia and the Pacific, has been introducing nuclear weapons into it since 1957.

Today, the number of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea far exceeds 1,000. According to data made available so far, there are about 500 nuclear bombs, about 270 nuclear shells, about 290 missile warheads, about 60 neutron bombs, and about 500 nuclear back-packs.

Not only has the United States deployed such a vast number of nuclear weapons in South Korea, but it also is about to provoke a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula by using them, in fact, at any given time. Already during the Korean aggression war in 1950, the United States had arranged for aircraft carriers brought to the war front in Korea to carry warheads, attempting to use nuclear weapons.

The U.S. imperialists, who have turned South Korea into a nuclear forward base following the end of the Korean aggression war, have publicly declared on more than one occasion that they would use nuclear weapons in an emergency.

The outrageous words of the United States on the use of nuclear weapons as such are practically being translated into action through its nuclear war exercises. The "Team Spirit" joint military exercise that the United States has annually been conducting in South Korea with the means of nuclear attack deployed in South Korea and (nuclear-powered) aircraft carriers, nuclear strategic bombers, and nuclear attack aircraft of various descriptions, and nuclear missiles flown from the Pacific and the continental United States is the most dangerous nuclear war exercise.

Not only has the United States stubbornly refused to heed our Republic's proposal that it discontinue the "Team Spirit" joint military exercise, a nuclear war exercise, at least while the North-South high-level talks, which had been arranged after twists and turns, are under way, but it has also conducted the provocative exercise this year again and is about to continue it next year, too.

In fact, the means for nuclear attack in South Korea are constantly on a Class A alert so as to be mobilized and fired in an emergency. The situation on the Korean peninsula is becoming more complicated because the United States and the South Korean authorities, while babbling about our nonexistent nuclear facilities, are trying to force us to sign the nuclear safeguards accord and unilaterally accept nuclear inspection.

As is widely known, after putting forward consistent antinuclear peace lines, our Republic has been struggling for their realization. Our Republic has neither the intent nor the ability to develop nuclear weapons.

It stemmed from our lines of opposing nuclear weapons and particularly out of a desire to remove the nuclear danger hanging over the Korean peninsula by legally declaring our antinuclear lines that our Republic signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Even after our Republic signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the U.S. nuclear threat against us has increased further rather than decreased. The United States call on us to sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord and to agree to nuclear inspection while they continue their nuclear threat against us is ultimately the same as insisting that we surrender, with our own dignity and safety entrusted to them.

Nobody can comply with such arbitrariness and a high-handed manner if he has the least sense of value for national dignity. It is out of a desire to leave nuclear weapons deployed intact and to keep its policy of nuclear threat in place that the United States keeps babbling about our nonexistent nuclear facilities.

Driven by our antinuclear, non-nuclear lines, we have been manifesting our patience with a view to settling the question by way of removing the U.S. nuclear threat against us and signing the Nuclear Safeguards Accord.

Saying that the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea and its threat against our Republic with nuclear weapons has nothing to do with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that our Republic's not signing the Nuclear Safeguards Accord alone is an act of not fulfilling the duty specified by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, some countries insist that our Republic sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord regardless of the U.S. threat and blackmail.

Such assertions are neither justified nor fair. If and when these countries face direct nuclear threat coming from any nuclear powers, would they sit idle and do nothing about it?

If the non-nuclear countries still face nuclear threats posed by the nuclear powers even after becoming the signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, who would sign such a treaty and fulfill the duty spelled out in such a treaty?

Precisely because of this, the treaty has come into being on the condition that the nuclear powers declare that they would not threaten or attack the non-nuclear countries with nuclear weapons.

Even in the international meeting held last year in Geneva for the review of the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an absolute majority of the non-nuclear countries demanded that safeguards against the use of nuclear weapons be guaranteed, placing it on the table as one of the major issues for fulfilling the treaty.

This being the case, the U.S. act of threatening our Republic, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with nuclear weapons is a wanton violation of the principal ideals of this treaty as well as the conditions on which the treaty has been built. Also, that our Republic's demand that [the United States] reconsider it is a right our Republic is entitled to according to this treaty.

The principal ideals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and then the Nuclear Safeguards Accord are to remove the danger of nuclear war. Will the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula be removed simply because our Republic signs the Nuclear Safeguards Accord, while leaving U.S. nuclear weapons and the danger posed by them intact?

The danger of nuclear war hanging over the Korean peninsula stems from U.S. nuclear weapons and policy of nuclear threat.

This notwithstanding, the United States has put on us a variety of pressure in a bid to impose unilateral nuclear inspection on us and even tries to risk a military adventure.

If such a provocative move by the United States against our Republic leads to another war in Korea, it will escalate into a nuclear war. If and when this happens, not only our people, but also peoples in other Asian countries cannot be safe and it will have a serious impact on the cause of global peace.

To ease tensions on the Korean peninsula which is aggravating with each passing day and to remove the danger of nuclear war is a pressing matter that cannot be delayed for even a moment.

Considering the creation of a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula to be the only way of removing the

source of danger of nuclear war hanging over the Korean peninsula and Asia, we once again proposed on 10 June and again on 30 July that the United States and the South Korean authorities respond to a proposal on negotiations for realizing the creation of the nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula.

Our Republic's proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into nuclear-free, peace zone corresponds to the ideals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its regulations.

If and when the Korean peninsula is turned into a nuclear-free zone, our signing of the Nuclear Safeguards Accord as called for by the United States will be resolved automatically. So, it will be significant in reinforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Structure as well.

The United States brought nuclear weapons into South Korea during its stand-off with the Soviet Union. Now that U.S.-Soviet relations are moving toward detente and based on this the two sides are withdrawing and dismantling the nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and have agreed on a new nuclear arms control treaty, the creation of nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula has become a longstanding demand.

Even the youth, students, and broad range of the people in South Korea have risen up for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. Nobody can stop the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula unanimously desired by our people themselves.

The voices of solidarity from the people of the world constitute a valuable support and encouragement to the entire Korean population in the North and South.

I am convinced that the political parties and public organizations in Europe and the peace-loving European peoples will contribute, as a matter of course, to the cause of peace in Asia and the cause of peace in the world by more actively launching the movement of support and solidarity designed to hasten the creation of nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

Keynote Address Summarized

*SK0709155491 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1509 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, September 7 (KCNA)—Ex-Greek General Georges Pattas, chairman of the West European Committee for the Reunification and Peace of Korea, delivered a keynote report at the Conference of European Political Parties and Organisations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula which was held in Austria.

The reporter branded South Korea as the most dangerous nuclear magazine in the world.

He said:

The nuclear arms in South Korea are dangerous ones that have constant explosive possibility more than those in other regions and countries.

Particularly, after the Persian Gulf war, the U.S. policy of nuclear war in South Korea assumes more and more dangerous character.

The U.S. "120 day war plan" made public in April this year shows its intention to unleash another war on the Korean peninsula in which it will use even nuclear weapons.

The United States demands that the DPRK sign the Nuclear Safeguards Accord and accept nuclear inspection according to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is too unilateral a demand for a sovereign independent state to accept.

If the United States should demand a nuclear inspection of the DPRK, its nuclear arms in South Korea must undergo an inspection as well.

The reporter pointed out that the U.S. nuclear arms in South Korea are the root cause of threatening peace and security not only in Korea but in Asia and the world.

He continued:

Today the U.S.-Soviet relations are switched over from confrontation to detente and both sides do not regard each other as an "enemy". In such situation the United States persists in its opposition to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea. It is because it regards them as the means to realise its Asian domination.

The total explosive capacity of the nuclear arms in South Korea is 1,000 times the atomic bomb dropped in Hiroshima, Japan.

The real intention of the U.S. that has deployed more than 1,000 nuclear weapons in South Korea is to permanently seize South Korea as its nuclear forward base and realise its ambition threatening and blackmailing the northern half of the Korean peninsula and other Asian countries.

The reporter said that the denuclearisation is a realistic way for the removal of nuclear war danger on the Korean peninsula.

He went on to say:

The denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula will automatically settle the question of the DPRK's signature on the nuclear safeguards accord and nuclear inspection that the United States wants.

I think the world peace-loving forces are faced with the following tasks:

Firstly, they should vigorously arouse international public opinion, so that all the governments and the international organisations including the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency may make the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea and discontinue its nuclear blackmail policy on the Korean peninsula.

Secondly, they should stir up broad public opinion to demand the discontinuation of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war game which are annually held in South Korea and other large-scale military exercises.

Thirdly, they should launch an international campaign for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and urge the U.S. and South Korean authorities not to demand unilateral nuclear inspection against the DPRK but to immediately respond to its proposal of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Fourthly, they must raise international voices that the South Korean authorities may respond to the adoption of a nonaggression declaration between the North and the South, an effective way in guaranteeing security on the Korean peninsula.

Fifthly, they should demand that the U.S. turn out at the talks with the DPRK to change the Korean Armistice Agreement of 1953 into a peace agreement.

The reporter stressed that the broad international campaign to remove the danger of nuclear war and create a nuclear-free, peace zone on the Korean peninsula will certainly accelerate its denuclearisation.

Report on U.S. Nuclear Arms in ROK

*SK1009120791 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1002 GMT 10 Sep 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, September 10 (KCNA)—"On the Question of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", an information of the secretariat of the West European Committee for Reunification and Peace of Korea, was adopted as an official document at the Conference of European Political Parties and Organizations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula which was held in Vienna.

The information says that South Korea is the main stronghold for the execution of the U.S. policy of increased tension and nuclear war for world domination.

It cites facts to prove that South Korea has been reduced to the biggest nuclear base in the Far East.

The administration and military authorities of the United States have introduced nuclear weapons into South Korea, blaring that South Korea is a "theatre of operations vital" to executing the U.S. military strategy toward Asia.

Minutes No. 111 of the 125th regular session of the South Korean "National Assembly" in 1985 reveals that 1,720 nuclear weapons of various types were sited in South Korea at that time.

This figure is far more than the 1,000 odd pieces of nuclear weapons which was made public for the first time by a testimony at the congress by Ronald Dellums, member of the House of Representatives of the United States in May 1975 and proved in data by the U.S. Defence Information Center in September 1975 and Brookings Institution in January 1979.

It is an irrefutable fact proved by the authorities of the United States themselves that nuclear weapons were deployed in South Korea.

In June 1975, Schlesinger, defense secretary of the United States, informed a NATO defence ministers meeting of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea and, in February, 1976, William Les, superintendent general of the engineering division of the U.S. Army, openly confessed that the U.S. Army "modernized the nuclear declared facilities in South Korea at the cost of 364,000 dollars in fiscal 1976 alone." Weinberger hinted at deployment of new neutron bombs in South Korea in Feb. 1981, and Speakes, a former special assistant to President Reagan, confirmed that South Korea had turned into a nuclear base, in June 1990.

The white paper of the South Korean National Democratic Front (Hanminjon), issued on July 19 this year said that a general analysis of materials made public so far and reliable military information showed that the nuclear weapons of the U.S. troops in South Korea consisted of 504 nuclear bombs, 271 nuclear shells, 293 nuclear-tipped missiles, some 60 neutron bombs, 150 nuclear mines and 500 backpack nukes.

The total explosive power of the U.S. nuclear arms in South Korea at present is 13,000 kilotons, which is 1750 times that of the atomic bomb dropped in Hiroshima, Japan. Should they explode 260 million people would be killed.

The information says that the U.S. nuclear arms in South Korea is the source of threat to peace and security of peoples in Asia and the world.

The United States, in actuality, knocked into shape a "three-way military alliance of the United States, Japan and South Korea".

"Five-day war strategy", "nine-day short-term intensive attack strategy", "three-day nuclear war emergency plan" and so on made public in military magazines of the United States, are war plans envisaging the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.

Not only huge armed forces and latest conventional weapons but nuclear arms and nuclear-capable planes have been hurled into the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises which has been escalated from 1976 and these military exercises have reached a very dangerous phase.

Timed to coincide with the nuclear war exercises, the United States and South Korean military authorities are openly letting loose provocative war remarks against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea these days.

The strained situation on the Korean peninsula as it is today shows that they are gravely threatening peace and security not only in Korea but also in Asia and the world hourly.

It is as clear as noonday that if a war broke out on the Korean peninsula, it would turn into a nuclear war sweeping Asia and the rest of the world and no one can predict what a calamity it will bring to mankind, the information notes.

The withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea, it says, is an indispensable condition for peace and security in Asia.

Nuclear inspection on the Korean peninsula must not be unilateral but involve the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, the information points out, and continues:

A simultaneous international nuclear inspection of the two parts of Korea conforms to the principles of fairness and impartiality required by the treaty and it is the right of a nuclear-free state to demand a guarantee for its security under the treaty.

It is an unavoidable duty of the United States, a nuclear state and a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], to give up the nuclear threat upon the DPRK.

The United States must not insist on unilateral nuclear inspection of North Korea, but accept the international inspection of its nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea in compliance with the requirements of the NPT which it approved.

There can be no double discipline in the matter of nuclear inspection.

There are two options for the United States whether to accept international inspection of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea from the standpoint of nuclear disarmament and respond to the talks for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons or state in explicit terms that it is trying to block the independent development of the Asian countries, resorting to the policy of strength with nuclear weapons in a bid to establish its domination over Asia and the rest of the world.

Delegates' Letter to Kim Il-song

*SK0709045291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0425 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, September 7 (KCNA)—The great leader President Kim Il-song received a letter from the

conferees of the Conference of European Political Parties and Organisations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula which was held in Vienna, the capital city of Austria.

They have unanimously emphasized that the removal of nuclear war danger from the Korean peninsula is indispensably connected with peace and security of Asia and other parts of the world, and highly appreciated the efforts of the Workers' Party of Korea and the government of the DPRK to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

They have recognized that it is an unavoidable obligation for the United States, a nuclear state, to remove a nuclear menace against the DPRK in conformity with the U.N. Charter, the principle under international law and the spirit of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and, in return, it is a due right for the DPRK, a non-nuclear state, to demand the removal of the U.S. nuclear menace.

We assure you that we will actively conduct the international solidarity movement for the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and all sorts of nuclear weapons from South Korea and the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, the letter added.

Delegates Write to Kim Chong-il

*SK0709102791 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1003 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, September 7 (KCNA)—The dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il received a letter from the conferees of the Conference of European Political Parties and Organisations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula which was held in Vienna, Austria.

The message reads in part:

We, the participants, have expressed our great anxiety over the situation under which more than 1,000 nuclear weapons have been deployed and the "Team Spirit" and other large-scale nuclear rehearsals continue to be staged in South Korea, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula.

We, the participants, have unanimously stressed that the Korean peninsula should be turned into a nuclear-free zone at an earliest date in favour of peace and security in Korea and the other parts of Asia and the world, and extended our full support to the joint statement issued by the DPRK's political parties and social organisations to remove the danger of nuclear war from Korea.

We strongly hold that the U.S. deployment of a huge amount of nuclear weapons in South Korea and its continued nuclear threat against the DPRK, a non-nuclear state, can be justified with nothing and that the Korean people's claim and demand to stop such manoeuvres are quite natural.

We assure you that we will actively stage an international movement to withdraw the U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

U.S. Urged To Withdraw Arms From ROK

*SK0709105291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1012 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, September 7 (KCNA)—An appeal to the governments, parliaments, political parties and organisations of all countries and international organisations was adopted at the Conference of European Political Parties and Organisations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula which was held in Austria.

The appeal reads in part:

The U.S. has deployed more than 1,000 nuclear weapons in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and continuously stages large-scale nuclear war exercises, thus creating a nuclear threat. It is a great danger not only to the existence of the Korean people but also to peace and security of Asia and the world.

The situation on the Korean peninsula is becoming more complicated by the U.S. because it keeps its nuclear weapons in South Korea, pursuing policy of nuclear threat and forces the DPRK to sign the nuclear safeguards accord and undergo a unilateral "nuclear inspection."

Only when the Korean peninsula is denuclearised can the danger of nuclear war be removed.

It calls upon all governments, parliaments, political parties, organisations and international organisations to make energetic efforts to make the U.S. and South Korean authorities stop large-scale nuclear war exercises including the "Team Spirit", and get the U.S. withdraw, unconditionally and immediately, all its nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea.

It also calls upon them to do so to help hold without delay the negotiation for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula between the North and the South of Korea and the countries concerned, to make it possible to hold the tripartite talks between the North and South of Korea and the U.S., adopt a non-aggression declaration between the North and the South and sign a peace agreement between the DPRK and the U.S.

Letter to IAEA on U.S. Arms in ROK

*SK0709152291 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1503 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, September 7 (KCNA)—We hold that the principle of impartiality should be applied to the DPRK and the U.S. in their observing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, therefore, the DPRK's demand is reasonable.

This is said in the letter to the chairman of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency

[IAEA] which was adopted at the Conference of European Political Parties and Organisations for the Creation of a Nuclear-Free, Peace Zone on the Korean Peninsula. It goes on:

We think that the danger of nuclear war hanging over the Korean peninsula comes from the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and its policy of nuclear threat.

Recently the situation on the Korean peninsula is becoming more complex, when the U.S. is much fussy about the DPRK's "nuclear development capacity" and demands that it should sign the nuclear safeguards accord with the IAEA and undergo "nuclear inspection."

Some countries claim that the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea and its nuclear threat against the DPRK have nothing to do with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that the DPRK's refusal to sign the nuclear safeguards accord is a breach of its obligations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But they do not stand to reason.

We argue that in light of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States has an obligation to lay ban on its nuclear threat against the DPRK, a non-nuclear state, and the latter has a right to demand it of the former.

Even if the DPRK signs the nuclear safeguards accord, a question will arise whether a danger of nuclear war can be removed from the Korean peninsula while leaving intact the nuclear weapons in South Korea.

In this respect, we view that the U.S. and the South Korean authorities should immediately accept the proposal repeatedly put forward by the DPRK to denuclearise the Korean peninsula.

This will naturally lead to a firm establishment of a non-proliferation system on the Korean peninsula.

We hope that Your Excellency chairman will deal with a nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula in this direction, when it is to be discussed in IAEA meetings.

We believe that you will affirmatively respond to our stand and efforts for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, the letter adds.

Paper Calls for Denuclearization of Peninsula

*SK1409104691 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0959 GMT 14 Sep 91*

["NODONG SINMUN Calls For Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, September 14 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN in a by-lined article today calls for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Denuclearization on the Korean peninsula is an important way of preventing a nuclear holocaust on the Korean nation and the peoples of its neighbouring countries, the article says.

Noting that South Korea where more than 1,000 pieces of U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed is the most dangerous hotbed of nuclear war in the world and the situation here is getting all the more strained, it goes on:

If a nuclear war broke out on the Korean peninsula today, no country would be spared its scourge, we dare say.

Hence, no one can remain indifferent to the danger of nuclear war created on the Korean peninsula by the United States. To remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula is an important matter related to the destiny of our nation and of the peoples of its neighbouring countries.

Our proposals for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula are most reasonable ones to eliminate one of the most dangerous hotbeds of nuclear war in the world, ease the tensions in our country and make a substantial contribution to the cause of peace in Asia and the rest of the world. They make it possible to remove the danger of nuclear war and thus prevent it from being escalated to a planetwide thermo-nuclear war.

If the Korean peninsula is to be turned into a nuclear-free zone, the U.S. nuclear weapons must be withdrawn from South Korea. Durable peace in this region cannot be ensured otherwise.

BULGARIA

National Security Aide on Balkan Arms Control Meeting

*AU2009101691 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
16 Sep 91 pp 1, 6*

[Interview with General Stoyan Andreev, the Bulgarian president's adviser on national security questions, by Ivan Garelov on the Bulgarian Television "Panorama" program on 14 Sep]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Garelov] The second event is a conference held on the Greek island of Rhodes in which you participated. Who organized it?

[Andreev] It was organized by two institutions—the UN Disarmament Committee and the Greek National Faction for Research in the Interest of National Security. One particular problem emerged as the most important subject on the second day of the conference. I think that it was our presence that contributed to this. The Balkans are exposed to many dangers. The destructive factors that are currently leading to a new explosive situation are also numerous. However, one of the difficult, unresolved problems in this respect is the tremendous concentration of troops and heavy offensive weapons deployed on Turkish territory, which is particularly dense at our borders. Approximately 70 percent of the tanks and over 55 percent of the artillery, the Turkish missile installations, are directed against our border. This fact should by no means be underestimated. Naturally, we do not believe that Turkey intends to attack us. The concentration developed over the past 10-15 years, when the Warsaw Pact and NATO confronted each other at our borders. Because the Warsaw Pact no longer exists and now that Bulgaria severed all its former military commitments and our country considerably reduced its armaments, everything that suggests a certain image of potential threat is situated on the other side of our border. We should point out that all security measures in Europe today are aimed not only at preventing conflicts but also at eliminating all prerequisites for them. For this reason, we raised the subject, which immediately caused a very lively debate. However, we were surprised and pleased by the reaction of Professor Karaosmanoglu, the Turkish representative, the great and well-known military expert, who got up and said that he accepts our concern as justified and thinks that Turkey should start restructuring its military forces in the sense that the offensive weapons should withdraw to the interior of the country and mainly concentrate on its eastern border. I

would like to point out that, from a purely military point of view but also from the psychological aspect, this can be described as a great victory for our policy.

The professor is one of the Turkish president's advisers. He evidently is submitting the proposal with someone's official authorization. When I asked him whether I could announce his statement to all of the Bulgarian people, this being very important and good news for our entire population, he answered as follows: "Yes, you may do so. At the same time, we should adopt practical steps for the implementation of this idea." It means that the ice has been broken. The policy of drawing closer together with Turkey, which our government is currently doing, is finally opening broader and more favorable prospects for the future, provided it is accompanied by military detente and a diminishing threat of war.

HUNGARY

Assembly Ratifies Agreement on Conventional Arms

*LD1009083991 Budapest MTI in English 1850 GMT
9 Sep 91*

[Text] Budapest, September 9 (MTI)—The Hungarian parliament, at its plenary session today, unanimously ratified the Agreement on European Conventional Arms [CFE] signed in Paris in November 1990.

"With this agreement, the world sets out on the path of reducing military potentials, creating confidence between opposing sides by an exchange of information and the introduction of a system of on-the-spot supervision," said state secretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Tamas Katona, who submitted the draft.

"Under the conditions of the agreement," Katona continued, "the Soviet Union has reduced its armed forces in five categories. Other signatories of the agreement have also been compelled to take their neighbours' interests into account."

The MPs accepted a resolution integrating the New York Convention on Children's Rights into the Hungarian legal system.

Present at the plenary session was vice president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Gerhard Reddemann, currently in Budapest as head of a delegation.

The Hungarian parliament is to continue its plenary session tomorrow.

ARGENTINA

Agreement Prohibits Chemical, Biological Weapons

PY0509232891 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish
2139 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Text] Mendoza, 5 September (TELAM)—The Governments of Argentina, Chile, and Brazil expressed today their "full commitment" to cease to develop, produce, or purchase, directly or indirectly, chemical or biological weapons in order to "strengthen the security of all states" and "to consolidate the region as a peace zone."

Through the agreement called "Mendoza Declaration" the three governments expressed their "desire to contribute decisively to the success" of the third conference called to review the convention that prohibits biological weapons. They also expressed their desire "to study ways to strengthen the verification mechanisms."

They reaffirmed their "right to use all specific applications of chemistry and biology for economic and technological development and for the wellbeing of the people."

The "Mendoza Declaration" was signed by Foreign Ministers Guido di Tella of Argentina, Francisco Rezek of Brazil, and Enrique Silva Cimma of Chile during a ceremony at the Flag of the Andes Hall of Mendoza Government House.

The foreign ministers said that they are convinced that the application of the convention should create among the states "a framework of mutual confidence that will allow a substantial increase of international cooperation in the exchange of chemical substances, equipment, and related technologies."

The foreign ministers also expressed in the eight-point declaration their willingness "to closely cooperate" toward a multilateral convention that prohibits chemical weapons, and "to sign it as founding members."

They also expressed their willingness to establish in their respective countries "appropriate control mechanisms on substances defined as precursors for chemical war."

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar said that the signing of the "Mendoza Declaration" is "a concrete step" toward peace and international security. He emphasized the commitments made by the Argentine, Chilean, and Brazilian Governments "to strengthen international harmony and to create a better world."

He stated that along with the Tlatelolco Treaty the declaration signed today "will contribute to keep Latin America and the Caribbean free of weapons of mass destruction and will become an important measure to encourage confidence among the states of the region."

He said that the trilateral document "will give valuable impulse" to the current negotiations in Geneva and he expressed his hope that the declaration "will inspire similar actions in other regions and subregions of the world."

INDIA

U.S.-Soviet Resolution of Differences Over CFE Lauded

91WD0920A Madras INDIAN EXPRESS in English
4 Jun 91 p 8

[Editorial]

[Text] There will be much relief all over the world following the announcement that the US and the Soviet Union have resolved their differences over the implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty signed last November. The chances of the two mighty powers continuing to cooperate in overcoming a host of problems bequeathed by the cold war and in establishing a stable and peaceful world order have, for instance, greatly brightened. Moscow had given cause for grave doubts on this score soon after the initial euphoria generated by the far-reaching troops and weapons reduction measures embodied in the CFE Treaty had dissolved. The Soviets struck a jarring note by contending, in particular, that their naval infantry, or marines, were exempt from the treaty altogether. The Western powers flatly rejected this interpretation. They ascribed the apparent Soviet stonewalling on this and related issues to Mr Gorbachev's having come under tremendous pressure from the military hardliners for granting major concessions to the West on arms control and for being unable to keep the Soviet reformers led by Mr Boris Yeltsin at bay.

The first sign of the Kremlin's interest in ending this impasse came during the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General Moiseyev's visit to Washington in the last week of May. After a series of talks with American officials, he seemed willing to bring the Soviet naval infantry units under the limits set by the CFE accord provided the Western countries would agree to change the mix of active and stored weaponry permitted under the stipulated ceilings. How precisely the US-Soviet differences have now been resolved has not been revealed because Washington would first like to take its European allies into confidence about this. What is heartening is that the new US-Soviet understanding on arms control in Europe has made it easier for the two countries to go ahead and wrap up the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (relating to nuclear weapons). This indeed is why both sides are now optimistic about going ahead with the next Bush-Gorbachev meeting later this year. The desperate Soviet need for large-scale Western aid was an important factor in the Soviet retreat from a hardline on arms control, but it would be unwise to push Mr Gorbachev into further concessions without endangering his already tenuous hold on the domestic situation.

Foreign Secretary Backs Chemical Arms Pact With Pakistan

91WD1016A Calcutta THE SUNDAY STATESMAN
in English 16 Jun 91 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, 15 June—India is prepared to enter into a bilateral agreement with Pakistan on banning of chemical weapons, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Muchkund Dubey, said last night, reports PTI.

In an interview with Voice of America, Mr. Dubey said the question of chemical arms could be separated from the nuclear issue, since there was worldwide agreement that such weapons should be outlawed.

"In that context, I am prepared to reach an agreement with Pakistan on a bilateral or regional basis," the Foreign Secretary said.

The VOA quoted Western diplomats here as saying that Pakistan was either extremely close or had already acquired the chemical weapons capability.

These sources were quoted as saying that the United States had been involved in trilateral talks with Pakistan and India to try to get them to reach some kind of understanding on the chemical arms issue.

According to a report from Islamabad, Pakistan today reacted cautiously to India's proposal of entering into a bilateral agreement with Islamabad on imposing a ban on nuclear weapons.

"We will give our response in this regard after due consideration," the Pakistan Foreign Secretary, Mr. Shahryar M. Khan, told a Pakistani news agency.

The U.S. State Department today endorsed the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif's idea of involving the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan and India in regionalizing the issue of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, a report adds from Washington.

Our Special Representative in New Delhi adds: The BJP today criticized the Pressler Amendment, saying: "We reject any attempt by any foreign power to place restrictions on India's sovereign right to pursue its national goals defined by Indians themselves."

Mr. K.C. Pant, former Defence Minister, said today the Pressler Amendment was "likely to generate strong resentment in India because of the principles involved. It has the potential for negative influence on India-U.S. relations which so many people in both countries have carefully nurtured in recent years."

Pakistani Proposal for South Asia NFZ Viewed**Foreign Secretary Rejects Idea***91WD1015A Madras THE HINDU in English
25 Jun 91 p 11*

[Text] New Delhi, 24 June—Mr. Muchkund Dubey, Foreign Secretary, has said that New Delhi has not yet formally received the Pak. proposal for multilateral consultations on the Indo-Pak. nuclear issue. Speaking at a seminar organised by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), Mr. Dubey said that neither had the proposal, which was part of a speech delivered by the Pakistan Prime Minister at the National Defence College, Islamabad, spelt out the status of the United States, China and the Soviet Union in the negotiating body.

Clarifying India's stand on nuclear weapon free zone [NFZ] and non-proliferation issues, the Foreign Secretary said: "The global reach of weapons made it difficult to enhance security by neutralising a particular area."

Mr. Dubey said that arbitrarily defined areas proposed so far did not include any nuclear power, implying attempts to create a discriminatory global nuclear regime where the existing nuclear powers retain their nuclear weapons but the rest of the world was disarmed.

In fact, Mr. Dubey pointed out that the Non-Aligned Movement had rejected the negative security assurances as meaningless given the global reach of nuclear weapons.

Proposal Termed 'Commendable'*91WD1015B Madras INDIAN EXPRESS in English
11 Jun 91 p 8*

[Text] The proposal by the Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, for a conference between India, Pakistan, China, the United States and the Soviet Union to discuss the denuclearisation of South Asia seems to have caught New Delhi on the wrong foot. It is otherwise hard to explain the External Affairs Ministry spokesman's knee-jerk rejection of the move. In reiterating the Indian objection in familiar terms, no account has been taken of the substantial progress already made by the United States and the Soviet Union in reducing their own nuclear arsenals and in giving an impetus to nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere. This makes nonsense of earlier Indian policy statements which made serious discussion on agreed abjurement of nuclear weapons in South Asia conditional precisely on such progress towards global nuclear disarmament.

There is another, more pertinent reason why Mr. Sharif's commendable initiative should have evoked a positive Indian response. India has been particularly concerned over the Chinese possession of nuclear weapons. The implication is that China must be brought into any credible non-proliferation scheme for Asia. Not only has Mr. Sharif opened the way for such a denouement but Beijing, too, has lost no time in agreeing to attend the

proposed conference. What is more, the United States, too, has noted the Pakistani proposal as a positive development. The least the Indian Government can do is to express its willingness to give serious consideration to the Pakistani initiative. In effect what India has done, instead, is to proclaim an inexcusably rigid stand on the nuclear issue.

It has been gratuitously suggested in official quarters that Mr. Sharif's proposal is no more than a gimmick connected with the imminence of a high-level Pakistani team's visit to Washington to try and get the Pressler amendment sidestepped so that the suspended American military and economic aid can be resumed. What motivates Islamabad in its changed attitude is neither here nor there. What is called for is a readiness to judge the issue strictly on its merits. Do we after all want the rest of the world to take seriously our frequent calls for a world rid of the nuclear nightmare? There is still time to undo the damage done to India's reputation and interests by South Block's automatic rejection of Mr. Sharif's move. The Prime Minister, Mr. Chandra Shekhar, must take a close look at the whole issue de novo.

Considered Response Urged*91WD1015C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 29 Jun 91 p 14*

[Article by A.K. Damodaran, former member secretary of the policy planning committee in the ministry of external affairs]

[Text] The Pakistani proposal for five-nation nuclear talks on South Asia is a major development in regional diplomacy. The timing is not entirely coincidental. Vital discussions have taken place in Washington between Pakistan and the U.S. Government on future aid arrangements. The debates in the Congress on the nuclear status of Pakistan, and now derivatively India, were expected and it was intelligent, if self-serving diplomacy on Pakistan's part, to come out with this proposal to multilateralise a bilateral issue.

In doing so Pakistan can well argue that it is trying to meet India's oft-expressed demand for looking into the South Asian nuclear problems from the larger regional and continental angles. This means the association of China and the other two nuclear weapon powers with a large presence either in the continental landmass of Asia or in the two adjacent oceans. Some distinguished Indian strategic experts have, during the last five years, suggested a regional agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons between India, Pakistan, China and the major powers. Mr. Nawab Sharif's new proposal is, perhaps, influenced to some extent by these ideas in a rather distant manner, even though the immediate motivation may be to get out of the aid problem in the U.S. Congress.

Redefine Position

On the strictly bilateral nature of the India-Pakistan nuclear issue, India has a good enough case. We have projected this all these years with some success to global audiences. But the world is changing, and it may be necessary for us to redefine our position. Since the Gulf War there has been an unconscious acknowledgement that nuclear proliferation, while important and even vital, is not the only issue in the global disarmament programme. Chemical and biological weapons are equally important specially when non-nuclear weapon states are involved in a desperate conflict. From this point of view India's latest diplomatic initiative in the area is significant.

The foreign secretary's specific announcement that we are prepared to discuss chemical disarmament with Pakistan and other concerned countries is a major step forward. Hopefully it would also provide a sensible precedent for the new government in Delhi to take a second look at the Pakistani proposal.

Nuclear initiatives in different parts of the world have been put forward by the United States or, in some cases, the Soviet Union. Both in the Korean peninsula and in the Arab-Israeli confrontation there are faint glimmers of negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons. There has also been a positive movement forward in sorting out bilaterally the specific nuclear problem between Argentina and Brazil.

There is no doubt that the main momentum for all this is coming from Washington. There is also no doubt that there is definitely a self-serving element in the American agenda of selective horizontal proliferation. While this is true, it is necessary for us to note that we really do not have an alternate constituency to turn to if there is a serious enough difference of opinion between us and the United States. The Soviet Union is more than willing to go along with America on this issue. France's decision to join the NPT can be dismissed as a token gesture when considered against the background of the continuing tests in the Pacific, but it is an indication of the pressures on all countries, big and small. China has slowly come round to accepting publicly the need for restraint in arms sales to West Asia. It is a fluid enough situation in which each actor in the drama is trying his best to protect vital interests while intoning the right *mantras*.

Bilateral Issues

This would mean that we should take the Pakistanis at their word. There is no harm at all in our discussing our bilateral issues in a multilateral context. Our refusal to engage in a dialogue would be self-defeating even though we have every reason to be suspicious of the small print in the Pakistani proposal. Our constituency in the United States is, perhaps, the most important external one we have to keep on cultivating. Even at the best of the times, long before Mr. Gorbachov came on the scene, we did not really have much serious support from Moscow because its commitment to non-proliferation

was never in doubt. Today, realism demands that we should go to the conference table and be prepared to discuss matters not only of general policy but also details.

We will have to consider the unavoidable question of the physical verification and confidence-building measures. Verification is the essence of any arms control agreement.

India has a rather impressive record of sensitivity and involvement in this regard. The six-nation initiative came out at its most innovative moment with detailed suggestions for adequate verification measures between the nuclear weapon powers. At the UN disarmament conference of 1988, Rajiv Gandhi's time-bound programme for total denuclearisation of the planet by the year 2010 contained specific references to threshold weapon powers and the need for a "no first use" agreement between all countries.

Throughout the last decade, India has been insisting upon both the "no first use" agreement and also a convention declaring the use of nuclear weapons as a crime against humanity. We would be only further developing our well-known policy formulation in this regard by demanding the application of both these principles in the India-Pakistan context with adequate external guarantees.

In the purely bilateral area our mutual relations are so strained now, in so many sectors, that any little improvement anywhere should be welcome. That does not, of course, mean that Kashmir and Punjab will go away. It does, however, mean that both countries will have to learn the rules of a new game in which lack of responsiveness to the oddest diplomatic initiatives from the other side will be exaggerated out of all proportion to one's own disadvantage.

We have a strong case on the question of both global nuclear non-proliferation and on our various bilateral differences with Pakistan. By going to the conference suggested by the Pakistani Prime Minister for his own purposes, we would not be really sacrificing any of our declared interests. When we go there, we should have our own seriously thought out alternative proposal. We need not accept any demands based on moral or legal discrimination.

Major Actor

There is one overriding argument in favour of involving China along with Pakistan in such a conference. The Chinese have, upto now, been a major actor in the South Asian drama without taking any responsibility. They have had the best of many worlds. We have quite successfully embarked on a bilateral dialogue with China on our problems with that country. A multilateral discussion with them is too valuable an opportunity to be missed.

It is important for us to present a responsible cooperative image on fractious questions at this particular time when the great powers are inclined to be impatient. In 1985 we lost the diplomatic chess game to Zia-ul-Haq whose proposals gave an impression of sweet reasonableness without giving away anything. Our response, then, was too quick, too defensive and petulant. Our case is much stronger than our diplomacy suggests. This time also we have nothing to lose and a great deal to gain by going to this round table. We may, just about, manage to salvage an agreement acceptable to both India and Pakistan simply because the great powers are reaching a position of nuclear-unanimity.

START Agreement Should Affect Indian Stand

91WD1061A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
inEnglish 20 Jul 91 p 9

[Text] In contrast with the world-wide euphoria over the U.S.-Soviet treaty of 1987, eliminating their intermediate range nuclear missiles, the first-ever accord on cutting back the far more deadly intercontinental ones, reached in London on Thursday, has barely made the headlines. This is because the change in the international environment stemming from the cold war has made a nuclear conflict so much more unlikely that the arsenals now seem to pose much less of a threat to the survival of mankind. There is also the fact that the 25-30 per cent reduction now agreed upon will still leave both with enough warheads and bombs to destroy planet earth many times over. Moreover, the nine years of extremely difficult negotiations that have brought about this limited advance has made further progress unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. As Soviet foreign minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh told the Soviet Press Agency Novosti, this may possibly be the last treaty of its kind. Even so, it is unquestionably a landmark event because it signifies that the two superpowers, bitter adversaries till yesterday, are now sure of their technological ability to prevent cheating by each other. In the final analysis, this is a confidence building measure which complements and reinforces the rapprochement between the two that has transformed the global climate.

Though New Delhi today is too distraught to take note of even momentous developments of this kind, it should in fact be rejoicing that a major step has been taken towards the goals that Rajiv Gandhi outlined on India's behalf in mid-1988 for a nuclear-free world by 2010. The journey ahead is still long but it will be churlish to ignore that a beginning has now been made. In recognition of this, India needs to pursue the proposals it put on the table for collateral steps by other nuclear powers, as well as near-nuclear ones like itself. To argue that the rest must wait until superpowers' arsenals have been cut much further will in truth be an evasion of the duty that humanity collectively bears for ensuring its own survival. There is no mistaking the worldwide concern over the danger of nuclear proliferation, as brought out by the action being taken under UN auspices to destroy Iraq's clandestine facilities and by the five-power consultations

in Paris earlier this month to restrain the spread of horror weapons. India will be doing itself a disservice if it continues to take the maximalist position that any progress on checking horizontal proliferation must wait until the vertical one is adequately addressed. With a start having been made on the latter, India needs to demonstrate its sense of responsibility by putting forward imaginative proposals for a safer world.

Editorials on START Treaty Signing

Drawbacks Noted

91WC0165A New Delhi PATRIOT in English 3 Aug 91
p 4

[Text] 'Big Power Asymmetry'

Although, given the prevailing camaraderie between the two super powers in recent years, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) had become something of an inevitability. The signing of the treaty of 31 July in Moscow was an important event, though it did not quite succeed in exorcising the incubus of great power nuclear arsenals haunting humankind. The vastly changed international strategic milieu from the time when two antagonists were compelled by the mutual balance of terror to moot the idea of strategic arms reduction and to end the suicidal n-weapon race has in no way detracted from the relevance of the treaty. For it is the capability of making war that holds the key to disarmament. In that sense, START marks a step forward. The Soviets and America not only agreed to cut their nuclear arsenals by 30 per cent but also work towards preventing its further proliferation. The treaty also provides for verification. Several lacunae, however, remain. Doubts are being expressed whether the long period taken for the treaty to materialise has not only rendered political contention between super powers a thing of the past but that some of the weapon systems slated to be eliminated have also become obsolete. In that sense the treaty is seen as something of an anti-climax after a decade of intense negotiations. Besides, START inspections are likely to be a difficult affair. Since long range missiles are still allowed, it would entail counting them rather than checking that none exist. There would also be the highly technical problem of counting the several warheads each missile carries. Above all, the treaty suffers from a serious drawback in that it does not preclude modernisation of nuclear weapons programme under its purview. So effectively, even while scaling down military confrontation, the signatories or one of the Big Two powers could continue developing new and more sophisticated weapons. That apart, there was the question of whether the treaty was not essentially an unequal one. There is strong pressure, as a reaction to the denial of free expressions in the past, in the Soviet republics in favour of closer political and economic ties with the West. President Mikhail Gorbachev has tried to give this trend a constructive turn. He has had to concede important concessions to the U.S. The exclusion of sea launched cruise missiles from the purview of the treaty seems to be

one such instance of the Soviet Union giving in to the persistent U.S. demands. In fact, while giving up the Soviet Union's principal strength, which is in land-based ballistic missiles, President Gorbachev appeared to have allowed the U.S. to keep its own advantages in bombers and cruise missiles. Given the fact that Soviet weaknesses rather than its strengths have been United States' chief preoccupation in recent times, the latter's superior bargaining position cannot be denied. Indeed, the most fundamental question looming in American calculations even as President George Bush landed in Moscow was whether U.S. interests would be better served by a unified Soviet Union or a group of smaller states built from its 15 republics. It is in this context that the political message emanating from the summit is equally significant. Despite President Bush's warnings on Cuba and the Baltic republics, his response to Russian President Boris Yeltsin seemed to suggest that the U.S. preferred a largely intact Soviet Union in which economic powers would be more widely dispersed but foreign policy and nuclear weapons would continue to remain under a unified central command.

Anti-Proliferation Campaign Urged

*91WC0165 Secunderabad DECCAN CHRONICLE
in English 2 Aug 91 p 4*

[Text] 'A Historic Accord'

Dispelling five decades of corrosive mutual mistrust, the two superpowers have at last agreed to bury the nuclear hatchet. Peace-loving people the world over were all praise for the Soviet President Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, and his U.S. counterpart, Mr. George Bush, when they signed the historic Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to cut down their nuclear arsenals by about 30 percent. This will be the first real cut in the long-range nuclear weapons of the superpowers to destroy each other. The fact that the cut falls short of the 50 per cent envisaged by the superpowers earlier does not detract from the historic importance of the Treaty. Last year, the two superpowers Presidents met in Washington and committed their governments to reducing their nuclear arsenals substantially and agreed on destroying 80 percent of their vast chemical weapons stocks in a time-bound programme. Later, the two leaders blazed another trail by joining European leaders in signing a treaty to cut conventional forces in Europe. That step did push the cold war deeper into history. It is no exaggeration to say that international relations, particularly those between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, have in recent years undergone a sea-change. A nuclear war between the two has now virtually been ruled out. Indeed, when the superpowers agreed, at the 1985 Geneva summit, that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," the world, which had been for many decades on the brink of a nuclear holocaust, heaved a sigh of relief. Much of the credit for the dramatic restructuring of international relations should go to Mr. Gorbachev. His policy of glasnost has blown away the cobwebs from global relations. Reason has replaced blind adherence to ideology,

the democratisation of the Soviet polity has inevitably had a beneficial impact on world affairs.

The two superpowers are now irrevocably committed to freeing the world from the threat of a nuclear war. They are believed to be working to create an insurmountable barrier to other countries acquiring nuclear and missile technology. There are some countries which are known to be making nuclear weapons secretly. The degree of commitment to nuclear non-proliferation varies from country to country. This is why the late Rajiv Gandhi, while addressing the U.N. special session on disarmament in 1988, suggested a three-stage time bound action plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the next two decades. A beginning has now been made by the two superpowers. There is need to strengthen the movement for non-proliferation of nuclear and missile technology. As nuclear weapons tend to make the world into a single theatre of war, the superpowers should prevail upon the other nuclear powers, especially China, to follow in their footsteps. Only then could the world be rid of the nuclear threat.

The balance of terror between the two superpowers is now replaced by an equilibrium of confidence. As Mr. Bush said after the signing ceremony in Moscow, the U.S. has to be on guard against renegades. There are many powers, including the U.S., which believe in nuclear deterrence. This is but natural in view of the nuclear proliferation. The solution to the problem lies in a proposal embodied in the Delhi Declaration signed by the late Rajiv Gandhi and Mr. Gorbachev in 1988. The Declaration proposed an international convention banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Only such a bold step could lead to a world free of nuclear weapons. The goal seems distant. But a beginning could be made immediately. Progress towards the goal depends upon the sincerity of the nuclear powers.

IRAQ

Iraqi at Biological Arms Session Urges Ban

*JN1309135591 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1249 GMT
13 Sep 91*

[Text] Geneva, 13 September (INA)—Iraq has stressed the importance of all nations signing the agreement banning the use, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and providing for their destruction. It also called for all countries, without exception, to be bound by the system of verification provided for in the agreement.

The remarks were made by Dr. 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Qadi, Iraq's chief delegate to the third review conference of the signatories of the agreement, which opened in Geneva last Monday and is due to wind up on 27 September.

He underscored the need to stay away from double standards in the application of the agreement, and warned that such an approach would undermine the

agreement and international credibility. It would also upset the international balance and reflect negatively on global stability and security.

It is vital that there be no distinction between weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, or biological, he added.

Dr. al-Qadi urged the international community to apply a single standard so that inspection teams would check on the possession of biological weapons and pursue effective procedures to monitor compliance with the agreement and the peaceful use of biological technology.

Refuting allegations from the Senegalese representative of Iraqi breaches of the agreement, the Iraqi delegate declared that Iraq has not been shown to have been guilty of a single violation during the Atlantic-Zionist [as received] aggression. If anything, he noted, it was the United States and its allies that used internationally banned weapons against Iraqi forces, and he cited napalm and phosphoric bombs.

In a rebuttal to a similar charge from the U.S. delegation, the Iraqi representative cited Iraq's cooperation with the biological inspection team during its visit to Iraq on 2 August, 1991. Iraq provided all the clarifications sought by the UN team to supplement the information it had supplied through correspondence, Dr. al-Qadi noted.

On the level of cooperation Iraq extended to the UN inspection team, he cited remarks made 2 August by the UN secretary general regarding its mission in Iraq. The UN chief quoted the head of the inspection team as saying that Iraqi authorities had shown excellent cooperation with the team.

Iraq had given legal shape to its position by placing the document bearing its signature to the agreement banning the use and stockpiling of biological weaponry. [sentence as received]

The Iraqi representative reiterated Iraq's unconditional commitment to the provisions of the Geneva Protocol banning the use in war of choking, poisonous, or other such gases in bacteriological warfare, signed in Geneva in 1925, and which the Zionist entity continues to refuse to sign or ratify, although it enjoys an observer status at the proceedings of the conference.

LIBYA

Geneva Review Conference on 1972 BW Convention Viewed

*LD1009103491 Tripoli JANA in English 0823 GMT
10 Sep 91*

[Text] Tripoli, al-Fatih [September] 10 (JANA)—News agencies reported that delegates from 17 states started a

meeting in Geneva yesterday to look into the international agreement on germ warfare [BW] signed in 1972.

World news agencies reported that the meeting, which will last for three weeks, was aimed at finding the best means to ban the production, development and stockpiling of germ-warfare [weapons].

JANA's political editor commented on the holding of such meeting by saying:

Great Jamahariyah had called in the past, and is always calling, for the need to get rid of weapons of mass destruction all over the world. The most recent call from Great Jamahariyah in this respect came from colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi, the leader of the revolution, in the speech he gave on the occasion of the arrival of the Great Manmade River's waters.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi announced in front of delegates from more than a third of the world's states who attended the celebration of that occasion saying: "The policy of fleets, the policy of starvation and the policy of terrorism cannot build the future of the world because the future of the world is built by peace, built by liberty, equality, and respect amongst the sons of the nations on earth—this [words indistinct] the future of the world and building civilization."

The political editor went on to say: Great Jamahiriya's calls for getting rid of weapons of total destruction were for the nations of the world to get rid of the states of terror created by such because Great Jamahiriya absolutely believes that this world must be dominated by peace based upon justice and equality. It is driven in that by its basic principles represented in the grand green document of human rights and in its just project in calling for direct democracy which was mentioned in the Green Book...

The editor added: The basic ingredients from which the belief of Great Jamahiriya stems to remove and end the weapons of mass destruction and saving the nations of the world from its catastrophes are firm and unchanging ingredients which cannot be contradicted because such ingredients constitute a civilised humane doctrine for Great Jamahiriya.

The editor concluded his commentary by saying: According to such vision, any speaker talking about removing all weapons of mass destruction must believe in the need for applying international laws and legislations to all the world's states in a balanced way without favouring anyone, without turning a blind eye towards one side or another, because that will confirm the principle of mutual respect and becomes a civilised line which denounces race discrimination attitudes.

GENERAL

Lobov, Velikhov on Nuclear Arms Security
91WC0161A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 31 Aug 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by V. Ostrovskiy: "Should We Be Worried About the USSR's Nuclear Weapons?"]

[Text] The Western mass media have repeatedly brought up the following problem: Who will get the nuclear weapons in the event of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how many new nuclear states will arise in place of the USSR? Undoubtedly this problem could become the subject of debate and reflection of idle people on a hypothetical level. But we should ask the Western mass media who has informed them that the president of the USSR has stopped being the commander in chief of the country's Armed Forces and where they learned that he has lost control over the country's nuclear potential.

How do General of the Army V. Lobov, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and Academician Ye. Velikhov, leader of the USSR's thermonuclear program and USSR people's deputy, see this problem?

General of the Army Vladimir Lobov, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces:

Nuclear missile weapons in our country are under the strictest and most rigorous control. It is part and parcel of the very system of administration of these weapons.

The security of nuclear warheads during storage, transportation, and existence on alert status is guaranteed by a multistep system of control which consists not only of technical but also of biophysical principles. The process of oversight is such, said General Lobov, that a chain of controlling elements functions at each state of the upkeep of a nuclear weapon. The control mechanism is such an integral part that it absolutely excludes any possibility of any kind of mistake. The chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces categorically rejected any possibility of nuclear blackmail in the event of the theft of the codes.

Both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are reliably controlled by the appropriate services of the USSR Armed Forces. General V. Lobov said that the Soviet military command authorities understand all the depth of the anxiety of the international community at the problem of the condition of the nuclear potential and the reliability of its control by the state. We have received requests by scholars to examine this problem, said the general. I believe that a discussion of this problem by Soviet scholars may serve as a new impulse first and foremost for halting the nuclear tests of the United States and the USSR, which may lead to a halt in the development of new nuclear weapons systems. Such a step by both powers could contribute to a decline in the numbers of nuclear arms in the world.

Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov, leader of the USSR's thermonuclear program and USSR people's deputy:

In order to discuss and examine the aforementioned problem we need a high degree of trust in the attitudes of those people who will be charged with the practical embodiment of such an idea.

The very process of administration of nuclear weapons requires secrecy, and it would be intolerable to go completely public on this issue. However, it is necessary that a study of this problem be conducted, but in such a way that such a study would provide the necessary guarantees and would lead to a concrete result. The people appointed to it should have the trust of the people. The academician presumes that the best variant would be to create a special committee for these questions and not to postpone such a project indefinitely. Yevgeniy Velikhov noted that control over the project should be assigned to the USSR Supreme Soviet and that it should involve a broad circle of deputies, and not just members of the parliament.

In the opinion of the academician, inasmuch as nuclear weapons are connected with the international obligations of our country, all proposals should be carefully studied, as should the procedure itself of administration (and control) of the nuclear weapons, in order to absolutely know to what degree the procedure is guaranteed or not guaranteed against any accidents.

Edward Teller, the American scholar and nuclear scientist, expressed approximately the same point of view in a 23 August 1991 letter to Ye. Velikhov. He writes that he believes the question of the reliability of control over nuclear weapons should be discussed in the Soviet Union and the results of such a discussion should be accessible.

In our turn we can only add that premature alarm concerning the possible partition of nuclear weapons among the republics cannot have any serious foundation.

Nuclear Weapons Control Mechanisms Discussed

91WC0167A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian Sep 91 p 2

[Article by Academician V. Goldanskiy, people's deputy of the USSR: "In Whose Hands Is the Nuclear Button?: A Large Part of the USSR Nuclear Forces Is Located in the Territory of Russia"]

[Text] The three days in August "that shook the world" now belong to the past. But the West has not yet recovered from the shock that occurred when the "nuclear button" was in the hands of the conspirators.

At a meeting of Soviet and American scientists in Washington in April 1990, the exchange of reports on measures being undertaken in both countries for this purpose was one of the main points on the agenda. It thereby turned out that many such measures in both of our countries are surprisingly similar. For example, after

three unsuccessful attempts to select a code to unblock a given nuclear warhead, its nuclear explosion becomes altogether impossible—even if a subsequent code is correct. True, this does not at all mean that the atomic bomb turns into a harmless toy. It is still possible that there will be a chemical explosion of the substance surrounding the nuclear charge and the dispersion in the air of very fine particles of alpha—radioactive and extremely toxic plutonium.

One can imagine the alarm experienced by all of humanity when after the coerced isolation of M.S. Gorbachev all three “safeguards” of the network of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms (normally kept with the president, minister of defense, and chief of the General Staff) were essentially in the same criminal hands. The alarm was all the greater on account of the fact that—according to American information—a system was developed in the USSR at the beginning of the 1980's that makes it possible for the top leadership of the country and armed forces to by-pass a lengthy chain of intermediate links and to launch live missiles by direct command from the “highest level.”

This time, fortunately, no irreparable harm was done. According to the information that has appeared in our press, people were able to block the possibility of a command for an attack with strategic nuclear forces not just in one (which would have been sufficient) but even in two of the three notorious “little suitcases.” This was done on 18 August by Gorbachev's receiving party—officers of the GRU—prior to the confiscation of his “little suitcase.” And on 21 August, Yazov's receiving party was able to do this when they remained behind at Vnukovo-2 Airport after Yazov's departure for the Crimea to see Gorbachev (which he, by the way, had no right to do without his receiving party). All that took place is, of course, a colossal lesson for the future.

The republics are unanimously striving for independence and in this connection the question arises of what will become of the nuclear forces of the USSR when the republics gain this independence, if in so doing several nuclear superpowers arise in place of one. Look how the nuclear facilities are now distributed in the republics (this information comes from the English journal *ECONOMIST*):

Facility	Russia	Ukraine	Kazakhstan	Belorussia	Lithuania
Nuclear power stations	13	6	1		1
Nuclear weapons plants	2				
Bomber bases	5	1	1	2	
Missile bases	13	2	2		
Bases for submarines and surface ships	5				
Antiballistic missile bases	2				

Thus, the lion's share goes to Russia but much remains for the others. We say that there are two missile bases in the Ukraine. In reality, this means 200 SS-19 intercontinental missiles each with a force of one megaton.

The union leadership and the Joint Military Command must take over the command and control of the nuclear forces. A very proper and balanced decision was made by the Ukraine, which declared that it is becoming a nuclear-free zone. This is an extremely important step in the direction of the reduction of the nuclear danger and think that it would be most reasonable for Belorussia and Kazakhstan to undertake similar steps.

‘Options’ for Nuclear Weapons Examined

PM0509103191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 91 p 2

[Andrey Krayniy article under the “Forecast” rubric: “It Seems That We Will Bring Not Only the Peaceful Atom But Also the Atom Bomb into Every Apartment”]

[Text] Our all-Soviet coquetry can rest assured. We are once again the center of the planet's attention. Earnest politicians, inclining their gray-haired, well-groomed heads toward one another, are pondering how to persuade us not to disintegrate. But can you really persuade us! Freedom! Everything was nobody's—but now it will be ours! Remember: “Those who were nothing...”

And everything would be all right if it were not for the superpower's superweapons, if it were not for what was created by the whole country's exertion, and now the country, as it divides itself up, wants to share out nuclear arms too. Of course, it is tempting: There was a republic—but with an atom bomb, oh, it's a nuclear power! And if a dispute arises with some camp, then... Precisely, what then? And what, in general, is it proposed to share out? First let us agree on the terminology.

So, the Soviet Union possesses strategic nuclear arms. These weapons consist of their own nuclear ammunition and delivery vehicles. Namely: ICBM's with a range of up to 10,000 km and SLBM's; there were intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (approximately 3,000 km), but the USSR and the United States have reduced them, and now France alone is left with them; and, finally, strategic aircraft (mainly bombers) armed with free-fall bombs, shorter-range nuclear means (up to 600 km), and cruise missiles (over 600 km). Five states in the world possess such weapons—the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Britain, and China. They are all permanent members of the UN Security Council. Israel, Pakistan, and Iraq are close to possessing nuclear weapons, and guesses alone—do they have weapons already or not yet?—make the world turn cold.

But, in addition to strategic nuclear weapons, there are also tactical ones. These include tactical and operational-tactical missiles, nuclear artillery, and also air-launched tactical nuclear weapons.

The enumeration alone of this whole arsenal is impressive, is it not? But on whose territory is it all?

Strategic offensive arms are based in four union republics—Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. As regards tactical nuclear weapons, it is easier to list where there are none. There are none in the Transcaucasus, the Baltic region, or (something that not many people know yet) in Moldova. Nor are there any outside the Union's present borders, whereas there used to be. In the GDR.

This is the disposition. Now let us try to examine the options.

What will happen if the center is no more, and the republics possess nuclear weapons?

First, the club of nuclear powers will at least double in size de facto, because de jure such a proposal will hardly get through the UN Security Council. The spread of the "combat atom" is fraught. The threat to world peace is directly proportional to the number of nuclear powers.

Second, everyone in the world seems to have decided already that there are too many nuclear weapons on this planet. It is necessary to hold talks on their radical reduction. Such talks were held for almost nine years between the USSR and the United States on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, and that was between just two states! There are only five of them in the world, and these five have never yet been able to sit around a negotiating table. But what if there are 10 of them? Then, in the opinion of Lieutenant General Fedor Ladygin, a leading specialist in the USSR Armed Forces, agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons will be made extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The security of the weapons proper also must not be forgotten. Measures that would render impossible their unsanctioned use and accidents. For this it is necessary to have a system to ensure nuclear security, a system to control and manage these weapons. But the present union republics simply cannot afford it.

Incidentally, in order to be certain of the reliability of a ballistic missile, it (I exaggerate) must constantly be checked. Nuclear tests are needed on the sites. Where will the Ukraine locate them? In the Crimea? In the Donbass?

There is also the problem of training service personnel, the problem of improving nuclear weapons, etc.

Second option.

What will happen if the center is no more, but there is a Security Council or a Federation Council?

In this case the weapons remain at the center, as it were. Strategic offensive arms are the same for all, and everything is fine, but there is one question: Who, after all, is in charge of the parade? Who is holding the notorious "black suitcase"? Or are there nine suitcases? Or 11? The NATO option comes to mind. In order to use nuclear weapons there, it is necessary to achieve a consensus of all the NATO member countries, including nonnuclear

ones. Thank God, a consensus has not been required throughout the past years, there was no need. But if there had been? I have already had occasion to speak about the approach time of missiles from the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea. They take between seven and nine minutes to reach our territory. I venture to assure you that West Europe has no more time than that. Of course, in the event of nuclear war commencing, the NATO countries will not have time to consult each other and the decision will be adopted by those that have weapons at hand. But if, instead of the president as the symbol of statehood and the supreme commander in chief, we elect some council (the first word in the proposed combination has no significance now), who will take on the difficult job of making the decision? Having before our eyes the experience accumulated by us of holding congresses and sessions, there is no need to answer.

What will happen if the Union of Sovereign States is led by the center?

And it will be. Obviously, the republic states delegate some powers to it, and these will certainly include the leadership of strategic offensive arms. Units and subunits of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy will be directly within these states with the status of "deployment troops [voyska prebyvaniya]." As our Western Group of Forces is now in Germany. And provision will be made in the treaty between the center and the republics for all the questions that might arise. Then all will receive their own (theoretical!) piece of the nuclear pie, and they will be able to assert themselves at sessions of the [USSR] Security Council, where the development strategy will be determined not only for strategic offensive arms but also for the common Armed Forces.

There are more questions than answers. In fact, we do not yet have any professionals in this sphere, for no one even thought that such questions might ever arise. But no one assumed that Russia's historical flag would fly over the Kremlin, did they?

It is necessary to think together, but, in my opinion, it is clear what we must do: Nuclear weapons must be in one pair of hands. Well, in actual fact, the only thing we have been doing all together for 74 years is frighten the world. The community has only just breathed a sigh of relief: "At last they have democracy." But we are again starting up a quarrel with underhand pushing, huffing and puffing, and quiet, constrained exclamations: "Who do you think you are!" in the lobby of the civilized world.

Of course, many of us (we do not even suspect how many!) are deeply nostalgic for the superpower. For this thought would console us during the hardest minutes. Nuclear parity accounted for the shortage of the most vital things, and our hearts, despite the meager food, swelled with legitimate pride—but then we make mistakes. Of course, it is sad to part with the thought that you live in the greatest and v-very strong country. True, I too am sad. But, after all, a great country is not the one that

has more missiles... Missiles mean prowess and titanic labor, but then there is something higher than prowess.

...It is also sad to part. Be that as it may: We have gotten used to one other or, at least, accustomed to one another. Maybe, in constructing a communal apartment, we will not drag in after ourselves our common bombs? Maybe we will sit down on the threshold, on the path, and will think a bit?

Defense Minister Shaposhnikov Cited on Arms Issues

Nuclear Arms Under Control

LD0509124491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1149 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Text] Moscow, 5 September (TASS)—“Nuclear weapons are under reliable control. Even in the days of the coup they were not accessible to anyone. At the present time control over them has been stepped up hundreds of times. Please reassure the world public.”

These are the words of Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, USSR Minister of Defense, at a news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents accredited to the extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies. He said: Irrespective of the structure the country might have, the Army will remain unified and undivided. The USSR Minister of Defense acquainted all the heads of the republics who were at the Congress with his conception for the armed forces in the new conditions. An accord has been reached on the delegations from the republics coming to Moscow—after this conception has been studied—to work out a final solution. Regarding the call-up for the Army, the Air Force marshal said the General Staff is now formulating conditions for a mixed principle for staffing the Soviet Army. While the USSR Constitution is valid the protection of the fatherland is the sacred duty of each Soviet person, so call-up to the ranks of the Soviet Army remains compulsory for all, except students. The length of service will be somewhat reduced. After a military special skill has been acquired at a training unit, service on a contract basis will start. Its duration will be three to five years, and it will be on a salary basis.

Great changes are planned in the Army's economic activity, and effective use is to be made of its technical potential in the interests of the country's national economy.

Answering a question about the fate of the Warsaw Pact, the country's defense minister stressed that after this military organization disbanded, there was a sharp change in NATO's profile. “If we could manage to find confidence-building measures with Germany, the United States, and other countries, we can build our relations with NATO on the same basis,” Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said.

Nuclear Testing, Further Arms Cuts

LD2009184691 Moscow TASS in English 1613 GMT 20 Sep 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Oleg Moskovskiy, Sergey Nikishov, and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Excerpts] Moscow, September 20 (TASS)—Banning party from the Army, reforming the Soviet Armed Forces and tackling the personnel issue were raised at a news conference in Moscow today by Soviet Defence Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. [passage omitted]

Replying to journalists' questions, the defence minister reaffirmed the Soviet leadership's course towards the total termination of nuclear testing.

“We are opposed to nuclear testing and call on all other nuclear powers to adopt a similar stand,” Shaposhnikov said.

On prospects of testing nuclear weapons in Novaya Zemlya, Shaposhnikov said that “this will depend on the other side.”

In addition to that, Shaposhnikov said, the USSR is ready for other steps on reducing strategic offensive armaments. In his view, it is time to start negotiations on the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, which would reduce the risk of the unsanctioned use of nuclear systems. [passage omitted]

Journalists wanted to know if the USSR maintained nuclear weapons on German territory. Shaposhnikov said that not a single Soviet-made nuclear or chemical warhead remained on German territory. The same applies to the Baltics.

Commenting on the issue of the Soviet troops withdrawal from the Baltic states, Shaposhnikov expressed the view that the pull-out could start on the basis of inter-state agreements after 1994.

Before 1994, the USSR will continue to withdraw its troops from East European countries.

The minister expressed the hope that the Baltic states will display the same understanding to pull-out issues as Germany by providing necessary assistance. [passage omitted]

The minister said there are plans to reduce spending on arms purchases. On the whole, he opposed the idea of slashing the budget in order to resolve social issues and reducing expenditures for military research and development.

Asked about the Soviet Armed Forces' potential adversary, Shaposhnikov replied, “I do not see potential adversaries at present, but a military threat has not been entirely eliminated since there remain large groupings of armed forces, some leaders have aggressive aspirations, and the solution of some political problems by force has not been ruled out.

"As long as this situation remains, we should maintain our Armed Forces at proper level."

Speaking about relations between the centre and the republics on issues related to the functioning of the Armed Forces, the minister expressed the view that "since we live in a single economic space and will probably live in a single military-political and strategic space and use single air space, we will eventually work out a common position."

At the same time Shaposhnikov did not rule out the possibility of establishing republican armed units, like a national guard.

On nuclear arms control, Shaposhnikov remarked that "irrespective of the republics' line of conduct, it should be controlled by the centre, but the republic presidents should know what weapons are located on their territory and how they are being used."

Shaposhnikov favoured establishing a defence council that would include "representatives of the republics on the territory of which there are nuclear weapons." [passage omitted]

High-ranking NATO representatives whom the Soviet minister met recently expressed "understanding and support" for military reform plans in the USSR, he said.

"I think that the NATO leadership is already reacting to some extent to our declarations and our aspirations. There are positive steps on reducing armaments and armed forces in Europe and on the territory of the United States."

Military Writer on Post-Union Nuclear Arms Control Mechanisms

PM0909164991 Moscow IAN Press Release in English (undated)

[Article by Vitaliy Pogrebenkov, IAN military writer: "Who Will Have His Finger on the Button?"]

[Text] The two interrelated problems—the signing of the Union treaty and the abortive coup attempt in the Soviet Union—have once again raised the vitally important issue of Soviet nuclear weapons. First, what will become of the almost 30,000 nuclear warheads once some or other version of the Union treaty is signed? Secondly, in the event of another coup attempt, wouldn't nuclear weapons fall into the hands of criminals capable of plunging the world into the nightmare of nuclear war?

Before the coup attempt, we could speak, with a greater or lesser degree of certainty, of a federal character of the future union. But no longer. The coup intensified centrifugal trends, tipping the balance of opinion in favour of a confederation. This trend seems predominant to me, and if it comes to fruition, any future union of independent states will have to decide exactly what kind of relationships—political, economic, and military—should exist between its members.

As far as the military aspect is concerned, I think an alliance patterned on the Warsaw Pact could be formed. Russia might be cast into the kind of role which the Soviet Union once played in the Warsaw Pact, while the armies of the constituent republics would act as allied forces. The status and functions of such armies would mean that the full burden of responsibility for strategic defence would lie with Russia, including the deployment of nuclear forces and relevant support services.

Today the country's nuclear forces are based in three republics—Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The Ukraine has declared itself a nuclear-free zone, meaning that it can demand that nuclear arms be removed from its territory. Kazakhstan provides nuclear testing grounds at Semipalatinsk, where, as the new defence minister, Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has said, the two or three underground nuclear tests planned for this year will not take place. Furthermore, as I was told at the USSR Defence Ministry, today no one of the union republics claims the right to possess nuclear weapons—neither strategic nor tactical. This leaves Russia, potentially the only republic with nuclear capability. So, even if the union breaks up into sovereign nation-states, it's unlikely that the number of nuclear powers in the world will increase.

This monopoly on nuclear arms puts paid [as received] to the fear of divided control over the nuclear push button. At the same time, it saddles Russia with many problems, as it will have to move these weapons to its territory and to provide protection and maintenance, let alone arms manufacture and manpower training. It is not ruled out that some republics, primarily those which will have nuclear weapons withdrawal from their territory, might be expected to share the financial burden of the whole exercise. Then again, other republics might also finance Russia's strategic nuclear forces, regarding their contribution as rent for the nuclear umbrella, which, unfortunately, will be necessary for a long time yet.

This brings us to the question of the presidential "nuclear briefcase" and the malefactors. Of course, the way this thing works is a national secret, so we have to generalise and speak figuratively.

Let us assume that this briefcase falls into the hands of criminals. They open it, push the fatal button and—nothing happens. A malfunction? No.

The fact is that strategic nuclear forces constitute a complex system which is not simple to use. Take the time factor, for one. Before a nuclear missile can be actually and effectively launched, it has to go through various stages of combat readiness. Normally, this process depends on incoming intelligence data and requires some time for operational checks.

But even if the nuclear forces were on red status, criminals with the briefcase would still be unable to bring them into action, as this requires several keys. To get an idea of how they work, let us imagine a safe-deposit box

which can be opened, say, with three different keys in a certain order and by different people. The final, and most important, key is made as purely personal to prevent counterfeiting. For example, as is the case in other countries, it can react to a voice of a certain timbre or to the retina of the eye of the holder.

Finally, let us imagine a scenario where a nuclear missile blasted off without sanction. Such an unauthorised launch is practically ruled out, but should anything like this happen, then a multiply duplicated self-destruct system would do its job.

As for the technical aspect, a fine-tuned and dependable nuclear safety mechanism is in place. Problems appear to lie in other areas, notably: legal (the right to disobey criminal orders), ethical (moral responsibility for the use of the most deadly weapon), and military (how such weapons should be used, particularly in the light of a doctrine of defence).

Even if Russia's dependable hand were to be in sole control of the nuclear arsenal, nuclear safety must be assured by other means—by scrapping all nuclear arms in the world.

Reports on Baker Sep Visit to Moscow

Meets With Foreign Minister Pankin

LD1109170791 Moscow TASS in English 1505 GMT 11 Sep 91

[Excerpts] Moscow, September 11 (TASS)—In accordance with a preliminary agreement, Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin held a working meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker here today. Baker has arrived in Moscow in connection with the opening of the Moscow meeting of the Conference on Human Dimension within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). [passage omitted].

Baker and Pankin examined the present state and prospects for the interaction between the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

The Soviet side reiterated its firm intention to unconditionally honour the Soviet Union's obligations under agreements it has signed or recognised, including in the field of arms reduction and disarmament.

They considered aspects of the negotiations on reducing arms, including short-range nuclear weapons, and the resumption of wide-scale negotiations on nuclear testing. [passage omitted]

The conversation took place in an atmosphere of openness and mutual understanding. Pankin and Baker reached agreement on further contacts, including their meeting at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly Session.

Discusses Arms Control With Yeltsin

LD1109171991 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 11 Sep 91

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Yuriy Kozmin]

[Excerpt] Moscow, September 11 (TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday met U.S. Secretary of State James Baker at the house of Russian Soviets in Moscow.

Yeltsin told journalists that during the two-hour talk, he and Baker discussed 20 issues, including principles of a new Union, "relations between the centre and new sovereign republics", as well as the signing of a new Union treaty.

Yeltsin said they focused on "the implementation of joint programmes during the crisis transitional period and technological and humanitarian aid".

Both leaders also touched upon "Soviet-U.S. and Russian-U.S. relations from the point of view of reducing nuclear, strategic, tactical and conventional weapons, as well as carrying out reforms in the army".

Speaking of strategic nuclear arms control, Yeltsin said "to make not only Americans but the whole world believe that only the centre, only one person can control them in the country," was the key issue at the talks.

"Strategic nuclear weapons will be controlled from the centre, from one point in the Soviet Union and none of the republics will have access to arms control," Yeltsin said. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Assures Baker on Nuclear Weapons

LD1109213491 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 11 Sep 91

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with James Baker today. The protocol measures, which are usually arranged literally to the minute, on this occasion were discussed for over three hours. During that time, Baker and Yeltsin discussed 20 questions of mutual interest. These included the destiny of the future Union and mutual relations between the republics, the implementation of joint economic and cultural programs, and the subject of technical and humanitarian aid to Russia and the Union, which has perhaps become a tradition. A great deal of attention focused on arms reduction, particularly nuclear weapons.

After statements by the republics about their nuclear-free status, Russia will be the only one on whose territory nuclear weapons will be deployed. What will their destiny be? From where and how will control over them be implemented? Boris Yeltsin replied to these and other questions at an improvised news conference that took place immediately after the talks.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] The monitoring of strategic nuclear armaments will proceed, as it has proceeded, from the center, from the one point; that is, the Union. No republic has or will have access to control these weapons. A guarantee, so to speak, has been given to the secretary of state and to the American people that in this respect they can be reassured. These weapons will not end up in the hands of anyone else in the world. [end recording]

Risk to Arms Treaties' Continuity Assessed

PM1209100491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Sep 91 Union Edition p 5

[Candidate of Juridical Sciences B. Tuzmukhamedov article: "The Future of the Union and Disarmament Treaties"]

[Text] The loyalty to the USSR's international commitments enshrined in Point 5 of the resolution of the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies is encouraging, but needs weighty arguments to back it up. The references to the law which constantly emanate from our as yet unbuilt rule-of-law state do not constitute such arguments.

In jurisprudence there exists the institution of succession [pravopreyemstvo] (as distinct from the "continuity" ["pravopreyemstvennost"] mentioned in Point 4 of that same document), that is, the transfer of rights and duties from one entity to another. The specific sphere of international law contains a whole range of norms regulating succession in the event of division, secession, unification, and so forth, when the former state (predecessor) is replaced on the map sometimes by several new states (successors), and moreover the original entity may not itself disappear. There is no need to point out that this means resolving—often far from painlessly—a great many problems: border and territorial problems, economic problems, property problems, humanitarian problems, ecological problems—the list could be continued. Some experience in settling these problems exists. Is that experience appropriate, and will it be used sensibly, to regulate the process of succession in the conditions of such a vast and paradoxical formation as the Soviet Union?

I will not venture to talk about all aspects of the transfer of international rights and duties from the USSR to its successors. I would like to share my concern about the fate of the Soviet Union's treaty commitments under arms limitation and reduction agreements, both those already in force and those that have been signed but have not yet come into force.

Take the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which for more than 20 years has been fairly successful in helping to prevent the growth of the "nuclear club." I am convinced of the sincerity of statements by the leaders of a number of republics on their intention to declare their territories to be nuclear-free zones; the tragedy of Chernobyl and Semipalatinsk

lies behind these statements. True, it is disturbing that Russia is still a nuclear stockpile, and in the worst case, which has not yet been ruled out, a nuclear target. But, first, these declarations need to be given proper legal form, including, obviously, guarantees from the nuclear neighbor, and, second, they require time and considerable expenditure to put them into practice.

However, intentions alone are not enough for the law, and in the period between the declaration and its implementation—the completion of the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of a state that rejects them—grounds may arise for raising the question of the violation of basic commitments under the said treaty. It transpires that until the removal of the warheads, that same Ukraine whose status, from the treaty's point of view, is different from when it was part of a unitary union, will exercise indirect control over nuclear weapons. Concern is deepened by the vagueness of terms like "transfer of jurisdiction" ["perepodchineniye"] and "dual jurisdiction" which are sometimes used with regard to contingents of the Union Armed Forces deployed in the republics' territories. From the viewpoint of the letter and spirit of the Nonproliferation Treaty, there could be a mixed reaction to the creation of the "special structures" that B. Yeltsin spoke about, which, in the absence of details, creates the impression of dual—centralized and Russian—control of nuclear weapons within Russia.

Yet the conference at which the future fate of the treaty will be decided is not so very far away, and cracks in the treaty's foundations could make that fate uncertain to say the least.

Remember the debates that flared up in the middle of the last decade over the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. At least it has hitherto been possible to save it. But now?

For instance, the treaty permits the sides after 1972 to deploy strategic missile attack warning radars only on the periphery of national territory and oriented outward. Until recently the periphery was, for instance, the Baltic coast, where, according to some of "their" information, there are such facilities. What are we to do? Conclude agreements with the former union republics on leasing parcels of territory on condition that the equipment installed there is used specifically for its designated purpose? Or spend incredible sums on dismantling it and rebuilding it elsewhere?

In fact the first option cannot be ruled out. After all, the Americans have such systems in Greenland and Britain, built prior to 1972 but subsequently modernized. At first glance our case is simpler. But what will be the view of those for whom even this conventional use of the term "periphery" is an insult, and for whom the idea of any kind of military cooperation with "another state" is hardly likely to be acceptable?

At the same time warning radars play an important stabilizing role in a world that is still too full of nuclear

weapons, and the Americans themselves have, I believe, an interest in the uninterrupted functioning of our radars.

The multilateral Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation and Reduction [START] have not yet come into force. What will happen now as regards their ratification?

A number of military districts within the limits of the region in the territory of the Soviet Union to which the first of these treaties applies, for which various specific total quantities of arms subject to limitation are stipulated, are located in the territory of the Ukraine, Moldova, and other republics. These total quantities form part of the agreed balance and can hardly be redistributed by means of simple division among the successor states.

The republics' declared intention, which is already being implemented, to create national troop formations gives grounds for raising the question of violation—by the Union which signed the treaty—of the international legal commitment not to deprive the treaty of its purpose prior to its entry into force. Furthermore, on signing this agreement the participants took on a commitment not to increase personnel strength during the period of further talks. Will the creation of territorial forces not come into conflict with this commitment?

What are we to do? Send the treaty back to the negotiating table, thereby calling into question not only this document, but its successor, which it was proposed to submit for signing at the CSCE conference in 1992, and therefore the entire military-political section of the all-European process?

And what lies in store for the START Treaty, which had such a difficult birth? Facilities in the territories of Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine are due to be covered by this treaty's operation. These are missile operating bases, storage facilities, and enterprises for the production of strategic offensive arms. If the declared intention of certain republic leaders to remove nuclear weapons from their territory is, in spite of everything, put into practice without delay, then not only will it mean the collapse of the carefully measured correlation between systems subject to reduction and those that are retained, but the structure of our strategic forces which has grown up over the years will be jeopardized. What price the treaty then?

What I have said is a pessimistic scenario for the development of events, a scenario that includes possibly fatal consequences for disarmament talks—whether current, planned, or possible in future.

But obviously I am laying it on too thick and wasting ink, since the organs for the transitional period will doubtless start up the well-oiled mechanism for the uninterrupted safeguarding of international rights and duties during this period of uncertainty. And this wise mechanism will

strengthen and maybe create an integrated structure for coordinating and ensuring compliance with international-legal commitments in the disarmament sphere. And the competent intellectuals who control this mechanism will cherish the enormous collective experience and knowledge of the diplomats and negotiators. And the energetic new actors on the foreign policy stage will not try to take the whole game on themselves, perplexing their partners and causing confusion in the established order of interstate behavior. And the partners, in turn, will tactfully accept the multiple unity of the new union.

And references to the law will cease to be a mere tactic in parliamentary rhetoric...

Kazakhstan Rejects RSFSR 'Control' of Nuclear Arms

LD1509134991 Moscow TASS in English 1332 GMT 15 Sep 91

[Excerpt] Tokyo, September 15 (TASS)—President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan said in an interview with the Japanese newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN that the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan would form the nucleus of the future Union of Sovereign States but that does not mean that it is possible to agree to Russia's control over all nuclear weapons. Its transportation alone will cost hundreds of millions of roubles.

In this connection Nazarbayev favoured cuts in the Soviet nuclear stocks down to a reasonable threshold and said the nuclear arsenal should be placed under control of a special committee under the State Council. [passage omitted]

Velikhov Discusses Nuclear Safety, Arms Control

AU1609163791 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 16 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and President Gorbachev's adviser, by an unidentified DIE PRESSE correspondent in Moscow on 10 September: "The Soviet Union Has Lost Its Claim as a Superpower"]

[Text] Yevgeniy Velikhov is the vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Since the beginning of perestroika, he has been an adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev. As one of the leading nuclear scientists of the Soviet Union, he supervised the measures after the nuclear accident of Chernobyl. Velikhov publicly supported Andrey Sakharov's rehabilitation. The following interview was given in Moscow on 10 September.

[DIE PRESSE] Last week, the new Soviet defense minister stated that nuclear weapons will be under safe control when the Soviet Union disintegrates into several sovereign states. Did this statement convince you, as perhaps the top nuclear scientist of the country?

[Velikhov] No, it did not. And I also do not believe that the heads of state and scientists of the West were

convinced by it. The defense minister did not say what went wrong or right, what must remain secret and what not, or what his proposal for the future would be.

It is like in the Chernobyl case. Before Chernobyl, a public investigation of the safety of nuclear reactors had not been carried out. Then came the nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, I called for an investigation of the safe control of our nuclear weapons at three levels: the internal, secret level; the public level of the Supreme Soviet; and the level of the international community. An investigation must supply enough information to guarantee that our weapons are under sufficient control.

[DIE PRESSE] What exactly do you propose?

[Velikhov] I propose discussions in several stages, to achieve a real guarantee for the safe control of Soviet nuclear potential. The first part of my proposal contains an internal investigation on the management, control, and safety of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. It is clearly difficult to hold such a detailed discussion with those who do not have a security clearance.

I asked President Gorbachev and the Russian Government to carry out this investigation. Gorbachev told me that, together with the Russian Republic, he established a relevant committee, which already started its work. We not only want to know exactly what happened during the coup, but also what may possibly happen in future crisis situations.

The second part of my proposal contains deliberations at the level of a committee of the legislature, as, for example, the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee, which would have access to selected secret information on our nuclear armed forces.

At the third level, the results from the investigation by the state committee are passed on to international scientists.

In addition to the efforts that are made to convince other nuclear powers of our stability, we have to reconsider the next step after the START Treaty. The START Treaty does not eliminate the danger of nuclear confrontation. The armed forces structures and the target lists remain the same. Only the number of weapons is somewhat smaller. The problem of the first strike continues to exist. In short, the conditions that might cause the military to make unsafe decisions continue to exist.

Now would also be a good time to discuss the complete elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. This is currently very realistic. Why do we still need them? Deterrence is based on strategic, not on tactical weapons.

Another very urgent question is how to put an end to the production of fissile material. The Soviet Union made this possible. We terminated all nuclear tests. I think that the radical reduction of strategic warheads is possible. Several hundred warheads on both sides could guarantee sufficient deterrence.

Today the Soviet Union has lost its claim as a superpower.

Therefore, I believe that now the United States and the Soviet Union can reduce the number of their warheads to that of the nuclear armed forces in France, Great Britain, and China.

I think that to stop the new threat of proliferation (of nuclear technology that can be used for military purposes—the editors), it is also time to revive the old Bernard Baruch Plan of 1946, which provided for the creation of an international agency that has all rights of supervision and control, from uranium mining to the treatment of radioactive waste, the whole fuel cycle. Every transport, every use or handling of uranium outside this international agency should be illegal.

Another point. Since the successful use of Patriot missiles in the Gulf war, there have been considerations of tearing the ABM Treaty (Antiballistic Missile Treaty—the editors) up. I am against it. Instead, we should stop the proliferation of new missile technology, nuclear material, and nuclear weapons.

[DIE PRESSE] The issue of the role of the republics and the nuclear weapons in the new union is currently being discussed.

[Velikhov] Today the republics do not have direct access to nuclear weapons.

[DIE PRESSE] How can Russian President Boris Yeltsin say that he will transfer all nuclear weapons to Russian territory?

[Velikhov] He must have said this in the euphoria of victory. This question is very delicate for Russia because almost the whole nuclear industry is situated in this republic. It is very difficult to differentiate between the civilian and the military use of nuclear energy. We never made a difference in the fuel cycle.

Of course, we have several plants for the production of warheads. But uranium mining, processing, enrichment, and waste management are handled together by mixing civilian and military purposes. This is the structure. Because of the high degree of secrecy before the coup, Yeltsin does not have any firsthand information on how all this is organized. Only Gorbachev, as the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, has this knowledge.

Now, with Russia's important decision to assume control over its resources, the problem arises. The decision on what will happen to the nuclear weapons cannot be made by Yeltsin alone. It must be supported by many people, even by the international community. Among others, the international community should assume a firm attitude and demand that the republics, particularly Russia, sign the Nonproliferation Treaty as a condition for the recognition of their independence.

In my opinion, it is wrong to simply transfer the status of a superpower from the Soviet Union to Russia. If we

permit the Russian Republic to assume control over these nuclear weapons, we will face a far more difficult situation in some years. As a Russian, I like most Russian people, and I no longer want to be a target of nuclear weapons.

[DIE PRESSE] What do you expect from the West?

[Velikhov] The West should be against the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia and instead try to come to an agreement with the central power on the radical reduction of nuclear weapons.

[DIE PRESSE] When do you expect the committee report to be presented? What will happen then?

[Velikhov] The new Supreme Soviet will be convened on 2 October.

I hope that the first item on the agenda will be that the new committee for defense and national security discusses the report on nuclear arms control with the state committee.

If we do not fulfill the international community's requirements regarding confidence, it might again have an eye to nuclear defense and antimissile missiles or similar crazy things.

The old parliamentary committee for defense and national security was dissolved on my initiative. Among its members were Anatoliy Lukyanov, Mikhail Moiseyev, and others from the Central Committee and the Defense Ministry who blocked real progress in arms control.

[DIE PRESSE] Would you go so far as not only to agree to the internationalization of nuclear energy, but also to the internationalization of Soviet nuclear weapons?

[Velikhov] This is more acceptable for us than for the West. However, it is impossible for the Soviet nuclear weapons to be under UN control if all other nuclear weapons are under national control. The West is not yet prepared for it. It is not even prepared for a comprehensive nuclear test freeze. At such a favorable moment, this is a pity.

START TALKS

A. Arbatov Analyzes Treaty Terms

91WC0162A Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian
No 2, Feb 91 (signed to press 23 Apr 91) pp 5-17

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences Aleksey Georgiyevich Arbatov, chief of the Department of Disarmament Problems at the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the World Economy and International Relations: "Strategic Arms Reduction: Problems and 'Non-problems'"]

[Text] I

The strategic offensive weapons treaty is the longest and, unquestionably, most complex international legal document in history. The text of the treaty itself, which includes 18 articles, takes up approximately 100 pages. In addition, there are 11 different documents—protocols, appendices and memoranda. Altogether, the text of the treaty and the documents that are an inseparable part of it number more than 500 pages.

Negotiations on this treaty went on for many years. If one takes as a starting point the beginning of negotiations with the Reagan administration in 1982, it took more than eight years to conclude. If one considers the starting point to have been 1985, when negotiations on nuclear and space weapons began, it took six years. And if one takes the starting point as Reykjavik, when the basic principle of the treaty— a 50-percent reduction— was formulated, it works out to more than four years.

Before moving on to analyze the treaty as such, let us discuss some widespread opinions concerning the subject of the negotiations and test how valid they are.

Thus, it is often said that the negotiations have dragged on too long. Indeed, since the start of the strategic arms talks the arms race has been outstripping the negotiating process.

A detailed analysis does not support this idea, since the strategic arms race is not a rapid process, either. Suffice it to say that the development, testing and deployment of strategic weapons systems take 10-15 years, and after that weapons systems remain operational from 10 to 30 years. Thus, the overall life cycle of strategic weapons is at least 30 years. Therefore, the claim that the arms race outstrips negotiations is more an emotional perception of a much more complicated reality.

It is another matter that so far negotiations have had a rather superficial influence on the arms race. They have been incapable of actually limiting, much less stopping, it. But that is a question no longer of time but of completely different factors, which we will discuss below.

Another commonly held opinion is that treaties are too complex, and that that is done all but deliberately in order to exclude the peace-loving public from real participation in the disarmament process.

It is true that each new treaty proves longer and more complicated than the one before. In the present treaty, it is probably only the preamble and introductory article, which contains the general pledge to carry out the terms of the treaty, that can be understood without special training. Nonetheless, that is not done deliberately. In essence, disarmament negotiations constitute a process of coming to agreement on certain regulations that regulate and limit the sides' actions in the most delicate, central areas of their national security. The very subject is extremely complex—and the further negotiations go, and the more palpable the impact on the arms race becomes, the more complex the documents themselves

become. The first strategic arms treaty (SALT I), which was signed in 1971, occupied only three pages, plus three pages of its attached protocol. And the present treaty, as already noted, occupies 100 pages, plus more than 400 pages of various protocols and documents. If all states could reach agreement on the general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons, all the volumes of the "Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya" [Great Soviet Encyclopedia] would probably not be sufficient to hold such an accord.

There is no need to set forth the treaty's content, article by article. Its quintessence is the following: at the present time each side has 2,000-2,500 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and in accordance with the document that number will be cut to 1,600. At the present time each side (according to accepted counting rules) has more than 10,000 nuclear weapons in strategic forces, and under the treaty their maximum number will be 6,000. That, strictly speaking, is all the figures that define the scope of strategic arms reductions. All the rest that the treaty contains consists of various levels and sublevels for individual classes of strategic arms and individual types of them; qualitative restrictions with regard to technical parameters; rules for the deployment and operation, testing, modernization and replacement of weapons; and extensive texts on inspections, verification, the exchange of data, and the procedures for the conversion and dismantling of strategic weapons (since their reduction is carried out by means of their conversion or dismantling).

In order to get a fuller sense of the problems of reducing strategic arms, one must constantly keep in mind that military rivalry in this area proceeds not so much through the buildup of quantities of nuclear arms as through the modernization of strategic forces, that is, the replacement of existing systems with new ones. And the strategic arms treaty is, figuratively speaking, like a bookcase consisting of many shelves. Right now the shelves are overflowing with both old and new weapons. Under the treaty, the sides will have to fit precisely onto these shelves. In this connection they can withdraw more old weapons and, by freeing space, put in more new ones. Or they can take out fewer old weapons and, accordingly, put in fewer new ones.

The qualitative limits, levels and sublevels affect this process but do not define it in every detail. Accordingly, the new treaty's essence and significance depend not only on the levels and sublevels, but also, to a very great extent, on how each side carries out its military programs within the treaty's agreed-upon limits. It would seem that the more weapons are dismantled, the better. But upon examination, everything is not that simple—and that is the first paradox of the strategic arms treaty. Within the fixed levels and sublevels, the more old land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are eliminated, the more new, more costly and effective ones will be deployed, and that does not necessarily benefit security.

Let us consider a number of questions that are usually raised in connection with the treaty.

First of all, is the arms reduction that is being proposed a feasible one? It seems that such a reduction is perfectly feasible. In seven years and three stages, the sides will evidently reduce, that is, convert or dismantle, a total of more than 2,000 ballistic missiles. The USSR and the United States will remove from operation, at the minimum, a total of 50 strategic-missile submarines and up to 200 heavy bombers. If one counts warheads (and as we know, many delivery systems—missiles and bombers—carry not one but 10, and sometimes even 20 warheads each), under the treaty the sides must remove a total of more than 10,000 nuclear warheads from operation. For comparison, under the Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles, for deployed systems half as many missiles and one-fifth as many warheads were reduced, and not a single submarine or warplane was taken out of operation.

But like any complex phenomenon, from this standpoint the strategic arms treaty has an opposite side, as well. Here one must say categorically that the treaty will not stop the arms race. Moreover, within its framework each side is planning to deploy a sizeable quantity of new weapons, while taking old ones out of operation. For example, according to some forecasts, over those same seven years the sides will, within established levels and sublevels, deploy a total of up to 1,000 new missiles, build 15-20 submarines, and put 100 or more heavy bombers into operation. Both powers will deploy a total of 5,000- 7,000 nuclear warheads during this period. That, strictly speaking, is the material side of the treaty, and it is, as we can see, far from unambiguous.

II

The treaty's significance and consequences deserve the most serious analysis. Since disarmament negotiations, for all their specific content, are part of Soviet-American political relations, one should first of all note the political aspect of the matter.

Unquestionably, the real reduction in the nuclear weapons that the sides have aimed at one another, the elimination of military facilities and installations, the closing of strategic bases, and the conversion and dismantling of ballistic missiles, submarines and bombers will all have a beneficial influence on both the public at large and on political relations between the two countries.

But the positive impetus that the treaty may provide for Soviet-American relations will largely depend on the course of its ratification. If in that process there are prolonged debates, numerous amendments, and the treaty is returned for reworking, all that will emasculate it and reduce its positive political impact. Therefore, the course of ratification will be the decisive factor in the sort of impact that the treaty has on the two superpowers' political relations: whether it will add something

to the political capital of Soviet-American relations or, to the contrary, borrow on that capital.

The second aspect is the economic side of the question. In the existing economic situation in the USSR, that is what arouses the greatest interest among the Soviet public and specialists. But it is precisely the economic side of the question that is extremely ambiguous, especially because there is no open Soviet information about how much our country spends on strategic arms, what sort of strategic-arms programs were previously planned, and how those programs will be changed in connection with the new treaty. If that were known, one might find out the difference between what it was previously planned to spend and what will be done now, and on that basis form a more or less definite judgment about the treaty's economic significance.

The strategic arms treaty will itself require expenditures, since the conversion and dismantling of strategic weapons is a fairly complex and costly process, and one that is sometimes even dangerous from the standpoint of accidents. The Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles demonstrated that these procedures are not without hazards for the environment, either. In the negotiations, efforts are being made to provide for conversion and dismantling procedures that will be least harmful to the environment, but that will also require additional outlays. There will also be expenses in connection with the verification system, since what is envisaged is an intensive, extremely broad, technically complex and multifaceted system of verification and inspection.

From what, in the final analysis, will it be possible to realize savings under the treaty? First of all, from the reduction of expenditures on the operation and servicing of the weapons that will be reduced. That is a relatively small portion of expenditures for strategic offensive weapons. What is costliest is developing, testing, producing and deploying them, while keeping them operational after that is much cheaper. But the savings will be realized precisely from this relatively small budget item involving operation and maintenance, because it is existing weapons that will be reduced. The bulk of the money for them has already been spent and cannot be recovered by destroying these missiles, airplanes and submarines. It may very well seem that what will be spent to implement the treaty and what will be saved in connection with its limitations will cancel each other out. It is possible that the re-use in the economy of certain equipment (for example, transport equipment), parts and materials from the reduced weapons will produce some savings, although that will be determined mainly by the cost of dismantling and the effectiveness of using a "sword" in the capacity of "plowshare."

Perhaps the most important economic aspect of the question is that, within the treaty's framework, new weapons systems that it was previously proposed to deploy on a larger scale will evidently be deployed on a smaller scale. Above all, this applies to certain missile

submarine systems (in all likelihood, fewer of these exceptionally costly strategic-weapons launching platforms will be deployed than previously planned, on account of the quantitative sublevels for missile warheads), as well as to certain mobile land-based missile systems. This is the category, that is, savings on the development of new programs, in which savings attributable to the treaty will come to several billion rubles, according to preliminary estimates. But in this connection a question arises: where will the freed-up money go? After all, many other programs will be carried out within the framework of the treaty. Moreover, the treaty even pushes the USSR toward a certain restructuring of its strategic forces, in particular, toward increasing the aviation component (the construction of new heavy bombers), numerically building up its mobile land-based single-warhead missiles, and deploying hundreds of sea-launched cruise missiles. One cannot rule out the possibility that all of the aforementioned savings of money will be offset by outlays for restructuring strategic forces and developing that which the USSR previously was not even proposing to build.

Thus, in economic terms two key questions are the following: First, at whose expense will the reduction, conversion and dismantling of strategic weapons, as well as provision for a verification system, be carried out? If it is to be at the expense of the Ministry of Defense, that will not give rise to additional expenditures and not place an additional economic burden on finances and the national economy. If, on the other hand, these things are to be paid for out of additional, special allocations from the state budget, the treaty will entail additional costs. That is nothing more than a statement of the objective state of affairs, while the choice is up to the authorized bodies.

A second question is even more important: What sort of programs will the USSR carry out within the treaty's framework, and how effectively will the Supreme Soviet be able to monitor the use of the money that may be saved in connection with the treaty through the reduction of expenditures on maintenance and a certain cutback in new strategic programs? If the freed-up resources go for civilian needs, that is one thing, but if they go for the development of new strategic weapons systems or aircraft carriers, fighters and tanks, that is an entirely different matter.

A study of the treaty's economic significance also enables one to draw several general conclusions regarding the disarmament process. From every indication, the savings that process produces are more potential than immediate savings. In other words, after concluding a treaty it is impossible to reduce military spending right away. One can only reduce it for a certain number of years ahead compared to what was planned earlier without taking the treaty into account. It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that the possibility of savings through disarmament is determined entirely by the effectiveness of oversight within a country over military policy and the military budget on the part of the civilian leadership

and the public. Thus, to a huge extent the matter rests with the Supreme Soviet, which must play a much more active role in these issues. There is also a need for annual, thorough and detailed information on the military budget and military programs. Also obvious, finally, is the need to enlist independent expertise on military and disarmament questions in order that assessments and opinions from outside the bureaucracy may be taken into account.

The three factors cited are also the components of effective political control over military policy. And until that control exists, we can never be sure that the savings from disarmament will be real, rather than ephemeral. Right now, as we know, a direct reduction is being made in the military budget: at least that is indicated by the figures that are cited in the open press. From every indication, the treaty will play a positive role in this case, because it will create political conditions that will make it easier to cut the military budget. That, of course, is only in the event that the military departments do not gain additional appropriations as compensation for the "moral" and "strategic damage" caused in the course of dismantling a large number of nuclear missiles that cost the people an immense amount of money in the 1970s and 1980s.

Now for the treaty's direct impact on security in the strategic sense. It seems that the treaty's net effect in this sense is unquestionably positive, that is, that its pluses outweigh its minuses. Views on this matter may differ, which is perfectly natural. In order of priority, the treaty's chief merits, it seems, are the following.

The main advantage in terms of the Soviet-American strategic relationship is not the reduction in strategic arms and not the limitation of new programs, but the measures that the treaty provides with regard to transparency, verification, predictability, exchange of data, and inspections. In that sense the treaty really is innovative—and not just compared to past strategic arms agreements, but even compared to the extremely radical Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles. Suffice it to say that the treaty provides 13 different variants and instances of inspections. They include inspections to verify initial data and inspections on suspicion, which can be carried out on very short notice (that is, by visiting practically any facility related to strategic forces, whether it be a missile base, a submarine base, or other facility belonging to the enormous strategic arms infrastructure). Provision is made for continuous observation at certain enterprises that produce strategic systems, for the showing of weapons to one another, and for inspections following the dispersal of certain types of strategic weapons (for example, of land-based mobile missiles) once they are returned to their basing locations.

The treaty provides for an extensive set of notification measures. They entail providing each other data on numerous technical aspects of strategic offensive weapons. (They are contained in a memorandum of accord that will be renewed annually.) New data will be

provided about the changes that take place in this area, and notification will be made about test launches of missiles and the introduction of new varieties and types of strategic arms. Measures are provided for assisting the other side's national technical means of verification (especially intelligence satellites), such as, for example, the removal of land-based mobile missiles from their stationary installations, and the opening of the roofs of such installations for monitoring the presence or absence of launchers in them. One more aspect of the same matter is the regulation of activities in the area of strategic weapons. The treaty includes an extensive set of limitations on the sort of areas that can be used for deploying land-based mobile missiles, the number of stationary installations for these missiles that is allowed to be maintained at deployment sites (restricted regions), the dimensions and parameters that must not be exceeded by basing stations for rail-carried mobile missiles, how much of various sorts of equipment may be kept at bases, and how many reserve stockpiling locations there can be. Provision is made for notification about all movements of strategic missiles, and the means of moving them, testing them, operationally deploying them, removing them from service, converting them into rockets for carrying objects into space, and so forth are regulated.

All these treaty terms will substantially increase the transparency of the USSR's and United States' strategic force, decrease unpredictability, and reduce uncertainty and mutual distrust. It seems that this is actually the chief positive feature of the new treaty from the standpoint of reducing tension in the Soviet-American strategic relationship and materially lowering the threat of war. The treaty provides truly unprecedented measures in this area. Besides everything else, these rules will force the sides to substantially change traditional practices, including, possibly, to take care to reduce disorder and mismanagement.

The regular and verified presentation of extensive information regarding the treaty will provide politicians, parliamentarians and specialists in both countries who are concerned with these and more general economic and political problems with much more extensive, systematic and truthful information about the other side's and their own strategic weapons. This is especially true of the USSR, where glasnost has not yet advanced far enough. Often it is absolutely impossible to directly obtain from the Ministry of Defense even information that is freely provided to our negotiating partners. "Confidence-building measures," unfortunately, have not yet been extended to the Soviet public, and for perfectly understandable reasons. The monopoly on information is a monopoly on judgments, forecasts and recommendations, and hence on policy-making. But any monopoly results in decay, costs and inefficiency—that is a commonly known and universal law, regardless of the level of competency of the people working in a monopolistic system. The destruction of an established monopoly is always a painful process, especially in such a super-monopolized, excessively secret and powerful (in terms

of the organizations and resources involved) area as military policy and military development. This process encounters ubiquitous, embittered resistance from the bureaucracy, especially in the security realm. Unquestionably, however, it is in the interests of society as a whole.

Without democratization and glasnost, as already noted above, effective political control over the USSR's military policy is impossible, which means that any serious benefits from disarmament are also impossible. In this connection, maybe this virtue of the treaty should even be put in first place.

Finally, a positive aspect of the treaty is that it is a foundation for subsequent, more radical agreements on the reduction and limitation of strategic arms. It creates an extensive basis in treaty and law that will make it possible to more rapidly and radically take subsequent steps to curb the strategic arms race.

III

As far as one can judge, the treaty's shortcomings are as follows.

Stability in strategic equilibrium is usually understood as the elimination of strategic military incentives for either side to deliver a first strike for the purpose of disarming the opponent or reducing the might of a retaliatory strike. Since specific criteria of stability not only have not been agreed upon between the powers, but remain the subject of disagreements within each of the countries, the treaty's influence on stability remains unclear. Depending on the programs that are carried out in the USSR and the United States in the 1990s, stability may be reduced or, in any case, become less predictable. In this connection it should be noted that the treaty has not avoided the lot of previous strategic arms agreements. It has proved much more adaptable to the two states' new arms programs than it has itself influenced those military programs. This, incidentally, is also a reason that the savings of money anticipated in connection with the treaty is insufficiently clear.

Granted, the fault for this lies not with the treaty itself, but with the activities in the area of military programs that the sides propose to continue within the treaty's framework and that constantly exerted extremely strong pressure on the negotiating positions of Moscow and Washington. From this the conclusion follows: in order that future treaties have a more palpable influence on the military balance and lead to more significant limitations on the arms race, we need, once again, much more effective political control over military policy within the countries on the part of the legislative branch, political leadership and public at large.

Furthermore, another shortcoming of the treaty, indisputably, is that a number of questions are resolved unsatisfactorily in terms of specifics. They include, first of all, the linkage between the strategic arms treaty and the observance of the ABM Treaty, and the definition of

rules for counting heavy bombers without air-launched cruise missiles and of the rules for counting such missiles on strategic aviation. They also include agreement on the limitation of sea-launched cruise missiles, on undeveloped systems, on the continuous monitoring of missile-production facilities, and so forth. By and large, these questions are resolved in such a way that one side will cut back on its systems less, and in exchange the other side will have less strict limitations, that is, they are resolved according to the lowest common denominator. In most cases the matter is attributable to the American side's insufficiently constructive line. But in all fairness it must be admitted that the Soviet positions, too, have often been insufficiently well thought-out and consistent, and have been unable to counter Washington's positions of large and bold solutions, which it would be politically difficult to refuse. Solution according to the lowest common denominator, of course, accelerated the pace of negotiations at the concluding stage, but at the same time it also laid the foundation for serious problems at the next stage of negotiations, when it will be necessary to return to these questions.

Now to discuss a few points of the criticism of the treaty that has already begun in our press and the foreign press, and in the parliaments. For example, the charge is made that under the treaty strategic arms will be cut not by 50 percent, as was promised in repeated declarations by the two countries' leaders, but by much less—only 20-30 percent.

It is true that actual reductions will be less than half, because of the accepted rules for counting heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles. Perhaps in political terms the less substantial lowering of real levels is a shortcoming. However, from strategic and economic standpoints, and in terms of the true impact on the sides' security, this is an extremely minor issue. Why is the total number of strategic weapons presented as the most important criterion for assessing the strategic balance and the treaty's impact on that balance? Neither the likelihood of nuclear war nor its hypothetical destructive consequences are directly dependent on the total number of the two powers' strategic nuclear warheads. The relationship here is incomparably more complex, and on certain conditions a reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons may even increase the likelihood of a first strike and undermine strategic stability.

In this respect it is extremely significant that the treaty makes real provision for 50-percent reductions with regard to other parameters that may be considered more important than the total number of weapons from the standpoint of security. For example, in the total number of warheads on land-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles, provision is made for a reduction of precisely 50 percent from the highest currently existing number, to a level of 4,900 units. Heavy missiles and their warheads are being reduced by 50 percent to a level of 154 ICBMs and 1,540 warheads, and the throw-weight of ballistic missiles (another very important index) is being cut by

approximately 50 percent. Finally, if one takes separately the existing number of warheads on Soviet ICBMs and the present number of warheads on American SLBMs, indirectly both categories will also be reduced by approximately 50 percent. This is extremely significant, since land-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles—given their present numbers of nuclear warheads, power, and accuracy, and given their short flight time—are precisely the most threatening systems in terms of the likelihood of a first strike.

It is another matter that the treaty places insufficiently strict limitations on the operational deployment of new strategic arms systems and the modernization of strategic forces, and that is perhaps its most important shortcoming, as a result of which, as noted above, it is difficult to predict the treaty's impact on strategic stability. Incidentally, the SALT II Treaty, for all its shortcomings, at least limited the sides to the right to deploy no more than one new type of ICBM. The new treaty leaves them a completely free hand in this regard, although it places extremely significant indirect (that is, quantitative and qualitative) limitations.

In addition, it is said that as the result of the treaty's implementation there will be no parity between the sides, because, on account of the artificial rules that have been adopted for counting the weapons on heavy bombers, the United States will be able to have approximately 3,000 nuclear weapons more than the nominal ceiling that treaty sets (6,000 warheads). This will enable the United States to have 2,000 more warheads than the Soviet Union (which, by some estimates, will realistically be able to have about 7,000 warheads).

However, even this circumstance, it seems, hardly plays a large role. After all, in principle the Soviet Union has the right to deploy just as many warheads as the United States. That is in the event that it builds a bomber fleet comparable to the American fleet and equips them with cruise missiles and other weapons. But is it necessary to do this? That is the question. Do these individual disproportions have any significance at the still very high levels that will remain after the treaty? It is extremely doubtful that they do. It would hardly be advisable to rush to reach ceilings by deploying new weapons, especially if we seriously intend, as soon as the treaty takes effect, to immediately begin negotiations on new, even deeper and more radical cuts. Why spend immense amounts of money in the next few years for new weapons that it is being proposed to once again reduce and dismantle in literally a matter of a few years?

The consideration that the treaty will once again require the USSR to reduce more than the Americans is also being expressed. That is indeed the case. But it is largely attributable to the fact that the USSR has had more weapons, and also to the fact that the Soviet Union makes more different types of weapons, produces them in large series, and replaces them with new models more frequently. Indeed, if two new types of missiles have to

be fit under the same ceiling, it will naturally be necessary to cut more existing systems than if only one new type of weapon were deployed. Herein, strictly speaking, lies the main explanation of the fact that the Soviet Union will have to cut more strategic arms than the United States. Once again the issue lies with the costs and excesses of Soviet military policy and military development, and not with the shortcomings or advantages of the treaty as such.

IV

In conclusion, we must not fail to touch on the decision-making mechanism. If one takes the final text of the strategic arms treaty as a point of departure and casts a retrospective glance at the sides' initial positions and the course of the negotiations from start to finish, it will become obvious that in the vast majority of cases the United States' proposals—although far from irreproachable—were better interconnected logically and more thoroughly thought-through than the Soviet proposals. Therefore the American positions, although they were also changed substantially in the course of compromises, found more marked reflection in the final document than Moscow's initial proposals.

After the breakthrough in Reykjavik, as of early 1987, the USSR's line came down to a proposal to eliminate all strategic weapons in 10 years (reducing them by half over the first five years) on the condition of a ban on testing antimissile defense components in space under the SDI program, and the restriction of work on space antimissile systems to the confines of laboratories. No sublevels on strategic weapons would be established (other than a reduction to 154 units of heavy ICBMs); for the first five years it would be forbidden to develop new varieties of strategic weapons, and for the second five-year period it would be forbidden to develop new types. The treaty that is the product of negotiations has very little in common with that initial draft.

Some Soviet civilian and military figures who are concerned about the sufficiency of the USSR's defense may attribute this circumstance to the political leadership's proclivity for "one-sided concessions" and its line of "negotiating from a position of weakness," and may even charge the president and the Foreign Ministry with disregarding the needs of national security. But a historical analysis does not support this view. Not only the treaties on strategic arms, medium- and shorter-range missiles, and conventional forces in Europe that have been concluded in recent years, but even past agreements demonstrate the same distinguishing characteristic. This includes the 1963 treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water and in space; the Salt I and Salt II treaties in the 1970s; and the 1974 treaty limiting the thresholds of underground nuclear tests, that is, it goes back long before the "new thinking" to the "good old times" of the Soviet ideological offensive and military buildup. The same pattern shows up everywhere: either negotiations reach an utter impasse (as happened with the 17-year Vienna conventional arms talks), or a treaty

is concluded that is closer to the Western side's position and, accordingly, demands large cuts and more substantial limitations on our part.

This pattern prompts one to serious reflection. It is evidently no accident that our initial positions, as a rule, have been insufficiently firm and consistent, and that the sources of this phenomenon are systemic in nature, that is, derive from the traditionally established mechanism for developing and implementing policy.

The history of negotiations over the past three decades indicates that the US policy is usually developed with the involvement of a much broader range of participants and alternative opinions, in a situation of much more open information, with the active and systematic participation of Congress and scholars, and under the intent and critical gaze of the press. In contrast, our line has traditionally been developed through behind-the-scenes bargaining, on the basis of bureaucratic compromises. The initial Soviet position has often represented a strange mixture, reflecting, on the one hand, the highly pragmatic technical and operational interests of the military industry and departments of the Ministry of Defense, and on the other, propaganda declarations or simply unrealistic notions (such as the elimination of all strategic weapons in 10 years). It is perfectly natural that it was impossible to stick to those shaky positions, unless the objective was to keep the negotiations in an impasse for years.

When the USSR's initiatives with regard to various disarmament problems become public knowledge, their vulnerabilities often immediately become obvious to many specialists from the academic community, and the course of events becomes largely predictable (moreover, this is not limited to the realm of strategic arms; the same thing has been true regarding medium- and shorter-range missiles, the Vienna talks, proposals on tactical nuclear weapons and naval forces, and so forth). The question arises: Just why does the top political leadership overlook these weak spots? Most likely it is because the departments, which have coordinated their positions among themselves, naturally do not emphasize their weaknesses when they are presented for approval at the top level, and do not underscore the strong sides and likely counter arguments of our negotiating partners. Thus, our proposals do not undergo a comprehensive and severe preliminary "strength test." When they enter the arena of negotiations from the hothouse conditions of the behind-the-scenes decision-making mechanism, they become an easy target for the other side. To a considerable extent, this also happened in the case of the negotiations on a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms.

In such complex areas as disarmament agreements, what lies on the surface is usually deceptive. The seeming bias of the treaty terms toward the American side does not indicate that it is more advantageous to the United States, or that the Soviet Union made unilateral concessions. The essence of the matter is that the initial Soviet positions were further from a mutually acceptable and

realistic solution of the problems, and for that reason Moscow had to travel a longer path to reach a true balance of interests.

Without fundamentally changing the decision-making mechanism, and without offsetting the tremendous pressure that the Ministry of Defense and military industry put on that process, we will not get out of the vicious cycle. We will continue either to sign treaties that are extremely far from our initial positions, or we will drive the negotiations into lengthy impasses. There is no other alternative, if we do not fundamentally restructure the whole decision-making process, both with respect to the development of negotiating positions, and in direct relation to the formulation of military policy and general military development.

That is understandable, since negotiations and military programs are inseparably intertwined for each side. After all, where does the development of a negotiating line on any disarmament issue begin? With the assessment of the military balance in a given area, and a forecast of its evolution under the influence of the powers' military programs. The whole subsequent course of diplomatic interaction depends on this stage. It is precisely at this stage that the military-industrial complex's monopoly on information and on the planning of measures (especially with regard to our own forces and programs) is especially harmful. Suffice it to recall that always and in every case—in the case of medium- and shorter-range missiles, in the case of conventional armed forces in Europe, and in the case of strategic arms—on the eve of the negotiations we have deduced the existence of parity. And in the end it has turned out that in order to attain parity the Soviet Union must cut several times as many weapons. (Isn't the same thing being repeated once again with respect to tactical nuclear arms in Europe and naval forces?)

But the point is not that someone has been deliberately and systematically deceiving the political leadership. Nor can one accuse Ministry of Defense officials of incompetence (although they themselves never miss a chance to accuse those who disagree with them of incompetence, and sometimes even of bad intentions). The problem, however, is that the military departments hold a monopoly on information and on determination of the methodology for calculations, which are developed, quite naturally, in accordance with bureaucratic interests. And these assessments are not subjected to timely critical analysis, and are not drawn up with alternate approaches. Understandably, the shortcomings in initial assessments predetermine weaknesses in negotiating positions, as well.

In no case, of course, should there be any thought of removing military institutions and the defense industry from the decision-making process. After all, the subject of negotiations and object of reduction and limitation measures are precisely what these organizations bear responsibility for—the state's defense potential. It is simply that, since the supreme goal has already been set

of ensuring security through primarily political means (that is, primarily through disarmament talks), the defense complex's role in defining that course can no longer be a monopolistic, or even dominant, one.

For the same reason, since plans for military policy and military development have such a significant impact on initial negotiating positions and the objectives of negotiations, the question should be raised of altering the decision-making mechanism for military programs. It needs to include far more considerations and opinions that come from outside the bureaucracy and are associated with the prospects for disarmament, the possibilities of verifying treaty observance, foreign policy, and our long-suffering civilian economy (including plans for conversion).

In restructuring the internal policy-making process, there is no question, of course, of copying the American experience. Especially since their mechanism has many flaws stemming from serious shortcomings and mistakes in US policy, including shortcomings and mistakes connected with the treaty on the 50-percent reduction in strategic arms. The Soviet Union has its own specific political, military and administrative circumstances, and the American model cannot be artificially transplanted in our soil. However, the US decision-making process is, as we say, their problem. A restructuring of the Soviet system unquestionably will also lead to changes in the American system, some of which will be in the direction of reducing the influence of the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff on Washington's negotiating policy.

Certain considerations need to be expressed concerning negotiating methods themselves. There is still no shared understanding between the sides of just what the goal of strategic arms talks actually is. After all, the Americans openly disagree with the ultimate objective of completely eliminating such arms (and all nuclear weapons, in general), about which we still speak from time to time. For the foreseeable future a 50-percent reduction in strategic weapons, and then, perhaps, another 50-percent reduction cannot, in and of themselves, be considered the goal of negotiations. After all, if, for example, everything old were eliminated and all new weapons were deployed while staying under overall ceilings, one could speak either of curbing the arms race, or of reducing the threat of war, or of reducing economic costs.

It seems that we do not yet have our own clear idea of the realistic objectives of negotiations for the foreseeable future, much less any mutual understanding with the American side. That is one of the most fundamental shortcomings in the negotiating process, a shortcoming which is largely responsible for the drawbacks of the new strategic arms treaty. For all practical purposes, the negotiations deal with the form of the strategic relationship between the two powers, rather than the substance of it. After all, numbers, levels, sublevels and the qualitative characteristics of weapons are form. And the substance is what sort of balance in strategic weapons

must be achieved at this and subsequent stages in order for that balance to preclude the possibility of a first nuclear strike, that is, to rule out the likelihood of nuclear war.

At the summer 1990 summit meeting, the sides signed a joint statement regarding future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in which, for the first time, emphasis was placed on the objective of strengthening strategic stability at increasingly lower levels of nuclear equilibrium, and certain general principles and criteria of stability were set forth. But that is merely a first step; immense work is needed in order to transform these propositions into specific points of a future treaty that are applicable to specific systems of strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

In summary, one can say assert quite confidently that the treaty on reducing and limiting strategic offensive weapons is necessary and useful. But the treaty is a child of its time. And all the contradictions of the present period have left a sharp imprint on the treaty itself. It was engendered largely by the old administrative-command method, with periodic injections of "new thinking" from above. It has a lot of virtues, but they are not in every case along the lines where it was expected to reap the main fruits—namely, in the area of radically curbing the arms race (that is, the race in new strategic programs), cutting defense spending, and reducing the strategic possibility of a first strike. There is also a paradox in the fact that the treaty lays a thorough foundation for subsequent negotiations, but it will hardly be possible to achieve radical new disarmament measures if the old decision-making mechanism remains in place in the country and at the Geneva talks.

In present-day world politics there is evidently not a single other area that is so clearly technical in nature as strategic arms negotiations. This makes it all the more noteworthy that the treaty, for all its specific nature, has persuasively demonstrated the universality of social and political laws, no matter what form they are expressed in.

The negotiating experience of the past few years demonstrates quite vividly that the good intentions of the top political leadership alone are insufficient to bring about radical and consistent reforms. It is impossible to implement a new policy while relying on the old state structures, just as it is impossible to drag oneself by the hair out of a swamp. The negotiations serve as an example of the fact that a combination of new political impulses from above and an old policy-implementation mechanism at the working level will, at best, produce half-way, instable results, and will sometimes entail major shortcomings.

The history of the strategic arms treaty also confirms the truth that the conduct of a new policy requires the establishment of new public institutions that have a stake in it, the consideration of independent assessments and opinions from outside the bureaucracy, and the entertainment of the broadest possible range of options

in a situation of the utmost glasnost and democratization. Finally, this experience once again proves that real and consistent restructuring of the outside world and of relations among states (including strategic relations) is inseparably bound up with the restructuring of our own house.

Bovin on Pluses, Minuses of START I

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[Aleksandr Bovin article: "Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty: Compromise Cannot Be Beyond Reproach"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] I think that the first Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty [START I] has at least two undoubted merits that allow us by and large to regard it as outstanding, a fundamental step toward nuclear disarmament.

First, the fact that more than one-third of the USSR and U.S. nuclear missile potentials has been cut back is "per se" of fundamental significance. It is, moreover, important that this is no mechanical reduction in the number of carriers and warheads but the first moves toward increasing strategic stability by gradually changing the strategic offensive arms structure and the proportion of the most destabilizing types of weapons, thus lessening the danger of nuclear war.

By reducing the quantity, the Soviet Union gains in terms of quality. Obsolete intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's] and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will be removed from the arsenal. The reliability and accuracy of the remaining missiles is increasing. ICBM survivability will be enhanced inasmuch as a considerable proportion of these missiles will be mobile. The proportion of strategic aviation will rise.

Second, continuing the line taken by the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the USSR and the United States have elaborated an unprecedented, carefully conceived, and essentially all-embracing system of verification of the fulfillment of START-I. Twelve types of on-site monitoring have been authorized, and provision has been made for approximately 60 differing types of notification covering the production, testing, movement, deployment, and destruction of strategic offensive arms. The significance of the prescribed monitoring procedure goes far beyond the framework of the treaty; it is leading to increased mutual trust and is preparing the ground for further progress in disarmament.

I will directly make the reservation that these merits are not indisputable.

There are people in both countries, particularly among the retired military, who are unhappy that too many strategic offensive arms are to be cut back. These people cannot be persuaded otherwise; we cannot and must not pay attention to them.

More numerous—both in our country and across the ocean—are the critics who think that the prescribed ceilings are too high. Especially since it was promised that existing arsenals would be halved... "The recently signed strategic arms treaty," P. Nitze, the well-known disarmament (and arms) specialist, writes in THE WASHINGTON POST, "is disappointing; much more could have been done to create U.S.-Soviet strategic equilibrium, reducing the danger of nuclear war to a minimum." In principle he is right. But after all, unlike the high jump, the lower the bar the more difficult it is to get over it. Standing in the way is the tremendous inertia of the arms race. Standing in the way are the continuing mistrust and the confrontation mentality that takes far longer to overcome in the military-political sphere than in the sphere of politics proper. Let us be realistic. What has been done would have seemed like a miracle quite recently. Yet neither Moscow nor Washington has any intention of stopping at what has been accomplished.

There are also disagreements over the second point. People in the United States complain that it is hard to verify the situation as regards mobile missiles and that in a number of cases the treaty restricts inspection checks. People in our country habitually flinch: Are we not baring ourselves too much in front of the U.S. inspectors' immodest gaze. If we want disarmament to continue, we must completely abandon our mania for secrecy. And not forget that our beloved "cunning little ruses" have seriously damaged our reputation. When it is a question of shutting off all routes to the nuclear threat, no verification can be excessive or superfluous.

By and large, I repeat, the deep cuts in strategic offensive arms, accompanied by reliable verification, that preserve USSR-U.S. strategic parity and increase the stability of Soviet-U.S. relations allow us to describe the treaty as an important step designed to strengthen our country's security.

Now a word about the treaty's weak spots, its minuses. Naturally, those that are visible to the nonspecialist's unaided eye.

First, the Americans have effectively kept a free hand on SDI because the linkage between strategic offensive arms cuts and the problems of ABM defense is a weak one. At one time this linkage was one of the key demands of the Soviet position. We removed this demand. In my view, we were right to do this. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. We got the bird in the hand. Now we have to think further.

The fewer missiles there are the simpler the tasks of ABM defense. The Americans realize that. It seems that they have appreciably slowed research in the sphere of space laser exotica. The emphasis is being switched to land-based defense systems. In particular, it is a question of deploying 100 missile interceptors at the Grand Forks Base (North Dakota) by 1996. The Senate has already appropriated a first installment of \$1.55 billion for this.

At present the Americans' action does not constitute a breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty and we have no legal grounds for complaints.

In the future the Pentagon is to raise the question of developing [sozdaniye] the so-called Global Protection Against Limited Strikes [GPALS], which also envisages space-based components (the task is as follows: to repulse any attack with a quantity of 20-200 warheads [boyezaryady] from any point on the globe on any target). The deployment of this system (parallel with further strategic offensive arms cuts) may drastically destabilize the situation insofar as it will render problematic the effectiveness of a second, retaliatory strike. Our position will depend on the general evolution of Soviet-U.S. relations. If they develop evenly, without disruption, you cannot rule out the possibility of cooperation in developing GPALS. Otherwise strategic offensive arms limitation may be left hanging in midair or (and) give way to a defensive strategic arms race. Which is undesirable, in the economic rather than in the military context. The consultations in the fall may clarify the situation.

The fact that the treaty—apart from certain, clearly stipulated cases—does not restrict the modernization, improvement, and development [sozdaniye] of new types of carriers and nuclear warheads is also confusing. It is logical to assume that the quantitative ceilings will stimulate and spur a qualitative, technological arms race. In that case it would be worth resuming the talks on, if not a complete ban on, then at least a further material limitation in the yield and number of nuclear explosions. I would remind you that since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki members of the world nuclear club have carried out more than 1,900 nuclear tests—that is, every three days a nuclear explosive device has been tested on the planet. [Sentence as published] It is time to call a halt...

Among the treaty's shortcomings I would cite the fact that the United States—if it deems it necessary to fully load its heavy bombers—will have more nuclear weapons [yadernyye boyezaryady] than the Soviet Union. I realize that heavy bombers are not destabilizing systems or a first-strike system, and that the above asymmetry does not upset the strategic parity. When producing the final form of the strategic equation such "compensatory" facts as our superiority in heavy ICBM's (the Americans simply do not have these) and mobile ICBM's (the Americans would hardly want to catch up with us) were probably taken into consideration. Incidentally, it is these two targets that come under critical fire in the United States.

That is all true. But I think that it would be advisable in the course of subsequent talks gradually to close the gap between our strategic offensive arms structures and thus get rid of the existing inequalities.

I am sure that a specialist's trained eye will find plenty of other defects in the text of the treaty. A compromise

cannot be beyond reproach. Details can always be disputed. But it is in my view indisputable that by and large the treaty performs its task—it renders the world a more stable, calmer, and more peaceful place.

Looking back over the past 20 years, there is every reason to repeat the sacred words: "The ice has broken!" In 1972 the ABM and SALT I Treaties were signed which drastically limited the option for ABM defense and curbed the increase in strategic offensive arms. The year 1974 saw the tightening up of the ABM Treaty, while 1979 saw the signing of the SALT II Treaty and new limitations on strategic arms; and even though the treaty did not become legally binding, it was to all intents and purposes observed by both sides. The year 1987 saw the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which banned and destroyed two kinds of nuclear carriers; and in 1990 the CFE Treaty was signed, whereby 22 states considerably reduced their conventional arms. Finally, 1991 saw the START I Treaty. Let us hope that this series will not be broken.

'New Model' for Strategic Balance Outlined

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[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Sergey Vadmovich Kortunov, advisor to the Administration on Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Toward a New Model for Strategic Relations"]

[Text] One of the most important results of Soviet-American military-political interaction in the years of perestroika is the completion of work on the Treaty on Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons. Now, when as the result of many years of efforts by politicians, diplomats and soldiers of the two nations this treaty is finally signed, it faces its most serious trial: discussion in the highest legislative organs of the USSR and the USA—the Supreme Soviet and the Congress.

It is altogether natural that this most important document draws rapt attention to itself. Its coordinated positions are being carefully analyzed; moreover, it is already being subjected to criticism.

Doubts in connection with the treaty are frequently expressed from completely opposite positions: some say that the reductions stipulated for the two parties are not enough; others—that the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union are being subjected to excessive reduction, and that we have made excessively large concessions, to the detriment of our security.

Questions of another sort arise as well: Does the rate of reduction of strategic nuclear weapons coincide with the rapidly-changing nature of international relations as a whole, and Soviet-American relations in particular? How are the USSR and USA to operate after concluding

the START-I Treaty? What should be the parameters of the next stage of nuclear disarmament—START-II?

This group of questions is, I think, no less important. After all, if continuity is assured for the process of nuclear disarmament, and if the parties start negotiations on further radical reductions in strategic arms, then the clear shortcomings and incompleteness of the treaty concluded may then not be dramatized.

In this connection the decisiveness of the USSR and the USA following the signing of the treaty, recorded in the special joint declaration adopted in the course of the May-June 1990 summit meeting in Washington, is extremely important; namely, to conduct without delay consultations with respect to future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and further strengthening of strategic stability, and to begin these negotiations as soon as practically possible. Moreover, a weighty and objective analysis of the treaty can be provided only in the broad context of the unambiguous intentions of the USSR and USA expressed at the meeting in Washington, to undertake further stabilizing reductions of strategic nuclear arsenals, for which it establishes the necessary prerequisites.

Political and Military Aspects of the Treaty

With all the differences in analysis of the Strategic Arms Treaty, one certainly cannot doubt that it will become a major landmark, both in the history of arms limitation, and in the relations between the USSR and the USA. Being a result of the recognition by both parties of their special responsibility for reducing the danger of the breakout of a nuclear war, strengthening strategic stability, consolidating peace and international security, the treaty marks a turning point in Soviet-American efforts in the realm of arms limitation, orienting them toward the establishment of relations characterized by greater rationality, openness, cooperation, predictability and stability.

On the broader political plane, the treaty is a symbol of the formation of the new nature of Soviet-American interaction, and is a material affirmation of the intentions of both parties to cross the Rubicon of confrontation and "cold war," and to create conditions for constructive, civilized relations. Both the very fact of the large-scale limitations and reductions of nuclear might, and the ramified verification mechanism built-in to the treaty will promote the introduction to Soviet-American relations of unprecedented standards of trust and openness, and create the prerequisites for both fundamental re-evaluation of the nature of the military threat, and for the resolution of conflict situations which arise, by exclusively political means.

The implementation of this treaty, as well as the Treaty on Reduction of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, will radically improve the health of the entire international situation, will render positive influence on many levels on international relations, and will mark the irreversible end of the post-war confrontational period.

Thus, the positive political "dividends" of the treaty are altogether indisputable. But what can one say about the military-strategic side of the matter? After all, there have already been periods in Soviet-American relations when important bilateral agreements were concluded in the realm of strategic offensive weapons. However, they led merely to restraining the arms race in certain directions, to a certain limitation of military rivalry between the USSR and the USA; moreover, without sufficiently effective verification measures. The very idea of arms control was as a result compromised, being reduced, in essence, merely to fixing the parameters of continuing military competition between the USSR and the USA. It is understandable that in these conditions the question of their interaction in the military-strategic sphere could not even be broached.

Then what does the treaty recently signed in Moscow introduce to this situation that is new? Without going into details, we shall limit ourselves only to the most important features.

First of all, in the event it is put into effect, for the first time in the history of the development of the "strategic triad," the continuing trend for quantitative growth of all three of its components will be overcome, and in a seven-year period both the number of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's], submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's] and heavy bombers), and the nuclear warheads themselves, will be significantly reduced. And although neither party "stretched" to the 50-percent reduction which was the expressed goal of the negotiations, it is important that at last the process will begin of reduction of strategic weapons by means of their withdrawal from effective combat strength [boevoy sostav], while there will be major reductions, numbering in hundreds of vehicles and thousands of warheads. One must not forget that in the absence of a treaty the USSR and the USA could have an unlimited number of ICBM's and SLBM's, and could significantly increase the number of heavy bombers equipped with air-launched cruise missiles [ALCM's] both in the nuclear and non-nuclear version. Nor could the program for deploying nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles [SLCM's] be reduced in any way.

In addition, the treaty stipulates significant limitations on the modernization of strategic offensive weapons. For example, there are limitations on the total throw-weight of ballistic missiles and the number of warheads on them; new types of heavy ICBM's and SLBM's are banned, as are new types of launchers for ballistic missiles, and nuclear ALCM's with multiple individually-targetable warheads. Many other limitations and bans are envisaged as well.

Those who closely follow the military programs of the USSR and the USA have probably also noticed that with the beginning of the negotiations on 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, significant changes have taken place in the execution of these programs

toward reducing the volume of deployment of the corresponding weapons, and delaying the receipt of new weapons in the arsenals. The number of the very latest programs has been reduced, and funding of the development of strategic nuclear forces has declined.

Finally, potential critics of the treaty must also recognize that as a result of carrying out the reductions stipulated in it, under all possible structures of strategic offensive arms, the security of the USSR will be fully assured. The "safety margin" of nuclear parity leaves no doubt in the fact that under any hypothetical attack, each of the parties retains a sufficient arsenal of weapons in order to deal an unacceptable retaliatory strike, which would destroy the military-economic structure of the other party. This permits one to characterize the strategic situation as a whole as a stable one, which provides sufficiently reliable mutual nuclear deterrence.

At the same time, the treaty, it goes without saying, requires more in-depth analysis, with goes beyond the traditional impressions of the military-strategic balance. It is not as easy to go beyond these bounds as it seems—especially for the specialists who took a direct role in drawing up the treaty. And nevertheless, it is necessary to do this. Otherwise, the fundamental purpose and the prospects for negotiations on nuclear and space weapons might be neglected. And this purpose was defined in the joint Soviet-American statement of 8 January 1985 in the following manner: "...Working out effective agreements directed at forestalling the arms race in space and halting it on Earth, for limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, and for strengthening strategic stability... In the final analysis, in the opinion of the parties to the forthcoming negotiations, the efforts in general in the realm of limitation and reduction of arms, must lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons totally, everywhere."¹

Against the background of real movement toward this goal, the treaty, of course, is a very modest step, the more so since the reduction of strategic offensive arms envisaged in it is of an extremely arbitrary nature: neither nuclear warheads nor the basic mass of missiles removed from the arsenals are subject to physical elimination, although they will be removed from the effective combat strength. One way or another, after its implementation the arsenals of the parties will still contain a colossal surplus of nuclear might, which exceeds many times over any conceivable criteria for reasonable sufficiency for the purpose of deterring one another from attack by the threat of a retaliatory strike. In other words, the treaty not only does not take the strategic relationships of the parties beyond "mutual nuclear deterrence," that is, a situation in which the USSR and the USA look upon one another as potential aggressors, and stability is assured by the danger of mutual destruction, it does not even limit the nuclear potentials of the USSR and USA to the level of "minimal nuclear deterrence," which would assure unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike.

Moreover, the coordinated rule in the agreement for counting nuclear weapons on heavy bombers (all nuclear weapons, except ALCM's, are counted as one weapon for each heavy bomber) make it possible for both parties, without formal violation of its statutes, to increase their arsenal of strategic offensive arms by thousands of weapons.

In an of itself, the reduction of strategic offensive arms planned in accordance with the treaty (apart from the measures stipulated in it for verification, openness and predictability) could hardly be considered major positive achievements in the direction of creating the truly stable strategic relationship of the USSR and the USA even within the framework of the model of "mutual nuclear deterrence."

The fact of the matter is, that the treaty programs for both parties the elimination of practically only the obsolete weapons, the service life of which has one way or another already expired. And the parameters the treaty permits for modernization of strategic offensive arms makes it probable that after the reduction, the proportion of armaments of both parties, which could be used in a first-strike, will increase. At the same time, the greater part of the warheads of each of the parties will be deployed on precisely such systems which, of course, will not promote the strengthening of stability in the future strategic situation.

As a result, it may turn out that both the Soviet and the American strategic potential will consist of "fast-flying" missile systems based both on land and at sea, capable of striking heavily-defended targets; and also large groupings of heavy bombers fitted out with ALCM's and short-range missiles possessing the capability of flying to the target unseen. This will fix in the strategic relations of the two parties for many years an actual model of "counter-force nuclear deterrence," which is a less stable model in comparison with the "counter-value strategy," when the retaliatory strike is aimed primarily at military-economic centers and objectives.

Among the obvious flaws in the treaty is also the fact that it does not stipulate sufficiently strict limitations on putting new strategic offensive arms systems into operation. And this creates the prerequisites not only for attributing to the potential of the parties principally new counter-force capabilities, but also for a technological breakthrough in some kind of new direction of development of military hardware, capable of rendering significant destabilizing influence on the strategic situation. Nor must one ignore the very real prospect of accelerated development of precision non-nuclear arms of strategic range, among which is the re-equipping of the heavy strategic bombers, which is permitted by the treaty. All these unresolved problems will continually feed the concerns of the parties, and if the treaty is not backed up by the next stage of negotiations, then the political capital accumulated in the process of its preparation, could be quickly used up.

But even that is not the main point. Actually the treaty reflects the aspirations of both parties to assure for themselves the capability of inflicting "equal harm" in a nuclear war, which today is considered extremely unlikely. In other words, fixed in it is the "negative paradigm" of the Soviet-American strategic relationship, which was formed on the bases of the "worst-possible scenario" of developing events.

On this plane the treaty represents no more than a foundation, a "zero base" for building a stable strategic relationship between the USSR and the USA, and the replacement of the "negative paradigm" of such a relationship with a "positive paradigm" of strategic relations. And its basic value consists of the fact that it establishes the conditions for the next stage of nuclear disarmament which should, if not ensure, then approach the achievement of the principal goal of the negotiations, as formulated in the Joint Soviet-American Statement of 8 January 1985.

New Factors of World and National Politics

The main reason for the existing shortcomings of the treaty lies in the fact, it seems to me, that its basic contours were formulated in a principally different situation, which differs from the present, in the context of broad political compromise which was to bring Soviet-American relations out of the state of profound crisis in which they were found in the middle 1980's. Strictly speaking, at that time the very fact of an on-going dialogue between the two major nuclear powers on military-strategic problems was important.

Now it has become clear: to a significant extent this dialogue lagged behind the development of political events and the formulation of a principally new basis for Soviet-American relations. As a result, the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons, at the moment of its conclusion, was to a significant degree "morally obsolete."

There is, it goes without saying, no particular tragedy in that. On the contrary, one should probably only be glad for the fact that positive changes in the relationship between the USSR and the USA have grown so swiftly in recent years. At the same time, when defining the basic tasks for the next stage of nuclear disarmament, consideration of these changes and other factors in world and national politics as well is, of course, necessary, inasmuch as it establishes a qualitatively different context for Soviet-American negotiations on military-strategic questions. It is a question of the following:

First of all the termination of the "cold war" makes the structure of military-power confrontation that took shape in the postwar years senseless on the political plane and, consequently, groundless in the economic respect as well. As is well-known, the Joint Declaration of 22 States, including the USSR and USA, signed 19 November 1990 in Paris, recorded their triumphant statement of the fact that they are no longer enemies. Under these conditions one of the main components of

the aforementioned structure must not remain unchanged—the mechanism for "mutual nuclear deterrence," which is in essence a means for forestalling global war under conditions of confrontation, a kind of "modus vivendi" in a "bipolar" world.

Working in favor of radical transformation of this mechanism is not only the improvement in Soviet-American relations, but also such factors as the objective reduction of the rule of the two "superpowers" in world politics, and also a shift in the axis of global conflicts from the plane of East-West relations to the plane of North-South relations, and the accelerated events in the Persian Gulf. Finally, the growth of economic interdependence, and the objective need for joint solution to global problems of world development are powerful, politically integrating factors for both countries.

One might suppose that under these conditions the national interests of the USSR and USA would increasingly come together; in their policies qualitatively new elements of constructive interaction and even partnership will most likely continue to appear. At the same time the significance of the factor of "mutual deterrence" in their relationships, and consequently, its "proportion" of the priorities of the national politics of both countries will most likely become proportionally smaller.

Additionally, in the 1990's, by virtue of a number of circumstances, including the obvious waning of the mutual military threat, economic and political pressure in the USSR and USA will grow rapidly in favor of radical reductions in nuclear weapons.

As concerns the USSR, in conditions of transition to a market economy, its ability to effectively compete with the USA in the realm of deploying new kinds and types of strategic weapons will inevitably fall under question. For both the legislative organs and the executive authorities in the USSR the time has come to fully recognize that strategic parity with the USA was provided under conditions of the command-administrative system, which permitted uncontrolled funding of military programs at the expense of the civilian sector of the economy. Now, however, such a practice has become impossible.

No less important a "limiter" is the democratic reforms in the USSR which are leading to the creation of a rule-of-law state, in which the question of distribution of resources and financial assets will, of course, be decided not in the interests of the military-industrial complex, but in strict accordance with the priorities of national security, as confirmed by the Supreme Soviet.

A new and already revealing factor, which will restrain and control to an ever-increasing extent the aspirations of the Soviet military-industrial complex to compete with the USA in the area of strategic military build-up on an "equal" basis, is the increasing influence of the republics on the development and even the stationing of nuclear weapons. The Union government has already met with the firm opposition of the Kazakh SSR (and the

regional authorities of the RSFSR), for conducting nuclear weapons testing on its territory. Conducting further such tests on Novaya Zemlya remains problematic as well. The increasing aspirations of the union republics for independence, and the declaration of their territories as nuclear-free zones may force the central military-political organs of the nation to re-examine the system of basing strategic offensive weapons, and strictly regulate the corresponding military activity. One should not exclude the possibility that the question might arise of re-basing principal strategic offensive weapons facilities, in all likelihood, to the territory of the RSFSR.

Such prospects should not, by the way, be overdramatized. After all the influence of regional and social movements and that of the state structure on the development and basing of nuclear armaments is the norm for any civilized country. Central authorities of state in the USA, in Great Britain, and in France are forced to take this influence into consideration. Thus, this is merely the natural "deterrence" of a rule-of-law state, which we aspire to create.

In this connection, it is necessary to clearly recognize—moreover, without any kind of panicky rushing about—that in the very near future, and without any sort of negotiations with the Americans, the USSR shall have to introduce certain corrections not only to the plans for further construction and disposition of the strategic forces of the USSR, but also, perhaps, in the operational plans for their probably use in combat actions.

Finally, a powerful "moment of pressure" in favor of radical reduction of nuclear weapons and a high tempo for negotiations on this question would most likely create further "de-ideologization" of Soviet society and the world at large. It would make clear the senselessness of the military-power structure of confrontation, including nuclear confrontation, under conditions of the movement of industrially-developed countries to a homogeneous economic, political and legal field.

At the same time it would be unrealistic to expect that the next stage in Soviet-American negotiations would lead to total elimination of strategic offensive weapons. The support for nuclear deterrence will in all likelihood and for a long time like at the basis of the security policy of both countries, until the mutual mistrust, suspicion and all kinds of false perceptions of the one another's intentions are overcome. The USSR, as the USA as well, can ignore neither the existence of other nuclear powers, nor the danger of further proliferation of nuclear weapons; no less than ten countries have the capability to create them in a short period. To this one must add the colossal inertia of the functioning of the nuclear war machine; although under conditions of the end of the "cold war" it has to a significant extent run down, it can of course not be eliminated all at once; moreover, like any bureaucratic structure, it will try to continue to operate on its own.

In this connection the realistic goal of the next stage of nuclear disarmament must, apparently, be not the rejection of nuclear deterrence (which would also signify a fundamental change in the existing system of international relations with all its problems and contradictions; moreover, both on the field of East-West, but also on the North-South), but the achievement of a level of "minimal nuclear deterrence."

One should not underestimate the difficulty of achieving this goal. At first glance its realization seems possible largely by virtue of reducing the clearly excessive reserve of nuclear weapons. However, such a reduction would require examination of many other problems as well, which define strategic stability. For example, transition to "minimal deterrence" without taking decisive measures for increasing the life-span of nuclear weapons delivery systems would be a destabilizing factor, inasmuch as it might weaken the potential for a retaliatory strike. The fact of the matter is, that at a low level of nuclear deterrence increasing importance is given to the factor of the vulnerability of strategic offensive weapons even from conventional strike systems. In addition, to the extent that the strategic potential of the USSR and USA is reduced, the role of the strategic potential of third nuclear powers objectively increases, as well as that of non-strategic nuclear weapons. And one has to consider a number of other factors, of which we speak below.

In general, at the stage of movement toward "minimal deterrence," the numerical reduction of nuclear arms, it goes without saying, should not be an end in itself. After all, the main idea of agreement in the realm of disarmament is not reducing the number of weapons—but the reduction of the threat of their use. On this plane, at the stage of START-II, greater significance will be given to agreement on measures for confidence and predictability in the military-strategic realm, which in the context of radical reduction of strategic offensive arms and optimization of the structure of strategic potentials must lead to solving the basic task of the next stage of negotiations—ensuring strategic stability; that is, the kind of situation in which each party would have confidence that the other party not only cannot count on first use of nuclear weapons in the hope of coming out on top in a nuclear war, but also would not entertain thoughts of its use, except in response to an attack.

Tasks and Content of the Next Stage of Strategic Arms Reduction

In accordance with the joint declaration with respect to future negotiations on nuclear and space weapons and further strengthening of strategic stability, adopted 1 June 1990 in the course of the Soviet-American summit conference in Washington, the USSR and USA have agreed to conduct new negotiations on strategic offensive arms with the goal of further reducing the danger of the outbreak of war, especially nuclear war; to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability by means of further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. Both parties have also agreed

to rely in the course of these new negotiations on the elimination of stimuli for launching the first strike, for reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and to give preference to systems possessing increased survivability.

On the basis of these approaches, the principal task of the next stage of reducing strategic arms could be defined as follows: the formation on both parties of a strategic force structure which in terms of its material-technical substance could not be regarded by the other party as providing a first-strike potential, through—first of all—total elimination of such arms systems by each party, with the other party considers the most dangerous and provocative. Thus, this stage would be focused not only and not so much on quantitative reduction, as much as on a profound restructuring of the strategic potentials of the USSR and the USA, as well as covering the most destabilizing directions of the development of strategic weapons.

In practice, it will of course not be very easy to solve this problem. The more so that at the same time certain historically and geographically-conditioned asymmetries in the realm of strategic offensive weapons should probably be preserved. At once the question arises of drawing up objective criteria for determining the most destabilizing strategic offensive weapons system, which would be subject to top-priority reduction. At the given stage, if one proceeds from the Soviet-American statement, one could in all likelihood attribute to that category the systems whose first-strike capabilities would significantly exceed their capabilities in retaliatory actions; that is, the systems capable of striking and intended for striking heavily-defended targets (representing the retaliatory strike forces of the other party); and the most vulnerable systems, as well as systems with a high concentration of warheads, inasmuch as they would seem to provoke the other party to deal a disarming strike. Clearly this kind of reduction could be accomplished only on the basis of mutual stock-taking and removal of concern which, of course, assumes a high degree of mutual trust. With such a level the parties would not be interested in the appearance in their own strategic arsenals of such systems which would raise an alarm on the other party for their own security, based on the fact that they might be used for a sudden attack.

On the whole it would be important for the USSR and the USA in the process of reductions to strive for change from the policy of predominantly counter-force mutual nuclear deterrence as contained in START-I, to a safer policy of strategic relations which would ensure stability not only at a significantly lower level of confrontation of systems, but basically also at the expense of the forces adapted for use in a retaliatory strike. As a maximum-program one could have in mind total elimination of multi-warhead ICBMs and SLBMs the cessation of tests on their new generations (that is, "de-MIRV-ing the missile forces). In any event stricter qualitative limitations must be provided for strategic weapons, and a lower correlation between the numbers of warheads and

their delivery systems. Additionally, in order to eliminate one of the sources of mistrust, as if "programed" in START-I, at a new stage of nuclear disarmament it would be important to bring the maximum number of warheads considered closer to the real count. Nor should nuclear SLCMs be forgotten, which it would be preferable to totally ban.

At the same time it would be sensible to undertake the elimination or at least impose strict limitations on conventional weapons which have strategic range (above all, the SLCM). Otherwise agreements on nuclear disarmament would, in consideration of the growing strike capability of strategic non-nuclear weapons, be largely depreciated. (As concerns the "conventional" SLCMs, they could be made the subject of negotiations on naval problems.)

Finally, both in the political and the military plane, it is extremely important that at the stage of START-II, the parties would set about their own nuclear disarmament; that is, the controlled elimination of nuclear warheads. After all, thus far at the negotiations they have been talking about reducing only the delivery systems for nuclear weapons, and the warheads have remained in the arsenals of the states; and this has recently begun to cause legitimate concern among the world community.

Future agreements must establish effective bans on the means of combat with retaliatory strike systems of the other party, in particular with the mobile ICBM's, as well as single-warhead ICBM's in hardened silos. It is a question of, for example, banning the creation of planning, maneuvering and guidance (self-guided at the final part of the trajectory) systems, as well as "penetrating" [pronikayushchiy] warheads on ballistic missiles and systems, which ensure hidden approach to the target; re-equipping of long-fuselage aircraft as heavy bombers, and so on. There must be agreement on limiting antisubmarine warfare systems as well, the capabilities of which for strategic stability are becoming perceptible, with the radical reduction of strategic weapons; and also a ban on the creation of "space-to-earth" weapons, which have air-defense and anti-ballistic-missile [ABM] functions; and perhaps also on the creation of strategic offensive weapons on new physical principles as a whole.

From this same point of view a necessary element of future agreements must be a ban on fitting out penetration bombers using "stealth" technology, short-range "air-ground" missiles, and also long-range air-launched cruise missiles with elements of "stealth" technology and other technologies for hidden flight to the target.

An exceptionally important measure for strengthening strategic stability, which must accompany the restructuring of the strategic potential of the parties, would be a ban on the creation of new anti-satellite [ASAT] systems capable of striking or interfering with the functions of

systems for early warning, command and control, communication and reconnaissance of the other party, with elimination of already-existing ASAT systems ("ASAT zero option").

At the same time the parties could re-examine or reject the additional Protocol of 1974 to the 1972 ABM Treaty and totally ban the deployment of antimissile systems ("ABM zero option"). But, in case the parties come to the conclusion that at a low level of mutual nuclear deterrence a certain potential for defensive strategic weapons would strengthen stability—and the mandate for new negotiations directly stipulates the discussion of the question of the interrelationship of strategic offensive and defense weapons in the context of strengthening strategic stability—it would probably be possible to think about supplementing the 1974 Protocol on the plane of permitting the deployment of point-defense [obyektovyy] systems for the defense of strategic offensive arms bases, and command and control systems.

Finally, one cannot exclude that the problem of the use of ABM systems for defense from nuclear terrorism from third countries might be discussed at the negotiations, and also from accidental and unauthorized ballistic missile launches. In this case it would be necessary to agree on a "threshold of density" for limiting the ABM systems of each of the parties, in order that it would not cause mutual concerns and would not provoke the other party to create destabilizing systems to overcome it.

As it seems, the above-described parameters for the next stage of strategic arms reduction, if it does not coincide, it is very close to realizing the conception of "minimal nuclear deterrence," the essence of which, in all likelihood, consists of the achievement of the minimal level of strategic forces in which their deterrence capability is retained by means of the possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. At the same time the vastly exaggerated criteria in the operative plans of both parties for such damage must be, undoubtedly, radically re-examined, perhaps as a result of joint discussion.

With such a variant the ideal would be elimination of the capability of using nuclear weapons both on the horizontal (expanded deterrence) and on the vertical (counter-force strike) ladder of escalation in a hypothetical nuclear conflict. Or in other words—the capability not only for a first counter-force strike, but also for a retaliatory counter-strike, which threatens crisis stability. Although in a military-technical respect to limit the strategic potentials of the parties to the capability of only a retaliatory strike—is an exceptionally complicated task.

In the context of such a broad-scale approach to the reduction of strategic offensive arms, strategic stability becomes much more perceptible for non-strategic nuclear weapons—both land and sea-based. After all, minimal deterrence in all likelihood assumes at the same time maximum height of the "nuclear threshold." And

that, according to the analysis of the majority of military experts in the USSR and USA, is lowered with the introduction of such weapons to the nuclear arsenals of the parties. In this connection, in the future "minimal nuclear deterrence" must be provided exclusively by the strategic forces of the USSR and USA at a level of from 500-2,000 guaranteed-survivable warheads—depending upon how other questions (anti-missile defense, anti-submarine defense, air defense, etc.), and also upon the stage at which other nuclear powers subscribe to nuclear disarmament—with total elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The latter, however, will become the subject of separate negotiations, which should begin in the near future.

Confidence-Building and Predictability Measures

The dialectical unity of steps toward reducing strategic arms and confidence-building measures in the nuclear realm are obvious. It is manifested in the fact that, on the one hand, nuclear disarmament is accompanied by affirmation in military-political relations between the USSR and the USA of new standards of openness, trust and mutual verification, creating a mutual sense of the "removal" of the military threat and leading to increasing predictability and stability; and on the other hand, strengthening of mutual trust creates the prerequisites for further radical reductions in strategic arms. With respect to the next stage of strategic offensive arms reductions, one can say with confidence that the more far-reaching are the measures of trust on which the parties agree in the course of negotiations, the deeper such reductions will be.

Confidence-building measures can be arbitrarily divided into three basic groups:

- military-technical**, connected with ensuring effective verification of fulfillment of obligations the parties have assumed, and also with elaborating the obligations themselves (so-called "experimental [probnyye] measures," employed before the agreement goes into effect);
- military-political**, connected with improving interaction, with respect to strategic offensive arms, by the functional services of the parties, and also with limiting military activity in the realm of strategic offensive arms, removing the mutual concerns of the parties; and,
- political-military**, associated with ensuring openness of military activity and leading to predictability of the actions of the parties in the realm of strategic offensive arms.

As concerns the system of measures of verification of observance of the agreement for START-II, it will, on the whole, be based on those ramified verification mechanisms which are being created in accordance with START-I. By the time that new agreements are worked out, most likely the capabilities of the national technical means of verification will have significantly increased.

However, with all their effectiveness, the most convincing means remains on-site inspection. In this connection, under conditions of implementing a new stage of nuclear disarmament, it would probably not be proper to follow the path of expanding the range of sites subject to inspection, nor to expand the inspection quotas; but to introduce the following rule: "If you don't believe, come on in and convince yourself." In other words, a key measure of verification should be on-site inspection of any suspicious site [obyekt] without the right of refusal. Such a measure would not only correspond with the new character of the military-strategic relationship of the parties, it would also promote solution of the problem of simplifying the inspection-verification system and rendering it less expensive. On a practical plane this would mean ensuring the total transparency of strategic offensive arms facilities and their activity.

In general, affirmation of the fact that, to the extent that nuclear disarmament moves forward, the verification system will inevitably become more complex and, consequently, will become more costly, is at the very least debatable. After all, the cumbersome present-day verification infrastructure, created and established in accordance with the treaties on intermediate-range nuclear forces [INF], START-I, SALT-I, on chemical weapons, etc., is nothing other than the price the parties must pay—and a very high price—for mutual mistrust.

Therefore, if one proceeds from the premise that trust in relations between the USSR and USA will increase, to include the process of nuclear disarmament, one might assume that the parties will not, whatever happens, try to complicate and make difficult the inspection-verification mechanism, and in a number of cases it is possible they will reject its most costly parts. For example, the question should be weighed as to whether it will be necessary, at the stage of START-II, for continuous surveillance of this or that military facility by means of large inspection groups (according to the INF and START-I treaties—from 30-60 people at each site). For simplification and reducing the cost of inspection activity the question of creating inspection centers on the territory of the other party might also be worked out.

However, in the question of elimination of nuclear warheads, it will probably not be possible to get along without inspection. It is not excluded that here a significant portion of the "life cycle" of nuclear warhead facilities will have to be put under surveillance, including the production and processing of fissionable materials. Such verification will most likely require extensive introduction to the inspection activity of neutron and gamma-spectrometer devices for detection of nuclear warheads, which the parties might not only agree to, but perhaps will even work out jointly. Effective monitoring of nuclear materials and their production, and elimination of the possibility of rapid growth in the combat potential of strategic forces, would promote increased mutual trust of the parties.

Finally, at the stage of START-II, most likely the role of so-called "experimental inspections" will increase significantly, when the parties agree on showing their own weapons for the purpose of elaborating certain provisions of a treaty.

In the area of military-political confidence-building measures, it might be a question, as a minimum, of the following:

- to connect by means of automatic communication lines the command posts of the ballistic missile early warning systems [BMEWS—Sistema Preduprezhdeniya o Raketnom Napadenii] of the USSR and the USA, which would permit significantly increasing their effectiveness and increase the time for taking decisions in a crisis situation;
- to introduce in addition to information on the launch of ballistic missiles, information of test launches of weapons from heavy bombers;
- to forbid the parties' submarines with SLBM's and SLCM's (if they are not banned) to approach no closer than 1,000-1,500 km to the coastline of the USSR and USA (which coincides with the radius of action of modern air defense systems); and,
- to establish at storage sites for non-deployed strategic offensive weapons (for ICBM's, SLBM's and ALCM's) permanent observation posts with the use of the appropriate sensing devices.

At the same time, further-reaching confidence-building measures could perhaps correspond with the scope and scale of reductions in strategic offensive arms at the new stage. Thus, for example, there is a need for operational exchange of information in real-time, particularly in the event of false readings on missile launch warning systems, combat-training [uchebno-boevoy] and test launches of ballistic missiles, emergency launches of ballistic missiles, unsanctioned or anonymous employment of a nuclear weapon, or damage to a satellite important for national security.

To solve this problem, there are already functioning technical organs for ensuring a way out of a dangerous situation—Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers [NRRC's]—by which each party could be connected with the command posts of not only the missile-launch warning system, but also the space monitoring system [SKKP—Sistema kontrolya kosmicheskogo prostranstva] of one's own country, equipped with means for automatic transmission of inquiries to the other party and means of comparing the response received with data from one's own national means. For these purposes it would be possible to establish within the NRRC's, command-computer posts [KVP—komandno-vychislitelnyye punkty], connected by high-speed automatic data transmission lines with the command posts of the missile-launch warning system and space monitoring system,

and with the military-political leadership of both countries and the leadership of the armed forces, as well as with the analogous KVP of the other party.

The changing political atmosphere in Soviet-American relations and the mutual interest of the parties in implementing the necessary confidence-building measures permit achieving the implementation of previously-impossible approaches, such as the "open skies" policy which we rejected in the 1950's. Agreement on the use of the airspace of the states for monitoring its military activity opens possibilities for the employment of other joint measures, including the use of "black boxes," that is, automated tracking stations on the territory of the other state. In particular, a "zero" warning echelon could be introduced to the missile-launch warning system of the Soviet Union and the USA, created on the basis of local activity sensors situated in the immediate vicinity (200-500 meters) of ballistic missile launch silos, for the purpose of receiving reliable information on the launch of each ground-based strategic missile and transmission of a warning signal in automatic mode via satellite to the command post of the missile launch warning system of the corresponding party.

Various sensors might be used as information means in every "black box," such as seismic, electromagnetic, acoustic, infrared and television. Comprehensive use of various types of sensors would exclude the possibility of false alarms. Use of sensors based on various physical principles would ensure the reliability of the "ICBM launch" signal from each monitored launch silo with a reliability approaching 100 percent. Although such a solution does not remove the problem of early detection of an SLBM launch, the danger of a disarming preemptive strike would be significantly lowered, inasmuch as in the foreseeable future neither the USA nor the USSR will have the capability to carry out a synchronized strike on the entire spectrum of strategic targets by means of SLBM's alone, without involving the ICBM's.

Strategic stability would also be promoted by limiting the patrolling of nuclear ballistic missile submarines [SSBN's] in mutually-agreed upon regions, in which any kind of anti-submarine warfare would be banned. Additional measures for reducing the suddenness of a missile attack and incorrect interpretation of information from a missile-launch warning system could be a ban on testing of ballistic missiles with the use of flattened trajectories, which would provide a reduction in flight time of missiles; and also singling out on the earth's surface and in near-earth space of regions in which it would be forbidden to deploy chaff capable of deceiving BMEWS.

Regular exchange of data with respect to measures and means which guarantee unsanctioned launches of ballistic missiles might be yet another important military-political confidence-building measure. Ideally the parties should jointly develop and introduce such means with respect to strategic arms. Eliminating the danger of the outbreak of unpremeditated nuclear conflict would also

be promoted by agreement on informing one another on the level of combat readiness of strategic forces on inquiry from the other party. A far-reaching confidence-building measure would be agreement on mutual stationing of specialists of both parties at strategic forces control centers.

Finally, with respect to politico-military confidence-building measures at the second stage of strategic arms reduction, efforts should be made to formulate the strategic relationship of the USSR and USA on a principally new basis—predictability, transparency and mutual deterrence. Even before beginning the testing of prototypes of any new strategic arms the parties should inform one another about the basic parameters and characteristics, and should hold consultations for removing possible concerns. Visits to laboratories and test ranges should be conducted. It is exceptionally important that confidence-building measures embrace command, control, communications and intelligence systems as well. Under conditions of wide-scale reductions of strategic arms, the parties must have complete confidence in the fact that these systems are not adaptable for conducting extended nuclear war, including the fact that they are not capable of carrying out operations in real-time for re-targeting and re-coordination of nuclear strikes under conditions of extended nuclear conflict. Such confidence might be achieved by total transparency of the parties in the given realm. In this connection, confidence-building measures, openness and predictability must embrace all space activity of the USSR and the USA.

All this in aggregate would create a unique kind of bilateral mechanism for examination and removal of mutual concerns which arise in connection with the development of the strategic forces of the USSR and USA. Ideally, each of the parties would have a kind of "right of veto" on possible strategic offensive arms development of the other party. For purposes of increasing predictability of the development of strategic relations of the USSR and the USA, the parties would be obliged not only to exchange, at the beginning of each calendar year, data on planned changes in the number of strategic arms at the end of that year, which is stipulated in START-I, but also plans for developing strategic arms—both offensive and defensive—for a longer period (for example, for each forthcoming five-year period). The exchange of such information would comprise the basis for a future mode of openness and predictability of the strategic relationship of the parties, which in the future other states possessing nuclear weapons may join as well.

New Format for Negotiations

The existing format for the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks [NST] already seriously lags behind the level of development of Soviet-American relations as a whole. Its shortcomings include too slow a pace and the attempt to achieve a cumbersome, all-embracing agreement in all the problems discussed at the negotiations are squeezed

into a single combined "package," and a rather inert decision-making process. Clearly, the new model of Soviet-American relations being formulated requires qualitatively new organization of the negotiating process.

In particular, considering the fact that the "matrix" of strategic offensive arms reduction, as well as the verification, confidence-building and openness measures associated with it, are established by already-concluded treaties, work on a future forum might be oriented not toward drawing up some kind of new full-scale treaty replacing the preceding one, but on preparation of independent treaties on individual "matured" questions of strategic arms reduction or the confidence-building measures associated with it. If necessary, coordinated corrections and additions might be introduced to START-I.

Such a form of work would permit not only significantly intensifying the negotiating process and would make it more flexible and efficient, but also would simplify the procedure for working out joint solutions and their subsequent realization, inasmuch as their basic part could be of the nature of inter-governmental agreements. (Such a practice, as is well-known, was successfully employed by the parties in the course of the current NST talks and in carrying out the INF treaty.

Transition to the new form of Soviet-American strategic relations requires significant effort, going beyond the bounds of negotiations strictly on strategic arms reductions. It would seem that the goal of such efforts should consist of establishing an effective mechanism for monitoring technology in the strategic arena, which would allow bringing destabilizing trends to light at an early stage of development, and neutralizing them on the basis of cooperation.

In this connection one may agree with the opinion of those specialists who advise giving some thought to the creation of a kind of "communications cold-line" between the USSR and USA—a permanent bilateral forum of military personnel, technical experts and diplomats, where they could discuss the prospects for development of strategic forces, and the possible effects of this or that technological decision on strategic stability. This forum, apparently, should go beyond the framework of negotiations: its goal does not consist of the "exchange" of some systems for others, but of working out recommendations relative to coordinating the development of the strategic forces of the parties. Inasmuch as the participants on the "communications cold-line" would be discussing systems which still exist only on paper, it would be easier for them to avoid the influence of competing political and military-bureaucratic considerations, which of course distort the negotiation process to a certain extent.

One might assume that at the stage of implementing the agreements of START-II and the confidence-building measures associated with it, the parties would in all likelihood gradually begin to go beyond the bounds of

the situation of "mutual nuclear deterrence," that is, a situation in which the USSR and USA would deter one another from attack by the threat of a retaliatory strike; in other words, by fear of retaliation. During this essentially transitional period on the way from nuclear over-armament to a non-nuclear world, the role of the deterrence mechanisms would begin to be carried out by the coordinated obligations spelled out in the treaty under conditions of a widely-ramified infrastructure for verifying they are consistently observed, as well as maximum transparency of military operations. In other words, at this historical stage, nuclear-force deterrence would be transformed into political-legal, transparent and "verificational" deterrence.

Such a policy, it would seem, would not only provide continuity and successiveness in negotiations on nuclear arms reduction to the level of "minimal deterrence," but would also allow the USSR and the USA, in the future, to begin with other nuclear powers, a study of ways for jointly transitioning from a mode of mutual nuclear deterrence, to a new and much more secure model of strategic relations, which would guarantee stability on a non-nuclear basis.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 9 January 1985.

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U.S. Stealth Developments Reviewed

91SV0061A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Sep 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Col Yu. Omelchenko, doctor of military sciences, professor, under the "Military Technical Developments" rubric: "How to Counter the Stealths?"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The subject of the war in the Persian Gulf has been receding into the background in newspaper coverage. There has been a cooling of emotions and arguments, which have influenced the forming of contradictory opinions in various quarters, opinions ranging from unqualified praise of the battle capabilities of coalition forces armament on the one hand, to deep skepticism of Iraqi weaponry on the other, perhaps with the air defense weapons largely in mind, although this is not completely certain.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has dealt with the above topics. ("Shilka Against the B-52," 5 April 91; "The Dynamics of Parity," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Round Table, 25 June 91; "The S-300 More Effective than the Patriot," 27 June 91) The newspaper continues to receive letters from officers and warrant officers of the PVO Troops [Air Defense Troops] - real professionals in their field - who express an interest in new information on the combat capabilities of offensive air weapons designed

along the lines of the stealth technology, with an even stronger interest in how to counter the "invisible" craft. In general, is this complex technical problem solvable? This is the subject of discussion by a military science specialist.

Let me say without hesitation that the NATO armies' acquisition of offensive air weapons possessing reduced radar vulnerability has placed PVO, including in my opinion that of our Army, in a difficult position. The point here is that stealth technology, which has been applied to the creation of the F-117, causes a sharp reduction in radar vulnerability of offensive air weapons. This was shown in the war waged by the coalition forces against Iraq. However, the problem of detecting the above kind of weapons, as is now being brought out, is not as unsolvable as previously thought. The stealth technology in a number of cases does not provide complete invisibility, something that is admitted by highly authoritative specialists. Thus, D. Rice, the secretary of the Air Force, and Air Force Chief of Staff L. Welch have stated on a number of occasions in their support of B-2 bomber production that the B-2 is not completely "invisible," in certain cases experiencing detection by certain radars. Similar statements may be made concerning other aircraft. While American F-117 fighters were flying in the Persian Gulf area, it was learned that they were detected in Saudi Arabian air space by radar of the French firm Thomson.

Also concluding that B-2 bombers could be detected by over-the-horizon radars were Australian specialists. It is known that these radars illuminate a target from above. The bomber presents a so-called "shiny surface" on the upper fuselage, the location of the air intakes, thus rendering it vulnerable to detection.

However, specialists believe that the principal solution to the problem of low-signature aircraft is closely linked to the realization of advanced technical solutions, including the use of super-wideband radars; combining radars into a network that includes real-time correlation data processing; application of the nonlinear radar effect, and others. These technical solutions to some degree or other are even now being put into practice. Thus, Congress in 1990 provided 25 million dollars for the creation of ultrawideband (UWB) frequency radar systems and powerful microwave systems employing light excitation. This kind of radar is based on the transmission of very short and powerful wideband pulses that make it possible to detect and track aerial targets.

ITT Gilfillan, the well-known American firm, is conducting research on the application of integrated and super-high speed millimeter-range circuits used in multimode phased-array and active-aperture radars. These radars would be considerably lighter and more effective than existing types. They will offer a wide operating band and significant frequency stability, with the capability of transmitting a considerable amount of energy in the direction of distant or low-signature targets, using a system of improved power control. The firm's specialists

believe that the transmitting and receiving module developed by the firm is typical for the technology that will be employed in the next generation of radars featuring a phased array and active aperture.

Another effort in which ITT is involved is the development of bistatic radars that can function in the passive as well as active mode. They would receive signals reflected from targets illuminated by other radars, including enemy radars.

Intensive efforts are also under way to improve radar jamming resistance. Highly successful in this has been the French firm Thomson-CSF, for example. Its jamming-resistant medium-range TRS 2620 Gerfaut and long-range TRS 2630 Griffon surveillance radars are digital pulsed Doppler equipments offering pulse compression and carrier frequency variation. More than 75 of these radars will be delivered to the French Army under the Samantha Air Defense Program. Orders have also been placed in support of forward area air defense by armies of the U.S., Finland, and two Latin American countries.

To what can the success of the Thomson-CSF be ascribed in its creation of such popular jamming-resistant radars? The Griffon radar, for example, employs the upper portion of the 10-centimeter band. The radiation pattern is of a pencil type, with random change of carrier frequency from one pulse packet to another, thus providing good defense against response jamming. This variation in transmitter operating frequency within a broad spectral range forces the wide-band jamming aircraft to set up barrage jamming within that wide frequency range, thus suffering a substantial reduction in density.

At what distance can targets be detected? One of the ways being sought to solve this problem is the development of new over-the-horizon radars. The USA in 1990 demonstrated the command post of an over-the-horizon radar that offers the capability of observing aerial targets at a range of 3,300 kilometers. A radar set located in the northeastern part of the United States (city of Bangor) is capable of watching the air space over a large territory, from Greenland to the northern areas of South America. The equipment is designed to provide early warning of aerial targets. The new radar is based on the principle of atmospheric reradiation of direct and reflected pulses. All the data produced, which is processed by computer, assist the operator in selecting the ionospheric areas most favorable for signal transmission and the associated pulse frequency. It is planned to set up this kind of radar in North Dakota, California, and Alaska, thus making it possible to monitor the air space over the approaches to the entire territory of the USA.

Also in progress is work involving installing radars or antenna systems aboard dirigibles or balloons. As part of the air defense initiative program, the American firm of Westinghouse and the English Airship Industries are

working on several versions of a prospective multi-purpose dirigible that will be employed as a long-term aerial radar observation platform. For example, the radar carried by the Sentinel 5000 dirigible should detect - depending on altitude - low-flying aircraft at ranges of 187 to 209 kilometers, and high-flying craft at greater distances. A low-altitude surveillance system employing the radar-equipped captive balloon LASS was deployed over the territory of Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War.

I would like to stress that virtually all the abovementioned radars are capable of accomplishing their assigned missions in an environment of present and future offensive air weapons designed along stealth lines.

In this survey of present and future radars, it is easily seen that they all to a great degree are science-intensive and require an advanced manufacturing base. For this reason, the requirements relating to radar development emerge as a powerful motivation for creating and implementing advanced technologies for which there is also a well-known need in our national economy. The development and mastery of these technologies, while making it possible to manufacture at a modern level not only military products, but national economic items as well, will promote the resolution of a number of highly important problems related to strengthening the country's defensive capability.

Chelyabinsk-70 Arms Center Opens to Journalists

*LD1109014791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 2300 GMT 8 Sep 91*

[Text] The Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear center has been opened up to journalists. Correspondent Vladlen Kazanets has the details:

[Kazanets] Chelyabinsk-70 is a town that does not appear on any map of the world. In fact this urban center with 100,000 inhabitants is really not far from Yekaterinburg—some 40 km away. For 30 years this center, where the majority of Soviet nuclear warheads were designed, was kept secret both from us and from the CIA. Thanks to Mikhaylov, USSR deputy minister for nuclear power and industry, the strict veil of secrecy has now been lifted. Journalists from TASS were allowed to visit the All-Union Research Institute for Technical Physics at Chelyabinsk-70, where they saw with their own eyes the Soviet atomic bomb, the most hallowed of defense secrets. No doubt the Livermore Laboratory at Los Alamos could add greatly to the information gathered by the TASS journalists. After all, what secrets can there be when satellites can easily read car license plates from space? Local journalists are now impatiently waiting their turn to make it to Chelyabinsk-70. It would be interesting, would it not, to learn about a town with almost 100,000 inhabitants, whose existence we were completely ignorant of for so long. This is Vladlen Kazanets with a special report for Russia's Radio.

G. Arbatov Backs 'Radical,' Unilateral Nuclear Cuts

*PM1209084391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Sep 91 Union Edition p 7*

[Article by Academician G. Arbatov: "The Fewer Nuclear Weapons There Are, the Smaller the Risk"]

[Text] I received the letter from the American Association of Concerned Scientists to the Congress of People's Deputies, which IZVESTIYA reported (see No. 211), yesterday. Its author is Henry Kendall, chairman of the association, physicist, and Nobel Prize winner. The ideas contained in the letter seem extremely important to me.

On the eve of the last Soviet-American summit I wrote in an article published in IZVESTIYA that our approach to talks on restricting and reducing strategic arms should be radically changed. Is not the very fact that after 22 years of difficult, agonizing talks and three "disarmament" agreements both sides will have 2.5 times more strategic nuclear weapons than at the beginning of the process an indictment of how we and the United States have conducted these matters?

Very great opportunities now exist for changing the approach to and methods of the talks—the Cold War is over, U.S.-USSR mutual trust has increased, and the interests of both countries in cutting military expenditure coincide. In the same article I expressed the idea that if we really want radical arms cuts we cannot rely just on talks. Unilateral steps are also very important. To facilitate, of course, both the process of arms cuts and future talks themselves. Such a combination of talks and unilateral steps is the key—it is my deep conviction—to real arms cuts and the demilitarization of our society and international relations. Kendall's letter indicates that these ideas are also shared by many American scientists.

As a result of events taking place in the Soviet Union, another argument has been added to those in favor of more resolute reduction of nuclear weapons. Since the unsuccessful putsch fears have begun to be voiced both in our country and abroad that, given the radical and not always regulated changes in our country, nuclear weapons could fall into the wrong hands. We cannot dismiss these fears. It is a fact, after all, that for three days our nuclear potential or, at any rate, a considerable part of it was in the hands of plotters and adventurers. To which is added the concern about nuclear weapons located on the territory of other republics which will now obtain autonomy.

There are many proposals already on ways to maintain security in these difficult conditions. These include the proposal for talks on a complete ban on tactical nuclear weapons and also the proposal that, on becoming independent, republics should sign the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Arms and declare themselves nuclear-free zones like the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

I consider the most noteworthy of the proposals is Kendall's for a radical cut in the quantity of nuclear warheads—radical even compared with the figure established in the agreement signed in Moscow. The fewer nuclear weapons there are, the smaller the risk that they will fall into the wrong hands. Advancing along the path toward the complete renunciation of nuclear weapons is best of all, but this path will, of course, take quite a long time. It seems to me that in this regard the proposal contained in Kendall's letter deserves close attention.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Reports on Soviet Troop Withdrawal From Germany

Shaposhnikov, Genscher Meet at CSCE

PM1309152191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Sep 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Meeting at USSR Defense Ministry"]

[Text] On 11 September Marshal of Aviation Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, USSR minister of defense, met with FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher, who is in Moscow in connection with the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension.

Problems concerning the state of the contemporary international situation, its development prospects, and the further deepening of Soviet-German bilateral relations were touched on during the talks.

The USSR defense minister emphasized that the withdrawal of units and combined units of the Western Group of Forces from FRG territory will be carried out strictly according to plan and be completed, as provided for in the treaty, by the end of 1994. Questions connected with the construction of housing for the families of servicemen among the troops being withdrawn from the FRG were also touched on in the talks.

Genscher Comments on Talks

LD1109131691 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1158 GMT 11 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 11 September (TASS)—Questions on any change in the time limit of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany were not examined during the 90-minute conversation today between German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, USSR defense minister. Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the TASS correspondent this immediately after the meeting in Moscow in the USSR Defense Ministry with the new leader of the Soviet military department. "The withdrawal schedule remains the same," Hans-Dietrich Genscher said. He added that the meeting passed "in an exceptionally cordial and constructive atmosphere" and that, although

these talks are unofficial, he is "very satisfied with the results of the conversation."

Touching up its content, the German minister said that, among others, questions of consolidating the new system of security which has now evolved in Europe were discussed. "Mutual interest was shown in cutting armed forces and arms and in lowering the level of security," he stated.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher noted that the sides expressed sincere satisfaction at the entire course of the disarmament processes. "We expressed the desire that this process be extended to tactical nuclear weapons, too," the German foreign minister concluded.

Removal of Arms Dumps Poses Problems

PM1809082591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 13 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Shells Go by Sea"]

[Text] Whoever has served in the Western Group of Forces knows that during the 45 years of our stay there we established many depots and storehouses of various kinds. They now present one of the chief difficulties during the group's withdrawal. It is necessary to lift and ship out tens of thousands of tonnes of materiel.

But the ammunition and explosives are particularly complex to transport. They require specially equipped railcars, trucks, and seagoing ships.

A special group has been set up at the withdrawal headquarters to organize and ensure the entire volume of work on evacuating the explosive freight. It is cooperating closely with the German side.

Reports on Plans for Troop Withdrawal From Lithuania

Vilnius-Moscow Talks Held

LD1209210191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Text] Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Vaisvila and General Director of the country's Defense Department Butkevicius have held a meeting in Vilnius with Colonel General Klemenov and Lieutenant General Mironov, representatives of the Soviet Union's Defense Ministry. Problems relating to the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the Republic of Lithuania were discussed. Views were exchanged during the meeting in Vilnius on the formation of an interstate commission. This commission should solve problems concerning the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's armed forces from the territory of Lithuania, the division of the Army's property, and its takeover by the Republic of Lithuania.

Lithuanian Prime Minister Vagnorius today sent a telegram to Soviet President Gorbachev on the formation of the abovementioned interstate commission.

Landsbergis Seeks Unconditional Withdrawal*LD1309102791 Moscow TASS in English 0953 GMT
13 Sep 91*

[Vladimir Solntsev report]

[Text] Tokyo, September 13 (TASS)—Lithuanian parliament leader Vytautas Landsbergis said in an interview with the Japanese KYODO TSUSHIN News Agency that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Lithuanian territory as soon as possible and without any preconditions.

Landsbergis said there was not any agreement between Vilnius and Moscow concerning the troop pullout but it was not required because their presence on Lithuanian territory also was not based on any agreement.

According to available estimates, over 100,000 Soviet servicemen are stationed on the territory of three Baltic states with the greater part of them being in Lithuania, KYODO TSUSHIN points out. After the USSR State Council recognised the Baltic republics' independence, Soviet troops began moving out of Vilnius. However, Landsbergis said he doubted that this was the beginning of their complete withdrawal as promises made earlier were not fulfilled.

Despite an agreement with Moscow to withdraw all of the OMON units, part of them continues to stay in Lithuania, Landsbergis said. He drew attention to the accord under which all Lithuanians who do military service in the USSR Armed Forces, should be freed of it, but he said no formal decree on this score had yet been issued.

Landsbergis said Lithuania intended to be committed to the policy of neutrality, which the country had pursued when it was independent before the Second World War. He emphasised Lithuania was not going to join any international military alliance. However, he said Lithuania sought to elaborate a joint defence policy with Estonia and Latvia.

On relations with the USSR, Landsbergis said what should first and foremost be defined is what form the future union will take. He said Lithuania hoped to maintain friendly relations with the USSR but will not join any economic union. According to Landsbergis, the 1922 peace treaty between the Soviet Union and independent Lithuania can be regarded as having legal standing and a new bilateral agreement can be elaborated on its basis.

Calls For Troop Withdrawal at UN*OW1809191591 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1630 GMT 18 Sep 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Speaking at a session of the U.N. General Assembly Tuesday, Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis said that Lithuania will

struggle for the creation of nuclear-free and mutual trust zones all over the world. In this connection, Mr. Landsbergis demanded the withdrawal of the "foreign army" (the Soviet Army—BF [BALTFAX]) from Lithuania.

He assured that Lithuania has no hostile feelings to any of her neighbours. "We want to build a democratic state which would guarantee freedom, rights and dignity to peoples and individuals", he pointed out.

Airborne Troops Commander Comments*LD2009084791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International
Service in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 20 Sep 91*

[Text] As to the number of Soviet troops deployed in Lithuania, no exact figures have been officially given either by Lithuania or by the Soviet Union. According to THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, there are about 18,000 Soviet servicemen in Lithuania, but some Lithuanian officials believe that the figure is 80,000.

A high-ranking Soviet military official has stated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Lithuania will take at least five to seven years and will require 2 billion rubles. Lieutenant General Podkolozin, commander of the airborne troops, said at an interview to the Moscow IZVESTIYA newspaper that the troops must be pulled out in civilized manner, especially since it is not clear where they are to be transferred—to Russia, the Ukraine, or Belorussia.

As is known, the Lithuanian leadership demands that the withdrawal of troops be started immediately and concluded as soon as possible. It is also proposed that the so-called interior troops and the paratroopers be the first to be pulled out. Lt. Gen. Podkolozin points out that the paratrooper regiments stationed in Jonava and Kaunas can be withdrawn no earlier than 1994 after the pullout of Soviet troops from Poland and Germany.

**Latvian-Soviet Talks on Troop Withdrawal
Timetable****Officials Meet in Moscow***LD1309013391 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
0400 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] As reported, the leader of the Latvian Government, Ivars Godmanis, and legislative representatives Deputy Mikhail Stepichev and Talavs Jundzis, the chairman of the Defense and Internal Affairs Commission of the Supreme Council, met yesterday in Moscow with USSR Defense Minister Shaposhnikov. The talks touched on the future presence of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of the republic. According to what Talavs Jundzis said, the USSR side offered to begin the complete withdrawal of the forces from the Republic of Latvia no sooner than 1994. This proposal is of course

not acceptable to Latvia. We will report further on the course of the talks during the review section of the program.

Latvian President Rejects Soviet Proposal

*LD1709230991 Riga Radio Riga International
in English 2030 GMT 17 Sep 91*

[Text] The Soviet Defense Ministry proposal to begin the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from the Baltics as late as the year 1994 is unacceptable to Latvia, Latvian President Mr. Anatolijs Gorbunovs, currently on a visit to the United States, has said in a newspaper interview.

According to Mr. Gorbunovs, the withdrawal should begin immediately, with technical details acceptable to both sides to be worked out by the processes on the way.

The permanent representative of the Latvian Government in Moscow Mr. Peters, and the Soviet Defense Minister Mr. Shaposhnikov have today signed a document in Moscow on the setting up of a joint interstate commission to discuss the Soviet Army withdrawal from Latvia. According to Mr. Peters, the commission is to first determine the number of Soviet military personnel and its location sites in Latvia.

Further Talks in Riga

*OW1809194591 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1900 GMT 18 Sep 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov arrived in Riga September 18. He has already met with Latvian Prime Minister Ivars Godmanis and members of the Latvian government. During the meeting the two sides discussed questions concerning Soviet troops stationed in Latvia. According to the Latvian government press office, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov was satisfied with the results of the meeting.

On September 17 Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov and Janis Peters, Latvia's permanent representative in Moscow, signed a protocol "On urgent measures in relation to Soviet troops in Latvia". It confirms that by January 1, 1992 all servicemen from Latvia will be dismissed from the Soviet Army if they so wish, all military commissariats and bases on Latvian territory will be transferred to the republic and a Soviet-Latvian joint commission will be set up to assess military installations located in Latvia.

Shaposhnikov Comments on Talks

*LD2009161291 Riga Radio Riga International
in Latvian 0430 GMT 20 Sep 91*

[Text] Soviet Defense Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov had a meeting yesterday [18 September] in Riga with the head of the Latvian Government, Ivars Godmanis, to discuss questions concerning the temporary presence in Latvia of the Soviet Army. The minister also came to

Latvia on a working visit to the—for the time being—Baltic Military District. Minister Shaposhnikov has indicated that the dates of the Army withdrawal have to be determined by the newly formed bilateral Latvian-Soviet commission.

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording in Russian fading to Latvian translation] The purpose of my visit is to discuss conditions of the temporary stay of the Soviet Armed Forces during the transitional period. I want to reply also to the questions put by the government of Latvia, and to put my questions. I want to emphasize that at the present moment we have all the opportunities for solving all the questions put by the Latvian side, and also of those of interest to the Soviet Armed Forces, in a civilized and mutually interested manner.

We have experience in talks with former potential opponents—the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany—on successfully solving, for example, the questions of strategic weapons reduction and Army withdrawal. I think that those ties of friendship at the foundations of cooperation of the last 50 years have not disappeared without a trace, and this will help. [end recording]

Asked whether the minister has formed for himself a notion on the possible dates of withdrawal of the Army, Shaposhnikov replied that this question would be decided by the new inter-governmental commission.

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording in Russian fading to Latvian translation] The competence of the minister himself includes, after that, only to ensure the technical side of withdrawal of the Army. The contacts until now with the Government of Latvia cause one to think that it will be possible to successfully solve all questions in this connection. [end recording]

In conclusion, the minister confirmed that in the event the talks in Vienna on Army reductions are crowned with success, then the Soviet Union definitely will reduce the numerical strength of the Army. That much the Soviet defense minister said in the interview given yesterday to the government information service.

Reports on Open Skies Conference Third Round

'Rapprochement' in Positions

*LD1309175891 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1135 GMT 13 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Excerpts] Vienna, 13 September (TASS)—A rapprochement in the positions on many issues was clear at the

third round of the international "Open Skies" conference—taking place in the Austrian capital—where a technical break was announced today. The task of this forum is to draw up an agreement on the mutual flights of unarmed aircraft with the aim of monitoring the military activities of states and increasing openness in relations between them. [passage omitted]

Yevgeniy Golovko, the head of the Soviet delegation, told the TASS correspondent that the USSR is insisting that the "Open Skies" plan include military bases of its participants situated in countries that are not participating in this regime. First and foremost this relates to U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. In this case the USSR will be prepared to open up flights over all Soviet territory except for limitations to guarantee flight safety. Understanding the difficulties that may arise here with agreements with third countries, he continued, we are prepared to withdraw this issue but on the condition that we are reserving the right to close some regions of Soviet territory on the grounds of national security. At the same time it is intended that the number of these regions will be reduced to a minimum. Second, the transfer of military hardware beyond the Urals will not be a reason for closing these regions, the Soviet diplomat concluded.

It is noted in the corridors of the conference that in case this approach is accepted the whole idea of "Open Skies" loses its meaning. The overwhelming majority of the participants including neutral and nonaligned states think that without a principled solution of this question it is not worth starting to work out an agreement. Therefore, a technical break was announced. It is planned that the conference will continue its work on 30 September.

To Aid CFE, START Verification

LD1509014291 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 14 Sep 91

[Text] A third round has now begun in Vienna of the international Open Skies conference. It involves 22 nations of Eastern Europe and NATO, as well as delegations of Europe's nonaligned countries. The three Baltic republics, that is Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, will for the first time attend it as observers. More on this from our military analyst Vadim Solovyev.

[Solovyev in Russian fading to English translation] The conference is designed to set conditions for unimpeded aerial flights over each other's territories to monitor military activity. This will be in line with the spirit of disarmament processes and glasnost in the military area. If implemented, the Open Skies would provide further guarantees for European security laid down in a range of international agreements of recent time, including the Paris agreement on the conventional armed forces cut in Europe [CFE] and the superpower treaty on the reduction of strategic weapons [START].

Although nobody doubts the importance of the open skies, it isn't easy to implement in practice. The process

was started in Canada last February with negotiators outlining views on how to make the skies open. The sides met again three months later in Budapest to compare each other's positions and the extent to which they meet the goals of European security.

There are four main issues on the agenda of the Vienna conference. The first one, the number of flights to be allowed over each other's country's territory, was sorted out at the previous round after the Soviet Union had agreed to America's proposal [words indistinct]. The second one relates to the size of territory to come under aerial inspection. The dispute is caused by suspicions that inspection may turn into routine spying, which sparked off differences over a third issue on what kind of equipment can be used for aerial inspection. At the previous round in Budapest the Soviet Union had conceded to its Western partners by agreeing to use devices for inspection at night and adverse weather conditions, as well as lateral view radars and optical equipment capable of discerning objects as small as 30 cm in size.

And finally, the issue of information exchange following the inspection. The Soviet proposal for a uniform database which can be open to all signatories has been strongly opposed by a number of countries, including the USA. Nonetheless, the open skies idea can be endorsed in spite of the existing difficulties. What is needed is goodwill by all sides concerned.

USSR Seeks Postponement of Next Session

AU2009103091 Paris AFP in English 1012 GMT 20 Sep 91

[Text] Vienna, September 20 (AFP)—Negotiations on the so-called Open Skies agreement allowing unarmed aircraft to monitor military activities in Western and former Soviet bloc countries have been delayed by Soviet request, a Western source said here Friday.

The next session was to have opened September 30, but Soviet negotiators requested more time to brief leaders in Moscow on informal talks held here last week. They asked that the meeting be postponed until at least October 15.

Negotiations on the accord had stalled since the first two conferences on the subject, held last year in Ottawa and Budapest.

The main sticking points centred on the territory involved, the nationality of the observation planes, number of flights, equipment allowed on board and sharing of information gathered.

Until now, negotiations have been conducted among the 16 countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the six members of the former Warsaw Pact. But the next round is to be enlarged to include the 38-member

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which groups all countries in Europe, as well as Canada and the United States.

Soviet Officers Carry Out CSBM Inspection in France

*PM1909124191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 19 Sep 91 First Edition p 3*

[Unattributed report: "On Carrying Out Inspection on French Territory"]

[Text] In accordance with the provisions of the 1990 Vienna document of the talks on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBM] in Europe, on 16 September 1991 the Soviet side made a request to France to carry out an inspection of military activity on its territory.

After receiving a positive reply to the request, a group of Soviet military inspectors arrived in France 18 September and embarked on inspection of military activity in the stated region.

Canadian Officers Carry Out CSBM Inspection in Leningrad MD

*LD0509192891 Moscow TASS in English 1836 GMT
5 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow, September 5 (TASS)—The following official statement was circulated here on Thursday:

"On September 3, 1991, in keeping with the 1990 Vienna document of negotiations on confidence-building measures and security [CSBM] in Europe, the Canadian Government has requested the Soviet Union to allow a military inspection in the Leningrad military district [MD].

"The Canadian Government's request for inspection has been honoured. On September 5, an inspecting group consisting of four Canadian Army officers arrived in the Soviet Union and began inspecting the military activities in the requested area".

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

Defense Minister: French Proposal for Talks 'Very Interesting'

*AU1309074791 Paris AFP in English 0143 GMT
13 Sep 91*

[Text] Moscow, September 13 (AFP) — A French proposal to convene talks between the four powers with nuclear weapons deployed in Europe—Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States—was "very interesting," Soviet Defence Minister Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said here Thursday [12 September].

Marshal Shaposhnikov's statement, made at a dinner in honour of his visiting French counterpart Pierre Joxe,

was the first official reaction here to the French proposal, which was floated at a Paris press conference by President Francois Mitterrand on Wednesday.

The Soviet minister said his government would "study attentively" the French proposal.

An authoritative source said that talks between Marshal Shaposhnikov and Joxe had centred on European security and the future of the Soviet Union's nuclear arms.

The French minister also met Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev earlier in the day.

Baker, Chief of Staff Lobov Discuss Talks

*LD1309130691 Moscow TASS in English 1255 GMT
13 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker has suggested starting talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on reducing their tactical nuclear arsenals.

Gen. Vladimir Lobov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, backed Baker's suggestion.

During their meeting today the sides also agreed on the need to strengthen Soviet-American military contacts. In Baker's view, these contacts should be intensive, without breaks and in the interests of both parties.

U.S. Nuclear Arms Pullout From Europe Advocated

*LD1709095891 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1210 GMT 16 Sep 91*

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] Moscow has repeatedly suggested that Europe be rid of all weapons of this kind with a range of up to 500 km. The Russian President Boris Yeltsin reiterated that last week. Concrete proposals were put forward when the Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin was meeting with the United States Secretary of State James Baker. As you probably know, this country has already withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons from the East European nations that were affiliated with the former Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Significantly, it did so unilaterally. The United States on its part still has some 4,000 nuclear artillery shells, bombs, ground-based missiles, and nuclear anti-submarine bombs in Western Europe, namely Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Turkey and Greece.

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe could be justified when the continent was split. There were two military alliances opposing each other. But the Warsaw Treaty Organization is a thing of the past. New nations have come into being in Eastern Europe and the

two Germanies have reunited, and Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have won full independence.

In this context, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons is becoming absurd. What groups can they be used against? The allies of America or new democratic nations? Besides there is the danger of unauthorized use or even seizure no matter how tightly the positioning ground [as heard] can be guarded.

Moscow has naturally welcomed the statement of the NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner that a decision to scrap tactical nuclear weapons can be adopted as early as next November. But ground-based weapons alone are liable for scrapping, which is a pity.

America has not yet spelt out a future for its new generation air-to-ground nuclear tactical missiles for bombers based in Europe. Will it adopt them by 1995? It is yet to adopt a final decision.

The European situation seems ripe for ridding the continent of all tactical nuclear weapons without hesitation. Unilateral steps could be taken even before long talks could produce comprehensive agreements. An approach of this kind draws growing support from Moscow.

Chief of Staff Lobov on Tactical Nuclear Arms Talks

*91WC0168A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 17 Sep 91 p 3*

[Interview with Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Headquarters, by Vladimir Ostrovskiy; place and date not given: "Is the Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Solvable?"]

[Text] FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher believes that it is necessary to solve the problem of tactical nuclear weapons by reaching a "zero" option between the Soviet Union and the United States in Europe. During his meeting with the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Headquarters, Army General Vladimir Lobov, U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker expressed the United States viewpoint on this problem: "It is time to start negotiations to reduce these weapons."

So What is the Position of the Soviet Union?

Army General Vladimir Lobov answers this question posed by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

[Lobov] Readers of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA should not be surprised to learn that I will not start with tactical nuclear weapons. The special feature of this problem, like the problem of weapons of mass destruction in general, is that it is linked closely to the Soviet-American START treaty signed this summer in Moscow. After the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles (the INF treaty), the START treaty has become the second most important step toward a nonnuclear world.

[Ostrovskiy] I call this to mind this because, in my opinion, the START treaty, like the agreement to reduce conventional weapons signed in Paris last fall, must definitely be ratified, because ratification will open for us the door to a new stage in the Soviet-American talks on nuclear systems.

[Lobov] It should be noted that together with the strategic offensive arms held by the two sides, both have stockpiled mountains of tactical nuclear weapons or, as experts in the West say, "battlefield" weapons. There is no doubt that after ratification of the documents I mentioned previously it is necessary to engage in dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons. There are more than enough reasons for this. First, both sides have too many "battlefield" weapons. Second, the fact that they are deployed across the extensive territory of the European Continent presents a certain danger, particularly given the extremely changeable and tense political situation that has taken shape in the Balkans, on part of Soviet territory, and even in Germany, if we take into account the social tension in the eastern part of that country. The way in which these events may unfold offers no guarantee against unexpected situations at many points on the continent. Third and last, if used extensively (which from both sides, hypothetically of course, could amount to thousands of weapons) "battlefield" weapons could cross the boundary of tactical weapons and in terms of the consequences become strategic.

Nor should we forget that no one can today predict at what phase in the use of these weapons the sides would stop in the event of conflict. Here we have an endless range of scenarios that depend on the unexpected circumstances of engagement across a huge territory made up of dozens of states and many millions of people. All of this is too serious not to pay attention to the urgent need to review the problem of tactical nuclear weapons.

I see a unique paradox: We reject offensive strategic systems but at the same time keep mountains of tactical nuclear weapons capable of plunging the world into the abyss of self-destruction. This is not even logical on the human plane. Moreover, the storage, deployment, and safekeeping of these weapons involve considerable costs.

We touched on this problem during talks with U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker in Moscow. I stated that the Soviet side favors negotiations on these forms of weapons of mass destruction. These negotiations cannot be postponed. The more we delay with this problem the more palpably it will be felt and the more it will involve new regions on the continent. In short, there are more than enough reasons to initiate a dialogue.

It should be noted, however, that these negotiations cannot be limited only to two participants—the USSR and the United States. When we sit down at the negotiating table and resolve in principle that these kinds of weapons must be reduced, it will be possible to move to consider not only the numeric data on these weapons but also their tactical-technical characteristics. And then we

will inevitably move on to the fact that there are more than two nuclear powers in Europe, whose nuclear weapons also exert an influence on the strategic situation that takes shape here. It would be a mistake not to take those weapons into account. This means that the question of reviewing the participation of those powers in the negotiations must be considered at a certain stage.

Tactical nuclear weapons are European weapons. From whatever source, they are targeted against our common continent. We are sincerely interested in reducing and ultimately eliminating them, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Commentary Views U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons

LD1909213991 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 2300 GMT 18 Sep 91

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] During the recent talks in Moscow between the American secretary of state, James Baker, and the Soviet leadership an agreement was reached on holding negotiations over tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Vladislav Kozyakov has this comment:

The new situation in Europe and all over the world caused by the latest changes in the Soviet Union brings the question of the demilitarization of international relations more and more to the foreground. This applies to the deployment of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe; that is, missiles with a range of up to 500 km. The Soviet Union, now in a process of transforming into a union of sovereign states, believes it is pointless to keep in Europe thousands of short-range nuclear warfare means. In an interview given for the press on 17th September, the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, General Lobov, said the Soviet Union was sincerely interested in reducing and eventually scrapping tactical nuclear weapons within the area stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains.

Reports coming from Washington and West European capitals indicate that there too there are doubts as to whether it is necessary to keep in Europe 88 American Lance launchers with about 700 nuclear warheads and also about 1,500 nuclear artillery shells. The American defense secretary, Dick Cheney, said in an interview on Cable News Network that tactical nuclear weapons no longer had much validity in the new European environment. True, when the Pentagon talks about tactical weapons it limits the notion only to land-based missiles and ignores the nuclear air-based force, though in the opinion of experts the United States should place more emphasis on air-launched nuclear weapons. The United States is developing at present a tactical air-to-surface missile. All this is expected to become the theme of the coming talks on reducing and scrapping tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. The dialogue on this issue may run

into one obstacle—the position of some Western politicians, who insist on the need to slow the disarmament process. Their argument in favor of this is as follows: The Soviet Union's position is not stable right now, let's wait until a new union of sovereign states is formed and powers are divided between the center and the republics. Incidentally, similar arguments are used in Washington today to justify the delay with the ratification of the START agreement and the agreement on conventional armaments in Europe.

Yet despite the complexity of the current period of transition to a new union of sovereign states, the Soviet side proposes not to slow down but to speed up the solution of disarmament problems. There is every opportunity now for ratifying and bringing into effect the already signed agreements. Following that, negotiations over tactical weapons in Europe may be launched. The heaps of weapons accumulated over the cold war years should be shovelled away at a quick pace. This is important both for international security and for the promotion of Soviet reform, much talked about in the West these days.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Defense Minister Questioned on Nuclear Testing

91WC0164A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 5 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by S. Doronin, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA military observer, under the rubric "Passions Around the Military": "From a Sick Head of Government—to Warheads?!"]

[Text] Expounding his views on the future of the strategic nuclear forces at the special session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, minister of defense, put special emphasis on the problem of the continuation of testing of nuclear weapons. "We cannot refrain completely from testing," he stressed.

Why not? Military and nuclear science specialists, whose professional interests are dictated by one consideration—the interests of the defense capability of the state, have not asked themselves this question for 42 years. In the meantime the activists of "Nevada—Semipalatinsk," the Soviet antinuclear movement, completely reject the idea of testing. It seems that their position, which was a purely propagandistic one only recently, is being reinforced by legislative measures. President of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev has come out decisively against the use of the Semipalatinsk proving ground. He has issued the appropriate ukase. President of Russia B. Yeltsin has also called for a ban on testing at Novaya Zemlya for reasons of an ecological nature. The operations of the reserve range in Yakutiya will be another problem. The center will have to contend with the sovereignty of Yakutiya.

What position does the American side take on the question of nuclear proving grounds? During meetings with members of the Soviet parliament in October of last year in Moscow, U.S. Secretary of Defense R. Cheney declared unambiguously: Tests are necessary not only to improve weapons but also to increase their security. The nuclear inventory of the United States is much more secure today than it was 15 years ago because they have been working on it all that time.

On that issue, to be candid, we are beginning to fall behind. This is the first conclusion which results from an analysis of the rapidly changing situation in the country.

And what is happening today with our strategic nuclear forces? Subordinate to the center in the person of the president and the minister of defense, after the seizure of the system for activating the nuclear weapons and the basic and companion codes the world was kept in terrible suspense for three days. Is it necessary to say what kind of enormous gap Yanayev and company tried to make in the world system of nuclear security? And what kind of responsibility lay on the shoulders of the generals and officers of the general staffs of the branches of the Armed Forces which are armed with strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, doing everything they could to ensure that the irreparable did not happen.

Thank God, those troubled days are over. But the anxiety concerning the future of the nuclear weapons has not been dispelled. What does their future look like on the territories of those sovereign republics where they are located? Should they be removed? Or should the right of control over them be given to the localities in addition to the center? In any event A. Rutskoy, vice president of Russia, expressed just such a thought on 26 August: Yeltsin should possess the right of control over these weapons along with Gorbachev.

Strategic nuclear forces are stationed in Kazakhstan and the Ukraine... And what should happen to tactical nuclear weapons in units of the military districts—in the republics of the Baltics, Central Asia, and Belorussia? One can only presume that politicians will nonetheless refrain from unilateral decisions on military and strategic issues. Agreements concluded between Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan offer hope.

There is no choice. According to experts on the problem—academicians and military men—nuclear forces should remain in the hands of the center. If, of course, the center remains whole. The strategic inventory is not a box of matches that has fallen behind the kitchen table. It must be preserved and it must be checked by means of testing. Because even games with matches end badly...

Reports, Comments on Decision To Close Semipalatinsk

Closure of Test Site Hailed

LD0909211891 Moscow TASS in English 1011 GMT 9 Sep 91

[Text] Moscow, September 9 (TASS)—Not servicemen, but scientists are bosses of the Semipalatinsk nuclear

testing ground for ten days now. This military centre was recently decreed closed by Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev. USSR Defence Minister, Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov has supported this decision. And although tests will be carried out in other places, the closing of this testing ground is an important step towards a nuclear-free world, to preserve life on our planet.

"There will be no more nuclear blasts in Semipalatinsk. This is simply wonderful. However, we have fought against the Semipalatinsk testing ground not for the purpose of transferring nuclear tests to Novaya Zemlya", USSR people's deputy and chairman of the "Semipalatinsk-Nevada" movement Olzhas Suleymenov told TASS.

"I have always urged and now call on deputies of the Russian Supreme Council to adopt a corresponding decision. Our actions are a good example for foreign partners. They no longer regard us as enemies. It is wonderful that one nuclear testing ground has been silenced, but it is very bad that many others still remain active. Inspired by our first success, we will press for the closing of the remaining testing grounds, no matter where they are located."

"Scientists of all the world have long ago arrived at the conclusion that the arms race is absolutely senseless: There will be no winner in a nuclear war," USSR people's deputy, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the Kurchatov atomic energy institute academician Yevgeniy Velikhov noted. "It is senseless to modernise or develop new types of nuclear weapons. It is equally senseless and, moreover, a crime against ecology to continue nuclear weapon tests. I believe we must have no other testing grounds. Nuclear explosions must be stopped on Novaya Zemlya, too, on agreement with all the world." According to Velikhov, the process of disarmament gained momentum after the Soviet Union had announced a moratorium on nuclear tests. "In the current situation," he stressed, "it would be very good to take up again the 1946 proposals, envisaging full control over the entire nuclear cycle, an all-embracing and universal control".

Conversion Plans Reported

PM1309143991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Sep 91

[Report by G. Sytykh, identified by caption; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range has been closed down by a Kazakh presidential decree. Our correspondent reports.

[Sytykh] This iron cannon was once the most frightening weapon in Semipalatinsk. It stood guard over the fortress gates. But in our day and age something somewhat more frightening was created in Semipalatinsk. Just look at

this—a nuclear blast caused this piece of granite to fuse into slag. We're in Kurchatov—a town where testing personnel live. These laboratories will now be working on civilian programs. It has been decided to turn the test range into a union-republic scientific research center. Tremendous scientific potential has been built up here. And it finds the most varied applications. One area they are working on is in helping to design earthquake-proof buildings. The end of nuclear testing marks the start of a great deal of work. The time has come to eradicate the harmful consequences of these dangerous experiments. [Video shows K. Boztayev, oblast soviet chairman, identified by caption]

[Boztayev] We need to improve the population's health. It's a big problem and we'll have to get help from our state to do it.

International Meeting To Mark Closure

91P52088A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Sep 91 p 2

[Item under the "Panorama of the Country" rubric: "One Secret Less"]

[Text] Of five nuclear test sites in the world one—the one at Semipalatinsk—is closed for testing forever. From 14 to 20 October an international meeting under the slogan "5 Minus 1: For Global Disarmament" will be held here.

To begin with, participants in the meeting are acquainting themselves with archive documents from Clinic Number 4, which until yesterday was off-limits. They are also visiting special laboratories of the Ministries of Defense and of the Atomic Energy Industry. It has been proposed that a union of those who have been injured due to nuclear tests be organized.

Unsafe Practices in Atmospheric Testing Revealed

91WC0166A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Sep 91 First Edition p 3

[Article: "The Blast Will Be Above Ground"]

[Text] The Military Publishing House is preparing to issue the book "Zasekrechennaya sluzhba" [Secret Service] by A. Zharikov, retired colonel and member of the USSR Union of Writers. It tells of the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs and of the difficult and dangerous work of those manning the test ranges, among whom the author lived and worked.

The excerpt presented here tells about one of the first atomic explosions that was carried out in 1954 at Semipalatinsk Test Range, recently closed by decree of the President of the Kazakh SSR N. Nazarbayev. And Minister of Defense Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov stated at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that there will be no more explosions at the test range. The details noted by the author are not only interesting but also prompt all of us to consider once again how horrible the scenario of a nuclear Apocalypse could be.

We officers at the test range were not informed in advance how powerful the atomic blast would be. But we guessed that it would be of medium power: test structures and combat equipment were placed not far from the center of the area being prepared. In a few days it became known that an above-ground explosion was planned.

As required by the program sent from Moscow, in advance my scientific group of eight officers of rear services and material-technical supply set up several vehicles, refueling equipment, field kitchens, tanks and drums of fuel, rubber vessels, boxes of food, and bales of clothing in areas hundreds of meters from the blast center. They built several depots, dugouts, trenches, railroad and road sections, pipelines, and other things....

The academicians I. Kurchatov, Yu. Khariton, N. Semenov, Ye. Slavskiy, A. Zavenyagin, Ya. Zeldovich, and A. Sakharov arrived several days before the explosion. At that time we recognized only Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov—because of his beard. All of them were still young, bathed in the Irtysh, played volleyball, and lived in a special hotel.

There were many points on the test range where not even we heads of the scientific groups were allowed to go, just as it was not permitted to take an interest in what your coworker was doing. And although the entire test range was strictly guarded—everywhere there were guards, patrols, barbed wire, and signs saying "forbidden"—the scientists were guarded by young people "in civilian clothing," who followed them like shadows.

The place for the concentration of the test range workers who had to go out to the test area after the explosion was located on a hill. Through binoculars one could see not only tanks, guns, aircraft, and depots but also dummies. They were about 10 km away. It was a cloudless and hot day. All of us were wearing overalls made out of the material of ponchos, rubber boots, and respirators in protective covers. Several officers had dark glasses.

The loudspeaker crackled.

"Attention! The explosion is in five minutes...."

Soon white aircraft appeared. Ahead was the carrier and a little behind to the sides were fighters. Two eagles appeared high in the sky at this time. They seemed to be frozen in an endless blue, looking for prey on the ground.

"They are finished," someone said.

The loudspeaker quickly gave the countdown:

"Ten seconds...five...."

The bomber rose higher and the fighters went off to the sides. I covered my face with my arms. When I opened my eyes after a time, I saw a huge ball of fire. It rose rapidly, dragging dirt behind it and forming an enormous mushroom. The sound of the blast reached us, like a nearby howitzer shot.

Lt. Col. N. Prosyannik, the chief of the safety service, was the first to go out to the site in an open vehicle. And we followed him on our routes. The ruined vehicles and tanks as well as aircraft with their wings torn off were smoking and guns lay with their wheels in the air....

There was nothing to be seen at our near site—everything was destroyed. Vehicles looked like crumpled black paper, the field kitchens were broken and scattered 50 meters from their places, and rails were bowed. Surprisingly, however, nothing was burning, not even the torn tank where some fuel was stored. The reason is that there is no oxygen at the epicenter for several seconds. And when it comes back, the fireball is already too weak to ignite the objects.

The land looks like ash and near the epicenter like slag. Everything is reminiscent of scenes from the Apocalypse.

The radiation level was very high. But we (valiant and rash youth) went to see the crater. Hot air still emanated from it, things were flickering before our eyes, and objects appeared distorted. Our individual monitoring devices were technically inadequate and one showed 26 roentgens and another five, whereas mine indicated just 0.7 roentgen. So what can you believe?

At more distant spots, the clothing did not even catch fire on all of the dummies. Bright fabrics were not harmed. Only the black fur of a surviving dog was burned, whereas the white fur was not even discolored.

This is what surprised us: drums with fuel were smashed but rubber vessels covered with a thin layer of earth were intact. Animals were alive where a brick structure was totally destroyed. The explanation is simple: pressure destroys large hard surfaces but not soft elastic surfaces.

On that and subsequent days, we visited the sites several times and carefully examined the results of the explosion on test objects. We determined the magnitudes of pressure, luminous radiation, and contamination and we prepared detailed reports. They were needed not only by scientists for the improvement of nuclear weapons but also for those formulating instructions for protection against atomic blasts. And we who were working at the test range gained experience in preparation for the next tests of thermonuclear weapons.

A special service followed the radioactive cloud and studied the local radiation conditions. Dosimetric reconnaissance visited several remote population centers, checked the roads and reservoirs, and reported to the command: no dangerous radioactive contamination was detected beyond the region of the resettlement of the inhabitants.

It is probably logical to ask whether it was necessary to deal with all of this, to blow up and test things?

The answer was given even in our time by Yu. Khariton, one of the developers of atomic and hydrogen bombs: "Not all of the consequences were considered at that time. We did not think about the possibility of the

destruction of humanity. It was important not to fall behind, not to let the potential enemy surpass you...."

Nevada-Semipalatinsk President Interviewed

*91WC0160A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jun 91 p 3*

[Interview with Olzhas Suleymenov, president of the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" anti-nuclear movement, conducted by independent press agency "Aziya-Press" correspondent: "A Termless Moratorium. Directive!.."]

[Text] [Correspondent] M. S. Gorbachev visited Kazakhstan at the end of May. He was asked questions about the fate of the Semipalatinsk test site. His answers did not reassure Kazakhstan residents. We understood that there are plans to resume testing at the site, which has been quiet for 1 ½ years "at the fault" of the anti-nuclear movement "Nevada-Semipalatinsk". You were not present at these meetings and have not yet expressed your attitude toward the USSR President's responses, but we would like to learn of it.

[Suleymenov] Two weeks before the high-level visit, I met in Moscow with Mikhail Sergeyevich. In the course of our conversation, he mentioned his desire to visit Kazakhstan, but did not give an exact date, and evidently did not know it himself at that time. Otherwise, I would have undoubtedly participated in his meeting with the active membership in Alma-Ata. At the end of May, I was in Istanbul at a conference dedicated to the opening of the Turkish section of "Nevada-Semipalatinsk". I learned of Gorbachev's trip from the newspapers.

Yet even before that, I learned of the letter written by Minister of Defense D. Yazov and Minister of Atomic Power and Industry V. Konovalov to Presidents Gorbachev and N. A. Nazarbayev, in which they spoke of the need for conducting a series of tests at the Semipalatinsk test site in 1991. These tests would be comprised of three medium and low capacity blasts—two at 20 kilotons and one at one kiloton. It was explained that these blasts were for calibration purposes, within the framework of the 1974 agreement on marginal capacity. It was proposed that compensation in the sum of 250 million rubles be paid to the population of rayons surrounding the test site over a period of five years. A draft of the USSR president's decision on final cessation of nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test site as of 1 January 1992 was affixed to the letter. These documents, as I know, were discussed in our Supreme Soviet and in the USSR government. As a result, the sum of the proposed compensation increased significantly.

I am also aware of the counter-resolution of N. A. Nazarbayev to the ministers' letters: "Only with the agreement of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet".

In May of last year, the republic's parliament adopted a resolution on cessation of testing at the Semipalatinsk test site, and at the end of the year it voted for the

Declaration of Sovereignty, Article 11 of which states that: "The testing of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and biological—is prohibited on the territory of Kazakhstan." If we agree with the proposal of the military-industrial complex, then the Declaration of Sovereignty ceases to be a serious document. Tomorrow we will be able to correct one more article, and the day after—all the rest. And the sovereignty of Kazakhstan, without ever having time to be filled with real content, will become another political metaphor, and nothing more.

Moreover, there is one circumstance which puts us on guard, and to which we must pay particular attention. These are to be calibration tests, conducted under the observation of the Americans, who will be present at the test site from the drilling to the actual blasts. The instruments here and in America must define the physical parameters characteristic specifically for this territory, for its soils and geological structure. Thanks to these data, it will be possible to precisely determine the capacity of the tests being performed in the future. This is necessary for adherence to the agreement on marginal capacity of 150 kilotons. But if the test site is soon to be closed forever, then why do we need these measurements, these calibrations? Is not the test site being prepared for further use? Then what good is the draft of the President's resolution regarding its closure? A decision which they know ahead of time that they do not intend to honor. I do not think that the honorable ministers have understood all the fine points of the President's letter and draft resolution which have been submitted to them for signature. In whose interests is this deceit, these dangerous games?

[Correspondent] The USSR President's visit took place on the eve of the last round of discussions of the Union Treaty draft, according to which the sphere of defense is relegated to the management of the union government. This also includes questions of test sites.

[Suleymenov] The republics which are ready to sign the Treaty do not absolve themselves of the concern for the defense capability of the Union. It will remain a mighty power, following the doctrine of prudent-adequate defense. It must be coordinated with the defense doctrines of other states. And we must prepare ourselves for this stage of interaction, assuming the most minimal levels of nuclear arms capable of guaranteeing international security in the transitional period to non-nuclear defense. According to the drafts of the protocols to the Union Treaty, all questions of location and operation of military bases and test sites must be coordinated with the republics on whose territories they are located.

Moreover, the republics, as the exclusive owners of the territory and all the natural resources, stipulate in their agreements with the federal departments not only the size of the areas and sums of compensation, but also the degree of danger which the objects pose to the health of its citizens. And nuclear military facilities are dangerous

for every living thing on Earth. Even if the compensation exceeds the republic's budget, it will not appease our debt to humanity.

[Correspondent] Yet will there not be contraposition of republic egoism to all-union interests? The Semipalatinsk test site is quiet, and the one in Novaya Zemlya has practically been abandoned. The USSR is not testing nuclear weapons, but the USA, France, England and China continue to do so. The nuclear parity which we achieved with such difficulty is clearly being disrupted. Your perennial opponent, Deputy N. Petrushenko, wrote in his polemics with you that foreign critics have referred to the Soviet Union as an Upper Volta with nuclear missiles, and that you want to deprive us even of this advantage, i.e., to place us in the same economic rank with a backward African country.

[Suleymenov] It is because of our missiles that we have become an Upper Volta. The country looks like a half-starved, half-clothed warrior with a golden gun which shoots diamonds... Our movement has been accused of many sins—of anti-patriotism, of pursuing nationalistic goals, of inciting anti-military sentiments. We are not a party. We are a popular movement which unites people with a single common goal, common for all parties and nations. The nuclear-ecological danger does not pay attention to passports and party cards. Our branches have opened in Moscow, Leningrad, and Yakutiya. The "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" committee has begun to operate in Barnaul, uniting like-minded people of five Siberian oblasts. We work in close cooperation with the "Chernobyl" union and the "Nevada-Novaya Zemlya" society formed in the northern oblasts of Russia.

No, it is not regional patriotism which motivates us, but rather all-human. Otherwise we would not have received such support in the world. Branches of our movement have opened in Germany, the USA, Turkey, and South Africa. Together with the international organization "World Doctors for the Prevention of Nuclear War", we have become the initiators of unification of all related organizations into one—the "Global Anti-Nuclear Alliance", which was declared on 10 January in New York. The official name of this organization included the names of five operating test sites: "Nevada—Semipalatinsk—Mururoa—Lobnor—Novaya Zemlya".

We are in favor of the Soviet Union, the USA, and other countries giving up the advantage of nuclear missiles. Otherwise, in time even some Upper Volta will get them.

Thanks to the eternal argument of the VPK [military-industrial complex] which states, "But others are testing!", congresses and parliaments have allocated taxpayer's funds for the continued development of nuclear weapons. The appeals for all to simultaneously stop testing have not led anywhere. The military-industrial complexes of the nuclear powers are in close cooperation with each other. They are interested in each other and motivate each other toward activity. If you work, then I have work too. These are Siamese twins, who have a

common blood flow. If one gets sick—the other is ill too. This image has suggested to us the following strategy: We must stop ourselves, and then others will stop too. We must fight for peace in our own house. The Roman rule, "If you want peace—prepare for war!", did not save them from war. The ones who were most prepared were the ones who started it. We are proposing a new declaration: "If you want peace—prepare for peace!"

Perestroika in our country has evoked a restructuring throughout the world. Ideological confrontation is disintegrating. There are fewer and fewer dictatorial regimes on the planet, and the democratic colors are revitalizing the world map. The last empires are restructuring themselves. The imperial ideal, which for thousands of years has not allowed mankind to rest, is itself crumbling. The logic of history shows that imperial weapons—nuclear, chemical and biological—have outlived their usefulness. They must disappear from our arsenals in this decade. Then mankind will be able to enter the 21st Century, the third millennium, without fear and without the threat of self-destruction.

The idea of a nuclear-free 21st Century proclaimed by Gorbachev in 1986, the year of Chernobyl, is being implemented with difficulty. The adherents of the categories of Roman law are a significant force. Therefore, we need to activate the popular and parliamentary movements at this stage. Without them, presidential activity will be extinguished by the arguments of fanatics in uniforms and professor's gowns.

[Correspondent] However, thanks to the politics of the new thinking, much has been achieved during these years in the sphere of disarmament. All short- and medium-range missiles have been destroyed. Evidently, soon an agreement will be signed regarding a significant reduction in the strategic weapons held by the USSR and USA.

[Suleymenov] Nevertheless, there is a certain fineness in this process which has not yet been assimilated by the mass consciousness. In disarming, we are at the same time re-arming ourselves. More advanced weapons are coming to replace those which are going to the scrap heap. Instead of atomic shotguns there are nuclear machine guns. I would call the process of disarmament full-fledged if at the same time as the nuclear weapons are being destroyed, work would also be stopped on their modernization and production, and primarily—testing.

[Correspondent] So, Olzhas Omarovich, you insist on stopping tests on a unilateral basis. Yet the USA still continues [its testing] and recently even France detonated a 110 kiloton bomb on Mururoa atoll.

[Suleymenov] Yes, they continue. It would be naive to believe that they would stop all at once, following the example of the USSR.

Fanatics maintain that the policy of unilateral steps proposed by Gorbachev does not justify itself. Let us see if this is so. The Gorbachev moratorium of 1985-1986 was a half-measure. It was announced for a year, and

then extended for another six months. They did not have enough patience, and in 1987 the USSR detonated 23 charges. The moratorium should have been announced as being termless, without an ending date. Then there would have been hope for success. The West still did not believe in the sincerity of Gorbachev's policy, and therefore it exhibited a natural caution. Nevertheless, the USA reacted to the moratorium by reducing the number of tests from 17 to 14 already in 1986. And, despite the fact that we resumed testing, they did not increase this number. In 1989, when the movement of the Kazakhstan residents halted 11 blasts out of the 18 which were planned, the USA lowered the level by another three tests. In 1990 the Semipalatinsk test site was quiet, and in Nevada there were only eight blasts.

The ninth blast was conducted by England, which, due to the lack of its own test site, conducts its tests in Nevada with NATO approval. This year, the Americans are planning only four blasts, because the USSR is not conducting tests. If we hold out, then the U.S. Congress will stop financing these operations.

The third generation nuclear arms program has been in operation in America since 1985. And for three years in a row, the nuclear laboratories (Livermore and Los Alamos) were allocated \$350 million annually for this activity. Our people's moratorium has also made its impact known here. In 1989 their funds were carefully trimmed to \$330 million, in 1990—to \$220 million, and this year—already to \$100 million. The staff of the nuclear laboratories has been reduced to one-third its former size.

We may state that the movement of the Kazakhstan peoples has largely facilitated Moscow's and Washington's sharp reduction in the speed of the senseless, ruinous nuclear race for a parity which can never be achieved. Following their lead, Paris recently raised its voice, deciding to sign the Agreement on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. And in this too there is our contribution.

The American arms dealers are not happy about the success of the anti-nuclear movement in the Soviet Union. I understood this at my meetings in the White House, Congress, and at the Livermore Nuclear Laboratory. We are depriving them of their beloved work. However, their interests cannot be held above the interests of mankind. Yet how much the world would gain if their brains and their powerful intellectual-technical potential began to work for the needs of man!

Today as never before, the American atomic fanatics need the Semipalatinsk test site to continue its work. Then they will again regain their lost argument and get the necessary financial support.

And our nuclear proponents have answered the appeal for help. They have urgently pushed through the USSR Supreme Soviet the ratification of the forgotten Agreement of 1974 regarding the threshold capacity, and are applying to it their proposed series of tests at the test site.

Yet this means a violation of the people's moratorium, a violation of the program of disarmament, an active inhibition of the process of realizing the ideal of a nuclear-free world.

The serious weight of responsibility for the upcoming decision falls onto the shoulders of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet and its President, and on the hearts of all Kazakhstanis. Having stopped the test site, Kazakhstan proclaimed itself in global politics, forcing the world to move at an accelerated rate along the path of real nuclear disarmament. Our response must be worthy of this responsibility to mankind.

[Correspondent] In two years, the "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" movement has done much, as we know. The test site, we hope, will be closed for good and will become a scientific facility under the management of the USSR and Kazakhstan Academies of Sciences. What else?

[Suleymenov] Nevada and other test sites will remain. As long as they operate—we will not rest. In Kazakhstan there are, unfortunately, several other geographical place names worthy of taking their place among the sad ranks of "Chernobyl, Semipalatinsk, Aral, and Kyshtym". If the first part of our program is the closure of test sites which pose a threat to human life and to mankind, then the second part is the rehabilitation of the health of the population in the regions which have suffered. We are fighting for ecological safety in Kazakhstan and everywhere, wherever the rights of man to clean air, land, water and purity of relations between peoples are being violated. We have created the "People's Health" fund for building facilities of social application.

In 40 years, the population of the oblasts surrounding the test site has not received any compensation from the state, if only in the form of hospitals. Aside from assurances that the atomic blasts do not bring any harm to human health. Last year, President Bush signed a law which Congress passed regarding the rights of persons who had suffered injury from nuclear tests and industries. According to this bill, miners at uranium mines, workers and employees at nuclear plants and nuclear power generating plants, and, of course, persons subjected to the effect of testing, have the right to receive compensation in the amount of up to \$100,000. Although even this sum is already considered low. The main thing is that the U.S. government has officially admitted that the state has inflicted harm upon the health of the nation by its atomic operations.

Our state has admitted its guilt for now only in regard to Chernobyl. Yet if the accident had happened not in 1986 but, say, in 1958, as in Chelyabinsk Kyshtym, or decades before glasnost, as near Semipalatinsk, we could be assured that the newspapers would not write about the catastrophe, and that television would keep silent about it. People would live in the irradiated regions, not knowing why they were getting sick and why their children were being born without arms.

We will strive toward the adoption of such a comprehensive law as the Americans have, and first of all it must be adopted by the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet. We must repent before our citizens, before the millions who left life before their time, before those who are fated to be born as invalids in future generations to the grief of their mothers and fathers, whose genes bear the atomic poison.

The "People's Health" fund collects monies from founder enterprises, foreign and Soviet funds. We are not embarrassed to engage in commercialism and all legal forms of business. Such a program cannot be implemented solely from the contributions of citizens. Aside from propaganda work, our friends in the oblast, Russian and foreign sections are establishing relations with business circles and organizing aid for Kazakhstan. I too, as a member of the president's Commission on Humanitarian Aid to the USSR, participate in this activity. For now the aid is expressed in shipments of medicines and food, at times significant but still merely a light rain in a hot desert. We need to build pharmaceutical plants, modern clinics and rehabilitation centers.

A most interesting project whose realization the fund is undertaking is called "Clean water". Two years ago this idea was part of my electoral program. At that time, I obtained an analysis of the drinking water from the Kzyl-Ordinsk water line. Aside from all else, its arsenic content was 1,000 times greater than the standard. Although, how can there be a standard for poison in drinking water!

People cannot wait for the Aral problem to be resolved on the whole. They are drinking poison. If only for the chance to purify the water of our cities and villages, it was worth fighting for the deputy mandate. Since that time, the Kzyl-Ordinsk analysis results stand before my eyes. They give me strength when I get tired of trying to prove the unprovable to the state dullards! The helpless eyes of the mothers feeding their ill-fated infants with poisoned breast milk give me strength.

For two years, Leningrad scientists have been working together with the engineers at Kazmekhnabor on small installations for the purification of drinking water. The draft plans have already been defended, and reliable prototypes have been promised by the end of the year. With the aid of the Alma-Ata gorispolkom, we are finding plant floor space for the series production of three types of devices—the under-faucet urban type, and the rural type for one cubic meter and 50 cubic meters per hour. And for each city, for each locale, for the specific composition of the water—a set of filters to purify the water of biological admixtures and chemicals. The devices will be distributed free of charge and sold. The under-faucet model costs around 300 rubles. The money earned from this will go to the fund for building health facilities. Using this opportunity, I call upon the collectives of Kazakhstan enterprises to join the founders of the "People's Health" fund and to support

its projects with constituent contributions. The account number is 606706 at the Kazakh Republic Bank of the USSR Promstroybank (Turanbank), MFO 600013.

Our movement, bringing together people of different nationalities, is making its contribution to international stability and peace of mind of the republic, which is working hard to develop a democratic model of inter-ethnic cooperation. There cannot be separate ecological problems for the Kazakhs, the Russians, the Germans, or others. We are going from meetings, demonstrations and strikes to other less emotional and more effective forms of activity—interaction with parliaments, governments, business circles, and international organizations, and to the propaganda of ecological knowledge.

By means of people's diplomacy, the Kazakhstanis have stopped the test site. Together with the parliamentary movement, we are striving to obtain an official decision, a presidential directive [ukaz], which is possible already this year. Some believe that we are not doing anything if there are not crowds in the streets with posters. As long as the people's moratorium on the Semipalatinsk test site is not violated, we will adhere to the moratorium on meetings. We must be ready for our opponents to resort to the most unexpected steps in order to provoke the people to extremist measures. They are already needling the self-proclaimed "fighters for the people's cause". We decisively separate ourselves from those who in the name of "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" try to perform actions which have not been coordinated with us. Out of confusion and a desire to become famous, or for some other reasons, these people are capable of inflicting harm upon the common cause, and not only that of the Kazakhstanis.

We are working in close cooperation with the powerful miners' movement and the entire workers' movement, with social and parliamentary organizations, and with the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan and the other republics, and of the Union. This force will today achieve through legal and civilized methods the results whose importance for mankind can hardly be overestimated. Everyone who supports our views and methods of operation is a participant in "Nevada-Semipalatinsk"! And when all the test sites on earth close down, the Kazakhstanis will truly have the right to be proud. We were the first.

At the request of the authors, the "Azia-Press" agency will forward the honorarium received for this publication from the means of mass information to the "People's Health" fund.

150-Kiloton Underground Nuclear Test in Nevada
LD1509060391 Moscow TASS in English 0549 GMT
15 Sep 91

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York, September 15 (TASS)—The United States staged a 150-kiloton underground nuclear explosion at the nuclear testing site in Nevada on Saturday,

the first since it had signed protocols with the Soviet Union in 1990 to supervise nuclear tests.

Although Soviet observers were not present during the test, U.S. Energy Department spokesman Darwin Morgan said, they had been following preparations for three months.

According to Morgan, 23 Soviet scientists had been at the testing site in Nevada from June until the end of August, where they were thoroughly informed about the U.S. nuclear test programme and test performance mechanisms.

U.S. Given Limited Access to New Seismic Station in Novosibirsk

LD1709103491 Moscow TASS in English 1009 GMT
17 Sep 91

[By TASS Correspondent Viktor Elmakov]

[Text] Novosibirsk, September 17 (TASS)—U.S. experts have been granted limited access to a new seismic station built near the Novosibirsk Academy of Sciences campus to monitor underground nuclear tests. They can stay there ten days before the test and two days after it. The Soviet Defence Ministry handed the station over to the Soviet Academy of Sciences which will conduct scientific and economic research there.

Similar stations have been built in accordance with a Soviet-U.S. agreement in the city of Obninsk (near Moscow) and in the Artiy settlement in the Urals, according to Colonel Kovalenko, head of the Building Standards State Commission. U.S. experts will check the stations in October, and Soviet specialists will visit similar sites in the USA. The stations will monitor the yields of the explosions which cannot exceed 150 kilotonnes according to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests. Seismic measurements are a means of monitoring the compliance with the treaty. Each side will use their own equipment which helps increase the level of trust, the colonel said.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Regional, Multilateral Talks

Welcomes South American CBW Pact

LD0909171491 Moscow TASS in English
1657 GMT 9 Sep 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Rostislav Gertsev and Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow, September 9 (TASS)—The Soviet Union welcomes the decision by Brazil, Argentina and Chile

not to produce, not to acquire and not to use chemical and biological weapons [CBW], Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaly Churkin told a briefing here today.

He was commenting on the signing by the foreign ministers of three Latin American countries of a joint declaration on the complete ban of chemical and biological weapons.

Of great importance, the Soviet spokesman stressed, is the will expressed by them to work towards the signing of an international convention banning chemical weapons [CW] and to be among the first to sign it. This is a timely statement in light of the fact that the work on the convention within the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Conference has already entered the home stretch.

The Soviet Union for its part, Churkin said, is doing everything in its power to achieve the signing of the convention the soonest possible.

The USSR expresses solidarity with the determination, expressed in the declaration, to help make successful the third conference, at which the convention banning biological weapons will be considered.

Backs Convention To Ban BW

LD0909174491 Moscow TASS in English
1736 GMT 9 Sep 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Rostislav Gertsev and Sergeiy Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow, September 9 (TASS)—The Soviet Union intends to come out with new proposals and take an active part in working out new measures at the third conference which has opened in Geneva today to consider a convention to ban the development, production and stock-piling of bacteriological, biological and toxic weapons [BW] and eliminate them, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today.

The third conference will face the task of confirming the convention's effect and strengthening its authority, an urgent need in light of the recent achievements in the fields of biology and biotechnology as well as in connection with the growing threat of proliferation of biological weapons, according to Churkin.

The conference is expected to take important decisions to ensure the effective compliance with provisions of the convention, such as the creation of a special verification mechanism, new measures to build confidence and expand openness of the member-countries and attract all countries to membership in the convention.

Commentator Notes Need for Worldwide CW Ban
PY1109150091 Moscow Radio Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 10 Sep 91

[By Leonid Levchenko]

[Text] Good evening dear listeners:

Through the signing of the Mendoza agreement banning the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons [CBW], the foreign ministers of three Latin American countries have expressed their commitment to ban these deadly weapons from the face of the Earth.

The USSR is working toward this objective at the Disarmament Conference being held in Geneva through the implementation of measures that will completely eradicate these types of weapons.

It is obvious that the USSR will support the efforts of [words indistinct] by the three Latin American countries, as well as those attending the Geneva talks. It is no secret that some obstacles must still be overcome before the signing of an international convention banning the use of chemical weapons.

According to data [words indistinct] about 20 countries now have the potential to manufacture chemical weapons [CW]. During the recent Persian Gulf war, there existed a real threat that Iraq would use chemical weapons. I could not even ponder the consequences if this had happened. It is obvious that it would have had terrible consequences.

The issue, therefore, is not only that all countries possessing chemical weapons or those having the potential to possess these deadly weapons should sign an international convention; but that they also should consider the implementation of measures to oversee the enforcement of this international convention anywhere in the world.

Another complex problem is the disposal of chemical weapons, that is, finding a technology that will safely dispose of chemical weapons without damaging the environment.

The United States has stated that, once an international convention banning chemical weapons is signed, it is willing to aid any country to help find an effective and safe technique to destroy toxic wastes.

This is also important for the USSR, which has a large reserve of chemical weapons. We must be honest and admit that the USSR is facing serious difficulties in finding a practical way to dispose of its chemical weapons. U.S. technical assistance, therefore, is essential to the USSR.

The USSR and the United States have made the wise decision to destroy their chemical weapons arsenal. Now these two countries must make every effort to sign an international convention to this effect.

By expressing their willingness to ban chemical and bacteriological weapons from their territories, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have confirmed their decision to be among the first countries to sign an international convention on this issue. It is hoped that other Latin American countries will soon follow in their steps.

Tighter Control Over Biological Weapons Sought
*LD1309194291 Moscow TASS in English 0759 GMT
13 Sep 91*

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Sedov]

[Text] Geneva, September 13 (TASS)—Sergey Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation at the third conference to review the international convention on the prohibition of the development and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their destruction, which is in session in the Geneva Palace of Nations, made a statement at the conference's regular plenary meeting on Thursday.

The statement says the USSR calls for developing new drastic confidence-building measures and creating more effective mechanisms to verify compliance with the basic provisions of the convention by the signatory states.

Batsanov said the USSR lays immense importance on honouring all international agreements in the disarmament field, including the basic provisions of such an important agreement as the international convention that outlawed this whole class of weapons of mass destruction—germ warfare agents.

Over the five-year period that has passed since the holding of the second review conference, the Soviet Union carried out vigorous work via diplomatic channels with over 50 states, prodding them to join the convention. Experts say the USSR's purposeful activity largely helped increase the number of states which ratified the convention to 118.

Batsanov also singled out several other directions to shore up the international agreement. He said one of the possible ways was to create reliable guarantees for the fulfillment by all signatory parties without exception of the international convention's provisions. The Soviet delegation fully supports proposals that have already been aired in several speeches that an effective verification mechanism should be created for this purpose.

To this end, Batsanov urged the participants in the conference to take the first step towards establishing a control body and forming a special team of experts to study this problem. In addition, Batsanov put to debate a proposal that a standing group be set up within the structure of the U.N. department on disarmament problems to process information about compliance with the accords already reached in the field of confidence-building measures and openness, which is supplied by the member-countries of the international convention.

**NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE
ZONES**

**Ukrainians Discuss Measures To Achieve
Nuclear-Free Status**

Envoy to UN Comments

*OW0609191791 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1532 GMT 6 Sep 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Ukrainian ambassador in the United Nations Gennadiy Udovenko said his republic counted on 25 percent of all Soviet property abroad.

He also said the Ukraine intends to rid itself of all nuclear weapons on its territory, but a commission of experts would have to decide whether these must be scrapped or transferred to the Soviet Union.

The ambassador also spoke of the Ukraine's plan to establish diplomatic relations with the United States, Canada, Israel, and its neighbours.

Deputy Favors Destroying Nuclear Weapons

*LD0809220591 Kiev Radio Kiev International
Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Text] In connection with a new political situation that has taken shape around the future union and the development of sovereign states, the issue of the future of nuclear weapons situated on the territory of various republics is being energetically discussed in the Western press. As is known, the Ukraine Supreme Soviet came out in favor of the republic's nonnuclear status a year ago. However, how will the future of the nuclear weapons situated on the republic's territory be settled specifically? Here is the view of Dmytro Pavlychko, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission for Foreign Affairs.

[Pavlychko] We will obviously be discussing two variants. The first one is to put all nuclear weapons at the collective defense body's disposal, i.e. a joint headquarters of armies of independent states that are rising from the present-day republics. In other words, this weaponry should be put under Russia's command. The second variant is to create an international commission that will come to the Ukraine and register all atomic stations, and the Ukraine, as a member of the United Nations and a nuclear state, will come out with a proposal to completely destroy the weaponry situated on its territory. I tend to think that it is exactly what we should do. We should outlaw this weaponry without taking it anywhere and destroy it where it is located at present. I think that this second option will win. I would not like to anticipate events, but I think that the Ministry of Defense, which is being created, will take this position. Ukraine does not need atomic weaponry, it will have [words indistinct]. Today the talk is about how to get rid of it.

Green Party Wants Nuclear Arms Scrapped

*OW0909211191 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1815 GMT 9 Sep 91*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Kiev chapter of the Ukrainian "Green Party" has urged the republic's parliament to immediately adopt a program to scrap the Ukrainian-based nuclear arsenals under the control of international experts.

The "Greens" are also demanding the dismantlement in the Ukraine of all the strategic military bases and super-powerful radar stations, an end to the KGB activity, and the return home of young Ukrainians doing their military service outside the republic.

Presidential Candidates Disagree

*LD1909155191 Kiev Radio Kiev Network in Ukrainian
2200 GMT 18 Sep 91*

[Text] The contenders for the post of president, Vyacheslav Chornovil and Levko Lukyanenko, expressed totally opposite views as to the fate of nuclear potential deployed in Ukraine. The latter believes that there is no need to hand nuclear weapons over to Russia since they are the property of Ukraine and are of high value. Nuclear warheads contain uranium, a nuclear fuel, which can be extracted and given to nuclear plants of Ukraine.

Vyacheslav Chornovil noted that nuclear potential should be eliminated on the basis of former accords, and with the participation of all other nuclear powers.

The view of Stanislav Hurenko, former first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee and a Ukraine people's deputy, boils down to the need to insure reliable control over the use of nuclear weapons. Apart from that, the weapons should stay in the places they have been kept in till now, he said.

Candidate on Nuclear-Free Zone

*AU1909125391 Vienna DIE PRESSE
in German 19 Sep 91 p 2*

["Milo" report: "Ukraine To Become Nuclear-Free Zone"]

[Text] Vienna—On 18 September Vladimir Yavoriskiy, chairman of the investigation committee for the Chernobyl catastrophe and candidate for the presidential elections on 1 December, announced Ukraine's speedy abandonment of nuclear power—in the civilian, as well as in the military sphere: "The first of three Chernobyl reactors that are still in operation will be switched off at the end of the year," Yavoriskiy said. Subsequently, the other nuclear power plants will be closed down, one after the other. Even if the whole Chernobyl power plant is switched off, the power supply will not be affected: "This energy has been exported."

The Ukrainian politician, who was answering questions of the Austrian press at an event organized by the "Anti Atom International" (AAI), also said that all strategic nuclear weapons that are stored on Ukrainian territory would be destroyed: "The weapons and launching bases are administered by us. The Red Army is guarding the facilities, but its Ukrainian commander, General Anatoliy Marosov, represents the independent line of the Kiev parliament as our defense minister."

The scrapping of nuclear weapons is to be started soon. Non-Ukrainian soldiers will be called upon to return to their republics; an exclusively Ukrainian army is to be created, he said.

Finally Yavoriskiy criticized the "corrupt" IAEA for its report on Chernobyl, in which it mainly relied on information from the Moscow central authorities. IAEA Secretary General Blix should apologize for this to the Ukrainian people, he said.

DPRK Rejection of Nuclear Inspection Criticized

*SK1609035591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean
0900 GMT 14 Sep 91*

[Text] Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama issued a statement at a news conference in Tokyo, denouncing the DPRK for its refusal to sign the agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the inspection of its nuclear facilities. Foreign Minister Nakayama said that as long as Pyongyang maintains this position, Japan will not officially recognize the DPRK.

To remind the listeners, in 1989 the DPRK signed the international Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty stipulates that any non-nuclear state signing it, if it has facilities involved in the use of nuclear energy, must open them to the international inspectors, and such a state must not attach any condition to the implementation of this inspection.

Regrettably, Pyongyang's attitude is different from this. The DPRK stated last year that it could agree to the inspection of its nuclear facilities only when the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea. By this, the DPRK has in mind some 1,000 units of nuclear ammunition believed to be in the possession of the 43,000 U.S. forces in South Korea.

Last spring, expectations surfaced that the DPRK might give up its stand of closely linking the nuclear inspection issue with the U.S. nuclear arms in South Korea. A statement that came from Pyongyang could be interpreted by the international community to mean that North Korea might reconsider its position. However, doubts about this soon arose. A couple of days ago, a DPRK spokesman flatly stated that inspection of the Democratic Republic's nuclear facilities would be possible provided the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons from the southern half of Korea.

It is not difficult to understand Pyongyang's view of U.S. nuclear arms in South Korea. According to a long tradition, Washington neither acknowledges nor denies the existence of nuclear arms in South Korea. Is it proper then for Pyongyang to raise this issue as a condition to fulfilling its duty as stipulated in the treaty? This attitude taken by the DPRK does not help promote its international dignity. Tokyo's reaction substantiates this.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Sakhalin Troop Commander Cited on Withdrawal
OW1609103991 Radio Moscow in Japanese
1100 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Text] President Gorbachev mentioned reduction of Soviet troops on the Kurile Islands during his visit to Japan last April. Meanwhile, as pointed out by Colonel General Novozhilov, commander of the Far Eastern Military District, it is expected that at most, 30 percent of the troops deployed in this area will be reduced. Well then, how about the process of reduction now? In reply to my question, Lieutenant General (Lisotskiy), Sakhalin troop commander, stated the following:

Various problems are being settled now, and reduction will start soon. Several units of the artillery division stationed in the Kurile Islands will be abolished. In

addition, a large number of weapons have been removed from ordinary alert positions and put in storage. Regarding the possible reduction of Soviet troops deployed on Sakhalin Island, I would like to point out that a total of three incomplete divisions are deployed in Sakhalin, and five complete divisions are stationed in Hokkaido.

In settling the militarization issue, it is necessary to take a balanced and professional approach. Moreover, we hope that an equal and reciprocal approach will be taken toward us. In fact, the Soviet side has already taken quite a few measures: 200,000 troops have been reduced in the Far East, and the troop structure has been shifted into one exclusively devoted to the principle of defense.

Then, I asked another question on the theme for the recent exercises conducted by troops stationed in Sakhalin as far as he knew. To this question, Lieutenant General (Lisotskiy) answered as follows:

We do not have another theme here. The troops' objective is to stop landings on the island. They are not expected to carry out other objectives, nor are they required to do other tasks. When viewed from military or other standpoints, it is a pure fabrication that Soviet troops in Sakhalin are imposing a threat, for instance to the Japanese.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

NATO Secretary-General Lauds Yeltsin SNF Proposal

LD1209081991 Hamburg DPA in German 0658 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner has reacted positively to the proposal by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin that short-range nuclear weapons and nuclear artillery (SNF) should be swiftly scrapped without long negotiations. For him there is no doubt "that nuclear artillery and land-based Soviet and U.S. short-range missiles will disappear from Europe," Woerner said in an interview on Deutschlandfunk today.

At present there are discussions about whether this should happen unilaterally, whether a certain agreement should be reached, or whether there should be negotiations on it. Woerner expressed confidence that under reform-oriented forces such as Yeltsin disarmament agreements could be made more quickly than hitherto. Woerner said of President Mitterrand's proposal on Wednesday of a UN intervention force in the Yugoslav crisis that NATO could certainly support the involvement of the United Nations.

FRANCE

Defense Minister: France Will Not Impede SNF Cuts

PM1309083191 Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Sep 91 p 4

[Unattributed report under the "Diplomacy" rubric: "Joxe Reassures Germans on Deployment of Hades Nuclear Missiles in France"]

[Excerpts] While addressing his German counterpart Gerhard Stoltenberg in Paris on Monday 9 September French Defense Minister Pierre Joxe talked about the prospect of reducing tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (LE MONDE, 10 September) and stated that "France will not have its foot on the brakes if there is a large-scale global move toward disarmament."

Mr. Joxe added: "The kind of military threat that we have known for several decades is in the process of disappearing as the ideology which was its driving force has collapsed and been discredited. Europe has an historic opportunity to make progress along the road toward disarmament (...). A drastic reduction in nuclear arsenals—beginning with short-range nuclear weapons (SNF)—may be one of the objectives in this new era of disarmament" in the world.

U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney already let it be understood last week that the Atlantic alliance could contemplate reducing its short-range nuclear weapons in Europe during next October's meeting of the Nuclear

Planning Group in Brussels, and again at the NATO summit scheduled for November in Rome. By asserting that "France will not have its foot on the brakes" in this sphere, the French defense minister undoubtedly sought to allay fears which emerged recently in Germany following the announcement (LE MONDE, 26 July) about creating a Hades Nuclear Missile Unit based in two regiments stationed in the Marne and the Aube regions. [passage omitted]

Mr. Stoltenberg noted: "First the two superpowers must reach agreement on ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles." If an agreement were reached "I could envisage talks with our French friends on developing Europe's nuclear strategy," the German minister added, and he concluded that in such a context "France could review its positions."

GERMANY

Assurances Sought on Security of Soviet Nuclear Arms

LD1909163591 Paris Antenne-2 Television Network in French 1800 GMT 17 Sep 91

[Report by correspondent Laurent Boussie]

[Excerpts] Western powers' anxiety about the future of the USSR's formidable nuclear arsenal does not disappear behind the official toasts and dinners, the declarations of eternal friendship, and the assurances that the East and the West will no longer be enemies. Pierre Joxe, the first Western defense minister to come and seek assurances on this matter, studied the difficulties faced by the Soviet authorities. If, on the subject of strategic nuclear weapons—90 percent of which are stationed on Russian territory—the problem seems settled and the control by Union representatives effective, doubt and anxiety are increasing as far as the 15,000 tactical short-term missiles dotted all around the territory of the former USSR. The Western powers' greatest fear, along with certain Russians, is to see the republics achieving independence without being denuclearized. [passage omitted] Strategic, tactical, risk of proliferation: the Soviets only replied partially to the guarantees demanded by Pierre Joxe on the future control and security of their nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Foreign Minister Urges Elimination of Short-Range Nuclear Arms

Demands 'Swift' Worldwide Ban

LD0509153191 Berlin ADN in German 1447 GMT 5 Sep 91

[Excerpt] Dresden (ADN)—Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Free Democratic Party) has

demanding a Western initiative for swift worldwide elimination of nuclear short-range missiles and nuclear artillery [SNF]. In an article for the *SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG* (Friday edition) Genscher advocates a review of security structures in Europe in view of the changes in the Soviet Union. "In the sphere of conventional weapons too, new disarmament steps could contribute to a reduction in the dangers." [passage omitted]

Questions SNF Military Utility

*LD1309144391 Berlin ADN in German 1053 GMT
13 Sep 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher once again demonstrated his support for the swift and international destruction of short-range nuclear weapons and nuclear artillery. Their military purpose has always been controversial, Genscher told *NORDSEE ZEITUNG* (Saturday edition). The forthcoming Soviet military reform gives conventional and nuclear disarmament a new, unique opportunity.

The Free Democratic Party politician stresses that Germany is particularly interested since Western short-range nuclear weapons and nuclear artillery are stationed on its territory. In the Western alliance, "our demand for abolishing nuclear short-range weapons is winning ground," Genscher said. The foreign minister described a second conventional agreement that would urgently reduce personnel. Germany offered an example with cuts in the Bundeswehr to 370,000 men. Others must now follow suit.

Canada To Withdraw Troops in 'Next Few Years'

*LD1709174991 Berlin ADN in German
1718 GMT 17 Sep 91*

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—The Canadian Government has informed the Federal Government that Ottawa is to withdraw its armed forces from Germany in the next few years. This was stated by a Defense Ministry spokesman in Bonn today when questioned. The fact that Canada planned a revision of its troop strength was long known, said the spokesman in response to a relevant announcement by the Canadian defense minister in Ottawa today.

Genscher Urges Troop Reduction by Spring 1992

*LD1809150291 Hamburg DPA in German
1302 GMT 18 Sep 91*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Within the disarmament framework, troop numbers should be limited and reduced as far as possible before spring 1992, in the words of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Speaking in the Bundestag today during the first reading of the treaty on conventional forces in Europe, Genscher said that a conclusion ought to be reached on the reduction of conventional war machinery like tanks, artillery, and planes by the follow-up meeting of the CSCE states in Helsinki in March.

The treaty on conventional forces in Europe, which was negotiated by the then 35 CSCE states, must be ratified. Genscher asserted, with reference to his talks in Moscow last week, that the Soviet Union and the republics attached to it will adhere to this. However, there is still the task of working out special regulations for the three Baltic states, in which the Soviet units which will remain there for the time being will be included.

Once again Genscher appealed for the complete abolition of all short-range nuclear weapons worldwide. He said he has noticed an open-minded position on the part of both the U.S. Government and the Soviet Government on this issue.

At the same time the Foreign Ministry announced that the group of 38 CSCE delegation leaders have begun discussions in Vienna today on the continuation of disarmament in 1992. The diplomats in Vienna are to create the prerequisites for new disarmament initiatives to be taken up by the follow-up conference in Helsinki in March, when all member states will monitor the steps taken hitherto and plan their next moves.

UNITED KINGDOM

Plans for Future of UK Navy Discussed

Concern Over Cuts

*91WC0132A London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 28 Jun 91 p 9*

[Article by Peter Almond] txt

[Text] The Defence Ministry was criticised by the Commons Defence Committee yesterday for pushing ahead with its year-old Options for Change plans to halve the Navy's submarine fleet, without any effort at reconsideration in view of growing instability in the Soviet Union.

Despite cutbacks in the Army, the Soviet Union continues to modernise its submarine fleet at the same rate as before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

After studying the issue for several months the committee expressed particular concern about the drastic cut in Royal Navy diesel-electric submarines, saying the Navy urgently needs to reconsider its plans to retain only four; six should be the absolute minimum number.

The cuts mean inevitably that some diesel-electric tasks will have to be abandoned, performed less effectively or added to the patrolling strain of the nuclear-powered boats.

"It is essential that Options for Change proposals are regarded as the first, not the last, word on future force levels," said the committee's report. The MoD plans to reduce the submarine force from 27 to 16 boats.

The committee also said the MoD has confirmed that the hunter-killer submarine *Churchill*, in addition to the

Warspite, has serious problems with its nuclear power plant. Both are laid up awaiting repair.

Despite a report yesterday that two of the Navy's four Polaris ballistic missile submarines are so badly damaged that they are unlikely to go on operational patrol again, the committee's report offered no new information beyond the fact that the Renown has been in refit "for considerably longer than anticipated (an estimated four years).

"Despite requests for information about the present situation with regard to SSBNs (ballistic missile subs) MoD have not been forthcoming to us in private or in public. In view of the concerns that have been expressed in public, we believe that it would be in the general interest, including that of MoD, to be more candid," said the committee.

MoD officials this week confirmed that they are cancelling plans to build a new generation of SSN-20 nuclear hunter-killer submarines, and will instead upgrade the six existing Trafalgar class boats with new sensors, weapons, computer software, and towed array sonars.

The news had not been officially given to the committee, but the dithering over a decision "leaves the UK industrial base for the design and manufacture of submarines perilously close to the edge," said the committee. "It is increasingly difficult for a number of companies to keep their teams of designers and engineers in place when there is not enough real work for them to do."

Jonathan Petre, Political Staff, writes: A call to speed up decision making in the Defence Ministry was made by an all-party Commons committee yesterday in a report welcoming the Ministry's introduction of modern management techniques to ensure better use of the 22 billion defence budget.

The radical changes, under which responsibility for controlling budgets will be devolved from the Ministry's headquarters to managers further down the line, will result in job losses.

Debate in Commons

91WC0132B London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 28 Jun 91 p 13

[Article by Anthony Looch]

[Text] The Drift of Labour policy meant that one day a dictator like Saddam Hussein would have a nuclear bomb but Britain would not, Mr. Kenneth Carlisle, junior Minister for Defence Procurement, said in the Commons yesterday.

Speaking in a debate on the Royal Navy, he said the Conservative commitment to a nuclear deterrent was in marked contrast to Labour's "dodging and weaving."

"In 1983 and 1987 we all knew where Labour stood on nuclear weapons. They fought and lost on unilateralism. Now, with their new designer idealism, they are fudging the words in order to keep the basic policy intact, while trying to drop the unilateralist label."

Referring to a recent report by the Commons Defence Select Committee, on the effects of Options for Change proposals on the Royal Navy, he said he would not respond in detail, but the Government would do so in due course.

Options for Change involved a major restructuring of Britain's armed forces in response to the political changes in Eastern Europe. "The focus of our defence will continue to be Nato and its proven collective security."

"The Navy will continue to play its full part in Nato's maritime activities, in the provision of nuclear forces, the defence of the European mainland and the defence of the eastern Atlantic and the Channel," he said.

Working through the implications for the Navy of the new force structure had been complex, but he could make some announcements. A four-boat Trident submarine force would be provided as the cornerstone of Britain's defences and its nuclear deterrent. As with Polaris, this would allow at least one boat to be at sea at all times.

"Under Options, the Fleet will still make the largest European contribution to maritime operations in the eastern Atlantic. In particular, we will retain a major capability for anti-submarine warfare and provide modern equipment to keep these capabilities up to date."

"We will retain the three carriers, of which two will be operational at any one time. We will also have a substantial flotilla of minor war vessels and will continue to modernise our mine warfare forces."

"Inverness, the second of the new Sandown class of single role minehunters, entered service last year and three more of these ships are on order."

"We have, however, decided not to place any more orders for the time being. The tenders we received last year for up to seven ships will therefore lapse. Further ships will be ordered in due course, but the size and timing of orders has yet to be decided."

"Options has confirmed the importance of our amphibious force and we intend to maintain this capability. We intend to improve our specialist shipping over the years."

"In addition to Tridents, the submarine fleet will consist of about 16, of which three-quarters will be nuclear-powered. This reduction from 27, of which 17 were

nuclear-powered, will be achieved by paying off older boats while bringing new ones into service."

"We shall shortly begin studies into the design of a new SSN submarine to replace the Swiftsure class."

Mr. Martin O'Neill, chief Opposition Defence spokesman, welcomed a decision to invite tenders for

frigates but urged Ministers to complete the process as quickly as possible, because delays drove yards "to the point of desperation."

He pressed the Government to arrive at an early conclusion on the future of Britain's home naval bases and reaffirmed Labour's commitment to three Tridents.